# HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science

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The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science

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Volume 4 of *HiPo* continues the tradition of highlighting the exceptional undergraduate scholarship in the fields of History, Political Science, Classical Studies, and Art History here at Langara. Organized and composed by students themselves, this edition covers a broad range of topics across both time and the world. We are excited to present several very insightful pieces on colonial and post-colonial history and theory from around the globe, as well as various socio-political and historical analyses. Combined with in-depth artistic and cultural investigations from the ancient world to the 20th century, volume 4 presents a fascinating cross section of our fellow student's achievements. We are also proud to introduce the inaugural edition of our new Book Review section and hope it will provide another avenue for our peers to collaborate and share their scholarly interests with each other, and our general readership, in the future.

We would like to thank the staff and faculty of the History, Political Science, Art History, and Classical Studies departments for their help in promoting and spreading the word about the journal to their students. In particular, we would like to thank our Faculty Advisor Sean Maschmann, Dr. Jennifer Knapp, Dr. Erin Robb, and Dr. Jessica Hemming for their direct tutelage, advice, and guidance in compiling Volume 4; we could not have done it without you. Finally, we would like to offer a particularly enthusiastic thank you to all those who took the time to submit papers, as well as our exemplary team of editors. It was our pleasure to work with all of you on this edition. In a year dominated by the difficulties of the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the challenges of remote work and study, your commitment and efforts are all the more worthy of acknowledgement and celebration. Thank you all so very much.

We hope you enjoy this exceptional issue.


DECLAN BURKE & MICHELLE WONG
Editors-in-Chief

# A LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

This is the second year that I have had the privilege of writing an introductory letter for *HiPo*, and what a year it has been! However, despite the move to on-line, remote production, the *HiPo* marches on, undeterred and resolute in bringing the knowledge and wisdom that it bears to its readers. On behalf of the department I would like to express our thanks to the college administration for their continued financial and logistical support for the journal. Yet this issue could not have been produced without the dedicated and diligent efforts, in the face of considerable adversity, of the contributors, student editors, and faculty advisors who have gone above and beyond to ensure that the journal has continued to flourish. Please accept our most sincere congratulations and deepest gratitude for another excellent issue of *HiPo*.


NIALL CHRISTIE, PHD
Department Chair
History, Latin, and Political Science

# ARTICLES

# THE SHADOW OF JAPANESE POSTWAR NATIONALISM AND ZAINICHI DISENFRANCHISEMENT

MARZIA AMBROSINI

*This paper analyses the various modes in which Zainichi, ethnic Koreans who have lived in Japan for generations, are disenfranchised in Japanese society. The use of distorted cultural narratives about a "pure Japanese society", historical revisionism, and erasure of the Zainichi population all contribute to their current situation. Through denial of birthright citizenship and the difficulties in obtaining naturalization, the Zainichi are denied human rights and protections that all ethnic Japanese people are entitled to. Furthermore, populist politicians promote the erasure of Zainichi from popular consciousness because of their aims to amend the post-war constitution. In spite of growing effort to move towards multiculturalism, Zainichi remain outliers to these efforts because of their focus on newcomers to Japan rather than acceptance of diversity that already exists.*

With the planning of the 2020 Tokyo Olympics, the Olympic Committee stated its commitment to "Diversity and Inclusion" (as stated on the Tokyo 2020 website and in various marketing material). However, these goals can be seen as ironic and perhaps even insulting in the face of how Japan treats ethnically diverse people who live within Japan's borders. Japanese people perceive themselves to be ethnically homogenous. While a majority of Japanese report to support diversity, the myth of Japanese ethnic homogeneity has been allowed to continue to benefit Japan's right-wing Liberal Democratic Party; by erasing and ignoring the existence of ethnic minorities in Japan they can further their goals of more aggressive international policies. Japanese citizens are largely unaware of the positions and concerns of "foreign" residents in Japan. Japan's Zainichi population, in particular, remain the largest target of xenophobic attacks and are unable to garner support to push for policy change to improve their situation. This disenfranchisement is perpetuated in several ways: first by making citizenship necessary to obtain human rights; second, by creating high barriers to naturalization; and finally, by erasing public awareness

of their position, and creating an education system that does not correct racist perceptions.

The Zainichi are ethnic Koreans who initially came to Japan when Korea was a colony of Imperial Japan between 1895 and 1945. All Koreans were considered Japanese subjects that had Japanese citizenship. However, at the end of the war, when Japan lost its colonies, these ethnic Koreans, many of whom were born in Japan and had never been to Korea, became effectively stateless as their citizenship was taken away. Those who did not leave Japan became classified as "Special Permanent Residents," a category of foreigners that are in effect stateless. Foreign residents and Special Permanent Residents pay taxes and contribute to their community, the same as Japanese nationals. It is unclear how many Zainichi exist in Japan because census data does not include Zainichi in their questions, and they are grouped with all other foreign residents. Many average Japanese citizens are unaware that many Korean residents still do not have access to pension funds and some social benefits and that they have limited access in areas of employment, housing, and education, despite their long residence and history in Japan.[1]

One of the biggest problems for the Special Permanent Resident Zainichi is that human rights are tied to citizenship. Foreigners and foreign residents' human and social rights are seen as not being Japan's responsibility to uphold and protect because they are just "visitors." This lack of human rights for foreigners is reinforced at the through all levels of public office. For example, at the higher levels of public policy, the Prime Ministerial cabinet survey portrays human rights for foreigners as optional. On the prefectural level we see this perception reinforced with a comment made in 2011 by a prosecutor from Saga stating that prosecutors are taught that "foreigners have no human rights under police detention and interrogation".[2] Even with Special Permanent Resident status Zainichi are treated in the same way as visitors, such as being regularly fingerprinted (like all foreign visitors to Japan), having to carry government identification at all times and being subject to police questioning at all times without probable cause.[3] Despite having never lived outside of Japan for possibly generations, Zainichi have no right to vote, contribute to political campaigns, hold civil service administration jobs, or run for public office.[4] The Japanese Supreme court has affirmed their statement that "human rights in Japan are not linked to being human; they are linked to holding Japanese citizenship."[5] On multiple occasions, and most recently in a 2008 decision by the Supreme Court, it was determined that "a lack of Japanese nationality is the

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[1] Yoko Demelius, "Multiculturalism in a 'Homogeneous' Society from the Perspectives of an Intercultural Event in Japan." *Asian Anthropology* 19, no. 3 (September 2020): 170.
[2] Debito Arudou, "'Embedded Racism' in Japanese Law: Towards a Japanese Critical Race Theory." *Pacific Asia Inquiry* 4, no. 1 (Fall 2013): 161.
[3] Ibid, 158.
[4] Ibid, 158.
[5] Ibid, 161.

cause of discrimination, and that obtaining Japanese nationality is essential for basic human rights to be guaranteed in Japan."[6]

The pursuit of Japanese citizenship, which would ensure Zainichi equal rights, is also a fraught issue. Some Zainichi do not pursue naturalization because of the concern that it would erase their multi-ethnic identity. Naturalization also has a historical association with the colonial legacy of assimilation.[7] However, for those who pursue naturalization, the process is unduly difficult and influenced by racial bias regardless of how long or how well integrated someone has been in Japanese society. The vast majority of Zainichi have not obtained legal citizenship. [8] Unlike Canada, Japanese citizenship is not conferred by being born in Japan, rather through Japanese blood. Article 2 of Japan's Nationality Law requires at least one parent to be a Japanese national in order to qualify for citizenship regardless of the place of birth. This lack of birthright citizenship means that for Zainichi who have failed or chosen not to have Japanese citizenship, their child will not have citizenship at birth no matter how many generations of their family have lived in Japan. Naturalization is possible, but it is a difficult process. The Ministry of Justice claims that most candidates who apply for citizenship receive it, but this claim becomes dubious because of how many are rejected at the preliminary screening.[9] Before potential candidates for naturalization can even process their application, they have an interview at the Ministry of Justice. Candidates are questioned about their commitments to Japan and then are told immediately whether they may collect the necessary documents. The questions can be intrusive and personal, including family and income. This subjective questioning also opens up applicants to harassment from officials. In some of the examples that Debito Arudou encountered in his interviews of past applicants to the naturalization process, two Filipina applicants were asked about their sexual history, and a second-generation Zainichi was rejected because he had parking tickets.[10] If the applicant does make it through the questioning, then they have many official documents to retrieve at cost. Next, there are other requirements such as and having achieved adulthood (20 years old) with no criminal record, ability to support oneself without government assistance and a vague requirement of "upright conduct" and to "uphold and not advocate the overthrow of the Japanese Constitution or Government."[11] These last two stipulations are especially strong barriers for applicants because their vague wording makes their interpretation up to the individual person reviewing the application. Any protest or collective action to try and improve the status of fellow

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[6] Arudou, 161.
[7] Yuka Kitayama, "The Rise of the Far Right in Japan, and Challenges Posed for Education." *London Review of Education* 16, no. 2 (July 2018): 252.
[8] Demelius, 168.
[9] Arudou, 159.
[10] Ibid, 159.
[11] Ibid, 158.

Zainichi could be interpreted as violating of these last two conditions. Furthermore, there is no right of review or appeal, only reapplication.

These issues that Zainichi face go largely unknown by the wider public because of the structural erasure. Japanese people still have difficulties conceptualizing the possibility of multi-ethnic individuals. We can see this in the rejection of dual citizenship and ideas that even those who are half-Japanese are assumed not to be Japanese enough to be included in conceptions of who Japanese people are, as shown in the backlash to half African-American half Japanese, Ariana Miyamoto being crowned Miss Universe Japan in 2015. Japan claimed to the UN in 1999 that ethnically diverse people are not Japanese.[12] Through this statement, they were trying to justify the unequal treatment of ethnic minorities while reinforcing the idea that Japanese people can only truly be Japanese by having purely Japanese blood. Furthermore, Japan's census only measures citizenship, not ethnicity or national origin. Data from the Ministry of Justice says that the foreign residents only account for less than 3% of the population, but this number does not count those who have obtained citizenship in the "non-Japanese" category, or the Ainu and Okinawans.[13] The erasure of other cultural groups' existence in Japan makes it impossible to advocate for their rights because they must first prove to the larger society that they exist before you can even begin to argue for their protection. This is encompassed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs comment in 2001 that "since there are no other races in Japan to have 'relations' with, *ergo* there can be no racism in Japan."[14] This myth of homogeneity makes the larger ethnically Japanese society unaware of the discrimination that exists in their country. Any sort of education that could help reduce the discrimination Zainichi face, such as historical knowledge, is often censored in Japanese mainstream media, social platforms, and education.[15]

The suppression of rights for Zainichi people is critical for Liberal Democratic Party and right-wing nationalist grassroots organization goals. The main goal for the LDP for years was, and still is, constitutional reform with the aim to replace Japan's pacifist constitution that was created in the post-war years during the occupation by the United States. Right-wing supporters want a new constitution that promotes national pride, and includes the use of force as a sovereign right. Those who oppose constitutional revision fear it would increase Japanese involvement in international military conflict. It is no secret that populist politicians like Shinzo Abe, Junichiro Koizumi, and former governor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, harbour aggressive attitudes to China and Korea. They have all made

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[12] Arudou, 161.
[13] Demelius, 165.
[14] Arudou, 162.
[15] Demelius, 170.

remarks that justify pre-war colonization and invasion.[16] Koizumi and Abe have also repeatedly visited Yasukuni Shrine, where Japanese war criminals are enshrined, and Abe furthered poked at China regarding the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. By revising the constitution, it would be constitutionally permissible to attack their neighbours. The constitution also serves as a reminder to Japanese conservatives of an inconvenient and unpleasant past of colonialism and defeat they would rather forget, much like the Zainichi themselves. In conservative magazines, articles related to Koreans in Japan focused on four topics: 1) voting rights for foreigners and the right-wing establishment fear that it would pave the way for Koreans to be enemies from within, 2) Korean intellectuals would oppose right-wing revisionism, 3) attacks against the pro-North Korean community organization, the Chosen Soren (General Association of Koreans in Japan.)[17] These concerns serve as a motivator to target the Zainichi as representatives of their enemies hiding in their midst.

The main tool that the Right employs to ensure the erasure of Zainichi issues is revisionist history in schools. Since 1997 the main talking-point for conservatives has been the subject of history. Its importance was bolstered in magazines that were published by the same companies that make revisionist history textbooks, such as the Sankei Shimbun Co.[18] Current Japanese textbooks stress the positive aspect of colonialism and either downplay or do not mention wartime atrocities[19]. In Japanese schools, teachers are required to instruct apolitically, i.e., "to refrain from political education or other political activities for or against any specific party."[20] That means teachers have to teach with the very politically influenced textbooks without being able to counter the extremism it can instill.

The prevailing idea of how to help the situation of ethnic minorities in Japan is to increase multicultural initiatives. However, these multiculturalism initiatives are ineffective in their aim of making Japanese society recognize the different cultures that live in Japan, and at worse, they serve to erase the problems of the Zainichi further. In 2006 Japan introduced a national program to establish services for new foreign residents by coordinating with local governments.[21] Foreign residents who are not "newcomers" found no use for these initiatives as they focused on immediate concerns of new foreign residents in Japan, such as language services, help finding housing, education, medical services, labour protection, and

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[16] Naoto Higuchi, "The 'Pro-Establishment' Radical Right: Japan's Nativist Movement Reconsidered." In *Civil Society and the State in Democratic East Asia: Between Entanglement and Contention in Post High Growth*, 122.
[17] Higuchi, 131.
[18] Ibid, 123-4.
[19] Kitayama, 254.
[20] Ibid, 257.
[21] Demelius, 165.

evacuation procedures during natural disasters.[22] Zainichi have no need for language support and already know how to live in their local communities along with the Japanese codes of conduct, so either Zainichi's needs are not being considered at all, or, by positioning Zainichi along with new foreign residents in diversity initiatives it erases their history and particular situation and needs. This makes it clear to Zainichi that they are not included in Japan's "multiculturalism." The 2006 initiative was introduced under the perspective of increasing globalization and internationalization, leading to *new* diverse people coming to live in Japan, *not* the appreciation and tolerance of diverse cultures that already exists in Japan. This motive for multiculturalism is also reflected in textbooks, as Kitayama states, "Non-Japanese citizens in contemporary society are often portrayed by school textbooks solely as unproblematic 'visitors' who represent Japan's 'internationalization.'"[23] Multiculturalism in this way is not an integration of different cultures into Japanese society, instead it emphasizes boundaries between Japanese and non-Japanese. The 2006 plan is also too vague to be effective because it has an "absence of a clear goal, direction, and policy guidelines without specifying what living on equal terms with Japanese should mean and accomplish."[24] Demelius' participation in the organization of the yearly Akahashi city intercultural event shows that these local events trying to foster multiculturalism can turn to the commoditization of these cultures for Japanese people to consume rather than accept and integrate into a multicultural society. Moreover, any politicization of minority issues at the aforementioned event was discouraged by the city administration, saying that they should make the event apolitical out of concern for offending anyone.[25] So any historical information about minority people in Japan had to be left out.

Zainichi still do not have the same human rights as ethnic Japanese, and are excluded from pension funds, medical care, and suffrage.[26] However, simply undergoing naturalization to gain those rights is difficult and opens them up to harassment and discrimination because of the subjective screening process. The Japanese who are able to participate in the political community by occupying administrative roles in municipal office and education are kept largely unaware of the situation of the Zainichi with the misconception that Japan is a homogenous country, and textbooks reinforce this way of thinking along with fostering aggression to their East Asian neighbours. Public policy goals and revisions of laws remain toothless and shallow such as the Hate Speech Elimination Law of 2016 that neither prohibits nor punishes hate speech. Multicultural initiatives, by focusing on the 'newcomers,' allow the government to have the perception of trying

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[22] Ibid, 167.
[23] Kitayama, 253.
[24] Demelius, 167.
[25] Ibid, 172.
[26] Ibid, 167.

to improve tolerance and coexistence without having to reckon with or provide reparations for their past abuses.

It remains unclear if, going forward, Japan will change its stance on Zainichi. With the resignation of LDP leader Shinzo Abe and the Japanese government's handling of the Covid-19 pandemic, there are some questions about how these factors will affect the support of the LDP. Covid-19 has shown a resurgence of xenophobia; storefronts broadly putting up signs that say "Japanese only"; Japanese television programs fueling the hatred to China and Korea by skewing testing results to show them as having a much higher rate of infection than Japan; pundits and variety show hosts reigniting the idea of Japanese exceptionalism by saying how to clean Japanese are. However, during this time, we have also seen Black Lives Matter protests in Japan. While some argue that this is yet another way for Japanese people to distance themselves from racism by placing it as a "foreign" issue, the protests in Shibuya were largely centred around an incident involving the police's physical violence against a Kurdish man on May 22nd of this year. Whether or not this fervour will extend to protesting the unfair treatment of ethnic Chinese and Koreans remains unknown, but with the internet, it could be more and more probable that Zainichi and others can tell their story and make Japanese people more aware of the challenges they face when Japanese mainstream media refuses to do so.

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# RACIAL EQUALITY AT THE 1919 PARIS PEACE CONFERENCE: HUMANITARIAN RHETORIC AND JAPANESE IMPERIAL EXPANSION

RORY FLYNN

*When the League of Nations, the precursor to the United Nations, was founded at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 in the wake of the First World War, a charter was established to govern the relationships between member states. During the drafting process of the charter, the Japanese delegation at the conference proposed a racial equality clause to be added. Japan was the only state at the time to do so. However, the clause itself was not motivated by true racial equality of nations and was instead designed to safeguard the Empire of Japan's strategic interests from Western encroachment. This paper will examine the context in which the Japanese delegation put forth the racial equality clause, as well as the reasons why it was necessary for the Japanese to do so in an early-twentieth century context.*

In January 1919 leaders from all over the world met in Paris to settle on what the terms of peace would be after the First World War. For six months, delegations from the world over would debate over the fates of nations, the expansion of empires, and what face international order would take in the years to come. The intention of the agreements made at the conference, on the surface, was to usher in a new era of international peace and cooperation, all to prevent the possibility of another crisis that could lead to another war as horrific as the First World War. Wrapped up in the discourse were humanitarian sentiments, greatly influenced by the United States' president Woodrow Wilson. Wilson articulated Fourteen Points of lasting international peace in a widely publicized speech that he made before the American congress the previous year. Progressive ideas of democracy, equality of trade, transparent diplomacy, armament reduction, and self-determination of nations were some of the principles that were hoped to guide international relationships from 1919 onward. Wilson's fourteenth point was the creation of a "general association of nations" established under "special covenants" that would guarantee the "political independence and territorial integrity to great and small

states alike."[1] This would lead to the formation of the League of Nations at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. The Empire of Japan, a relatively new great power enjoying the status of a major player at the conference, was concerned that its national wishes would not be as respected as those of the West in the new League because of Japan's status as a non-white and "alien" country. During the debate surrounding the creation of the League of Nations' charter, the Empire of Japan submitted a racial equality clause to be included. Outwardly, the inclusion of a racial equality stipulation would seem progressive. However, the Japanese delegation's use of the phrase "racial equality" was in reality an appeal to be treated as an equal imperial power among other imperial powers. The proposed racial equality clause by the Empire of Japan to the League of Nation's Covenant had very little to do with any ostensible humanitarian ideals, and was but one of many instances of humanitarian principles being used to conceal imperial ambitions by imperial powers, notable others being Britain and France, at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. To understand why Japan's racial equality clause was disingenuous, we must first examine imperialism, with a focus on Japanese imperialism, in an early-twentieth-century context and its link to racism.

Japan by 1919 was undoubtedly an expansionist imperial state, acquiring its colonial holdings from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries through aggressive wars. Japanese imperialism was rooted in the Meiji Restoration, which began in 1868 when the Tokugawa Shogunate was overthrown in a coup led by Japanese elites, who believed that the Shogunate was not implementing radical enough modernization reforms to meet the challenge of encroaching Western powers in Asia.[2] The Japanese had looked to China, on which Western governments had been actively interloping since 1839, as a case to be avoided.[3] Unlike the Chinese, the Japanese believed that the key to modernization was through westernization.[4] Colonial empires were the hallmark of a modern, Western power in the late nineteenth-century, and Meiji Japan sought to establish colonies of its own through wars of conquest. As early as 1873, 5 years into the Meiji reform era, the Japanese Empire had designs for a takeover of their neighbour, Korea.[5] The Meiji reforms modelled the Japanese education system (1872), financial and legal institutions (1882), government (1885), and its Constitution (1889) on the West.[6] The Japanese military based its army on the Prussian (German) Army, and modelled its fleet on the British Navy.[7] Both Prussia and Britain were leading

[1] Margaret MacMillan, *Paris 1919: Six Months that Changed the World.* (New York: The Random House Publishing Group, 2003): 496.
[2] S. C. M. Paine, "The Japanese Empire: Grand Strategy from the Meiji Restoration to the Pacific War." (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017): 4.
[3] Ibid, 3.
[4] Ibid, 7.
[5] Ibid, 8.
[6] Ibid.
[7] Paine, 8-9.

colonial states of the age. With Westernizing reforms in place, the Japanese embarked on imperial conquest.

In July 1894, the Imperial Japanese Navy launched a surprise attack on Chinese warships near Feng Island, beginning the First Sino-Japanese War.[8] The Japanese objectives of the war were to displace China as the dominant Asian power and to gain dominion over Korea.[9] Japan defeated the disorganized Chinese naval forces with relative ease, and China and Japan signed the Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895, putting an end to hostilities.[10] Russia, Germany, and France interceded in what's remembered as the "Triple Intervention," preventing Japan from keeping the territorial concessions of the treaty.[11] Japan was allowed to keep Formosa (Taiwan) as a colony, however. A decade later, in January 1904, Japan launched yet another surprise attack, this time on the Russian Navy at Lushun, which triggered the Russo-Japanese War.[12] The Japanese devastated the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait in 1905, shocking the world.[13] Russia was defeated, and Japan would gain uncontested dominance over Korea, annexing it formally as a colony in 1910. The Empire of Japan, in the space of a decade, had aggressively waged wars that won them large colonial holdings in Asia. By 1919, the Empire of Japan was a premier colonial power, and imperialism of the era was fundamentally linked to racism.

The Empire of Japan operated under racist policies to maintain control over its territorial gains from the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, as was characteristic of all empires of the period. Social-Darwinism, a pseudo-scientific theory applying Darwin's Theory of Natural Selection to human societies, entered Japan from the West during the late-nineteenth century during the era of Japan's modernization reforms.[14] Under this theory, Japanese propaganda defined their national identity with a racial identity, as Western countries had previously done.[15] The existence of a Japanese empire came to be viewed as evidence in and of itself that the Japanese were a superior race, and because Korea and Taiwan were under colonial rule and lacked industrial development, they were populated by inferior races.[16] As suggested in Japanese school textbooks after 1910, the Japanese race had a responsibility to modernize Asia because of their supposed superior racial

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[8] Ibid, 21.
[9] Ibid, 23.
[10] Ibid, 37.
[11] Ibid, 40.
[12] Ibid, 52.
[13] Ibid, 69.
[14] Michael Weiner, "Discourses of Race, Nation and Empire in Pre-1945 Japan." *Ethnic & Racial Studies* 18 (1995): 443.
[15] Ibid, 449.
[16] Ibid, 450.

qualities.[17] In Japanese colonies, discourse on racial superiority and inferiority informed policy creation and administrative methods.[18] Japanese colonial discourse in Korea, using racial 'science' to justify Japanese occupation, presented an image of Koreans as "backward, immature, inferior and uncivilized."[19] The same racist discourse was used to promote cultural assimilation.[20] Assimilationist policies, which were far more widespread, were used in Japanese colonies as a method of disintegrating the indigenous cultures of colonized peoples and replacing them with Japanese cultural norms and behaviours.

The Japanese colonial government in Korea even used the American example of racial oppression to justify and maintain the unequal relationship between colonizer and colonized.[21] On March 1st, 1919, anti-colonial protests erupted in Korea, led by Korean nationalists who were inspired by Woodrow Wilson's point of "self-determination." The Japanese-published press in Korea appropriated racial violence from earlier race riots in the United States by suggesting that Koreans were at least better treated than the "unfortunate blacks" dying in the United States, a "country whose words and actions were in contradiction."[22] Japanese colonial authorities wanted to discourage Korean nationalist appeals to the United States, which had indeed occurred at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. Yun Ch'i-ho, a Korean nationalist leader, compared the Korean struggle to African Americans in the United States. An August 1919 diary entry stated: "[the] Negro must attain economic equality before he can claim social equality[,] so the Koreans must reach economic equality before we may claim political equality."[23] When examining the Social Darwinist theories and how they affected Japanese colonial policy formulation, as well as the clear racial oppression of colonial subjects in the Empire of Japan, it is clear that Japanese imperialism included strong racial elements. Any notions of "racial equality" seem very out of place when this is how colonial subjects of the state who put forth such an ideal were treated. When understanding Japan's true objectives of the First World War and the Paris Peace Conference, the reasons behind Japan's proposed racial equality clause to the League of Nations becomes more transparent.

The Empire of Japan's agenda at the Paris Peace Conference and goal in the First World War were to opportunistically gain imperial concessions in Asia and the

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[17] Weiner, 450.
[18] Ibid, 452.
[19] Joel Matthews, "Historicizing "Korean Criminality": Colonial Criminality in Twentieth Century Japan." *International Journal of Korean History* 22, no. 1 (2017): 17.
[20] Weiner, 452.
[21] Chris Suh, "What Yun Ch'i-ho Knew: U.S.-Japan Relations and the Imperial Race Making in Korea and the American South, 1904-1919." *Journal of American History* 104, no. 1 (June 2017): 92.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid, 91.

Pacific. At the time of the conference in 1919, the Anglo-Japanese naval alliance, signed in 1902, was still in effect.[24] At the outbreak of the First World War in early August 1914, the Japanese assembly was in debate over which powers to back, despite their alliance with Britain. Many army officers had been trained and educated in Germany, and had a profound respect for their military.[25] The navy, for similar reasons, mostly wanted to join on the side of Britain.[26] Debate in the Japanese cabinet was practical, and centered on which side would be most beneficial to Japan if supported.[27] Ultimately, Japan decided for entering the war on the side of the allies, and on August 23rd, declared war on Germany.[28] Japan had failed to immediately honour its alliance with Britain, and focused instead on what would best achieve Japan's strategic aims. This makes it quite clear that the Empire of Japan would make foreign policy decisions, up to the point of debating whether or not to back an enemy of their ally, based on what would best advance their strategic interests. While other nations were probably just as guilty of this, Japanese imperial ambitions were made apparent through this action.

The Imperial Japanese Navy desired possession of the German Pacific island colonies in Micronesia, to the south of Japan, in order to create a strong defensive perimeter for the home islands.[29] They feared the growing American power in the Pacific, which had begun in 1898 with the American seizure of the Philippines from Spain in the Spanish-American War. In 1908, the United States began construction on their Pacific naval base in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii; by 1916, the American government had fully and openly committed to a "two-ocean" navy.[30] By the fall of 1914, the Imperial Japanese Navy had captured all of German Micronesia with relative ease, subsequently establishing a military occupation.[31] The Japanese government then entered into secret agreements with Great Britain, who promised to support Japanese claims in Micronesia in exchange for naval support in the Mediterranean.[32] However, these claims would not be settled until 1919. The United States' naval attaché to Tokyo, Lyman A. Cotton, said of Japan's occupation of Micronesia: "Occupation of the German islands leads to America as the future enemy …and its exponents advocate a larger Japanese Navy."[33] Both Japan and the

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[24] MacMillan, 310.
[25] Ibid, 312.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid.
[29] J.C. Schencking, "Bureaucratic Politics, Military Budgets and Japan's Southern Advance: The Imperial Navy's Seizure of German Micronesia in the First World War." *War in History* 5, no. 3 (July 1998): 323-324.
[30] MacMillan, 314.
[31] Tze M. Loo, "Islands for an Anxious Empire: Japan's Pacific Island Mandate." *American Historical Review* 124, no. 5 (December 2019): 1700.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Schencking, 324.

United States drafted war plans with the other as a precaution.[34] The Empire of Japan needed to maintain its control over the German colonies it had captured, and indeed the seizure of these possessions was the primary reason the Empire of Japan had entered the war on the side of the Allies. In order to keep these territorial claims, the Japanese delegation in Paris pushed for the racial equality clause to be included in the League of Nations Charter after the First World War. Japan needed to ensure that its new acquisitions would be honoured by the League of Nations, as the Japanese held growing resentments after being treated unfairly by Western powers in past multilateral agreements.

The Treaty of Shimonoseki, which was signed to end the First Sino-Japanese War in April 1895, granted the Empire of Japan sweeping territorial concessions in China, including the ceding of Formosa (Taiwan) and the Liaodong peninsula to Japan, as well as giving Japan uncontested influence over the Korean peninsula. The treaty resulted in the Triple Intervention of Russia, France, and Germany. The three Western nations pressured Japan into relinquishing its claim to the Liaodong Peninsula, as outlined in article 3 of the treaty, on the grounds that Japan's possession of it would "henceforth be a perpetual obstacle to the peace in the Far East."[35] Japan gave in, and Russia seized the peninsula for itself three years later.[36] This was an international embarrassment for the Empire of Japan, and was viewed by the Japanese as unfair treatment simply because they were a non-white power. A decade later, the Treaty of Portsmouth was brokered by United States' president Theodore Roosevelt between Russia and Japan, bringing an end to the Russo-Japanese War.[37] Russia was not required to pay Japan an indemnity, which was a standard condition for a defeated nation suing for peace at the time. This again, lead to a perception in Japan of unfair treatment by the Western powers who were believed to be working together to undermine Japanese legitimacy on the basis of their race. Japanese statesmen had these instances of Western intervention in mind when they proposed the racial equality clause in 1919. The clause itself was using the same progressive language that was used by other imperial states and in an equally disingenuous way.

The Japanese delegation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 were following the same language of the humanitarian precedent, set by Woodrow Wilson in his Fourteen Points, that other colonial empires were using to justify their own expansions when they submitted their racial equality clause. Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points inspired peoples and nationalities around the world; the recent destruction of the Great War had left people wanting to believe that there was still hope for human society to improve, for nations to live in harmony with one another,

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[34] MacMillan, 314.
[35] Paine, 40.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid, 70.

and in 1919, the world was listening to him.[38] In his reception in Paris, one American observed that the crowds greeted him with " …enthusiasm and affection on the part of Parisians that I have [n]ever heard of, let alone seen."[39] Because of the humanitarian rhetoric of the moment, colonial states needed to express their ambitions in supposedly altruistic ways. The most glaring example of this is the establishment of "mandates." Mandates were countries that were given to imperial powers to govern with the hope that one day their inhabitants would be 'civilized' enough to govern themselves. Empires ran their mandates the same way they had governed colonies, except with a public, and ostensibly moral, face.[40] Britain and France were the greatest beneficiaries of the mandate system, gaining territories across the former Ottoman Empire's Arab regions, as well as Germany's African colonies. In these colonies, Britain and France would repress discontent with cutting edge military technology.[41] Japan was also given mandates in the Pacific, mostly from former German colonies in Micronesia, as per their secret agreement with Britain.[42] It was in this climate of feigned idealism that the Japanese delegation in Paris put forward the racial equality clause. The Japanese delegation argued that in the First World War, different races fought together: "A common bond of sympathy and gratitude has been established to an extent never before experienced."[43] A noble sentiment, but one that was masking goals that had nothing to do with racial equality of nations. Colonial and strategic ambitions, which were supported by social Darwinist ideas, were the true goals of the proposal.

The Empire of Japan was compelled to submit a racial equality clause to the League of Nations Covenant in 1919 for reasons which had little to do with actual equality of racial groups across different nations. The Imperial Japanese government was motivated more by their strategic interests, as is made evident through a close examination of the international order that existed prior to 1919. Racism was alive and well in the Empire of Japan, as it was in virtually every nation present at the conference. The Japanese government had been treated unfairly and hypocritically by Western imperial powers at a time when Japan was one of the most industrialized nations in the world. Because of progressive ideas being embraced after the First World War, states who were interested in expanding their colonies and empires had to seem progressive as well. The islands surrounding Japan were designated to be a protective perimeter from the United States' expanding influence in Asia while simultaneously being touted by the League of Nations as mandates that Japan was responsible for civilizing. Mandates were granted to the empires of

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[38] MacMillan, 15.

[39] Ibid, 16.

[40] Jane Burbank and Frederick Cooper, "Empires After 1919: Old, New, Transformed." *International Affairs* 95, no. 1 (January 2019): 87.

[41] Ibid, 87.

[42] Thomas W. Burkman,. "Japan and the League of Nations: An Asian Power Encounters the 'European Club.'" *World Affairs* 158 (Summer 1995): 51.

[43] MacMillan, 318.

1919 by the League of Nations to be governed as little more than colonies. The Empire of Japan was seeking to be treated as an equal imperial power among other imperial states. Ultimately, the racial equality clause would be rejected by the League of Nations. This had the effect of further alienating Japan from the West while also paving the way for militarism to take hold of the nation throughout the 1920s and 1930s and was a factor for the outbreak of the Second-Sino Japanese War and the Second World War in Asia.

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# THE IMPACT OF ETHNIC GEOGRAPHY ESTABLISHED IN COLONIAL KENYA ON POLITICS POST-INDEPENDENCE

SHAUNA BEVACQUA-SMITH

*Many colonized nations post-independence struggle to maintain a political system representative of the majority of its people and instead consolidates power and resources to a select few. Kenya in particular has struggled with this, as they have been independent of British rule since 1963 yet have been unable to maintain an effective multi-party democratic system. Much of Kenya's political turmoil comes from tensions amongst various ethnic groups as they fight to obtain access to power and resources for their specific groups. These tensions between ethnic groups can be traced back to British colonial rule as Britain initially divided the region into distinct districts giving groups of people tribal identities based on their location. While this style of rule mostly benefited European settlers, some tribal groups would benefit more than others based on their location and access to resources. This paper will look at how this system which consolidated power to a select few, would have lasting effects in Kenyan politics and result in a struggle to maintain an effective multi-party democracy.*

One style of colonial rule employed by empires was that of "indirect rule," which was the policy that some powers would be delegated to certain indigenous groups within a colony while the imperial regime would maintain overall administrative control. This was often the case in Africa due to the vast regions empires would be colonizing that were full of interspersed groups of people. Such was the case in Kenya; when the British arrived, it appeared that these varied groups of people had no centralized society. To manage these vast areas of land and varied groups of people, British officials separated the colony into distinct districts. How they chose to separate these districts would set in motion a series of power struggles shaping Kenya's political landscape for multiple decades.

In 1963, the colony of Kenya was declared independent from British rule and would become its own nation through a democratic election. However, the country would

not see another multi-party election until 1992. Kenya's struggle to maintain an effective multi-party democratic system has many contributing factors; however, one of the driving forces is ethnic discrimination established by its imperial rulers decades earlier. Ethnicity-based issues became a key point in many political parties' campaigns as differing groups strived to achieve power. While the British benefited from this style of rule, it resulted in a political system that struggled to maintain an effective multi-party democracy.

When British authorities separated the colony of Kenya into distinct districts, they attributed ethnic identities to communities based on where they resided despite these groups being more varied.[1] In order to better manage the African population, authorities assigned tribal identities to these groups and segregated them to designated districts restricting their use of land outside those areas. Additionally, the British were able to hand off administrative responsibilities for these groups by anointing a tribal chief who would oversee the group's needs. This style of rule mainly benefited European settlers as it ensured the best land was available to them and helped manage African labour.[2] However, it created inequalities amongst the African population as resources were consolidated to certain regions allowing some tribes to become more integrated into the colonial economy while cutting off other tribes from agricultural land and labour.[3]

Not only did this ethnic geographical system secure land for Europeans, but it also acted as a method to keep nationalist factions from forming against the imperial regime as segregated groups were unable to organize across districts. However, there was an exception in 1919 with the rise of The East African Association (EAA). The EAA was a collection of multiple tribes in Kenya protesting against issues such as taxes and forced labour. By 1922, following riots led by the EAA, British authorities successfully arrested many of the group's leaders and officially disbanded the party altogether. Going forward, British authorities instead encouraged more tribal-based political parties to form, which would focus on tribal-specific issues in their region.[4] Kenya would not see a national party form again for two more decades. Tribal-based issues became a theme in Kenya's post-independence elections as political parties based their platforms on ethnic identity focusing on issues unique to specific groups, rather than the nation as a whole.[5] As a result, many small ethnic groups in Kenya lacked proper representation in government, while the larger groups maintained control of resources.

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[1] Timothy Parsons, *Being Kikuyu in Meru: Challenging the Tribal Geography of Colonial Kenya* (Cambridge University Press, 2012), 65.
[2] Ibid, 65-74.
[3] Daniel Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011* (Yale University Press, 2011), 4
[4] Rok Ajulu. *Politicised Ethnicity, Competitive Politics and Conflict in Kenya: A Historical Perspective* (2002), 255.
[5] Ibid, 256-257.

The issue of ethnicity in Kenya often resulted in violence which eventually erupted in a civil war, known as the Shifta War, in the years leading up to independence. The peoples of north-eastern Kenya bordering Somalia wanted to integrate with Somalia as they felt closer ties to them than the rest of Kenya. This was denied during colonial rule and again post-independence by the KANU (Kenya African National Union) government, led by Jomo Kenyatta. Despite the violence that had been occurring, Kenyatta was adamant about retaining that region. Therefore, he responded by establishing a forced settlement of northerners into designated villages, which allowed the government to police Shifta activity more easily.[6]

Though the Shifta War's core issue was ethnic identity, it was also a war for a redistribution of wealth, as the northern communities felt neglected during colonial rule and cut off from much of Kenya's economy.[7] The issue of redistribution of wealth was not unique to the northern communities; it would become a common theme in the political tension in Kenya and one that political parties would often use as their campaign platform during elections. However, the previous system under colonial rule restricted redistribution and instead benefited only a select few groups. Therefore, political parties struggled to develop a platform that would provide the type of systemic reform needed to overhaul that system. Instead, opposition parties formed based on ethnic groups marginalized by the current group in power. Thus, they would continue the system established by their colonial rulers, rather than dismantling it altogether.

These political dynamics were evident in the first election leading up to independence. A key issue during this election was the redistribution of land; an issue Kenyans had been fighting for since the colonial era. The government would need to decide how to distribute land that had become available after many settlers left the country. However, some settlers wanted to stay in Kenya, and therefore KANU needed to strike a balance between both interests. KANU was ultimately successful in this election as they became Kenya's first independent government, led by President Kenyatta. However, KANU represented the ethnic Kikuyu, the group most integrated in the colonial economy and had closer ties to British interests. Therefore, much of the newly available land went to Kikuyu instead of the broader Kenyan population as promised during the election.[8] So, while Kenya appeared united in some ways as they became independent from Great Britain, disillusionment came as struggles for equality, power, and especially land rights came to the forefront of politics.

This struggle between ethnic groups would continue throughout Kenyatta's presidency, which lasted until he died in 1978, and throughout the next presidency,

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[6] Branch, 25-35.
[7] Ibid, 29.
[8] Ibid, 1-24.

led by Daniel arap Moi. Moi was not elected; as the Vice President to Kenyatta, he took over the Presidency after Kenyatta's death. While a change of leadership can signify a substantial change in government, this would prove not to be the case with Moi. Instead, Moi wanted to see the influence of the Kikuyu people reduced and replaced with his ethnic group, Kalenjin. This "Kalenjinization"[9] of government was a gradual process often met with violent opposition. This was another example of the deep ethnic discrimination in the politics of Kenya, where one group sought to hold power over another.

Kenya re-introduced multi-party elections in 1991, with the next election held in 1992. This period would show marginalized ethnic groups try to form political parties in opposition to Moi's government. However, it seemed these parties could not build a strong enough national platform to bring the type of reform needed. This resulted in tension and fighting within these opposition parties, as was the case with one of the largest opposition parties, FORD (Forum for Restoration of Democracy). FORD split into two separate parties, ultimately costing them the election as Moi won the votes.[10]

The issues of ethno-centred politics, tension, violence and the struggle for a fair distribution of resources have been going on in Kenya for multiple decades. These were issues that plagued the country when it was under colonial rule and continued into independence. When we can see the roots of this system dating back to British colonial rule of the region, why has this continued to go on for so long without meaningful change? It would seem that Kenya's economic and governmental systems continue to benefit some groups over others rather than the entire nation as a whole. Therefore, once a particular group or individual obtains that power, it becomes less urgent to make those major reforms.

The political system that emerged post-independence has not been representative of the majority of people in the country and instead consolidates power to a select few. This type of system is not unique and in fact is one that emerges commonly in post-colonial states as that is how imperialism is established in colonies. However, the division of ethnic groups based on territory, along with the consolidation of power and resources to select groups in Kenya has played a key role in its political system, and its ineffectiveness at maintaining a multi-party democracy.

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[9] Godwin Rapando Murunga, *A Critical Look at Kenya's Non-Transition to Democracy* (Journal of Third World Studies, 2012), 96.
[10] Murunga, 96-98.

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# COLONIAL MEDICINE ILLS

## VERN BEAMISH

*Colonialism and medicine may seem to be separate subjects on their own, but this paper demonstrates how both subjects have interacted together in the recent modern era and produced harmful effects on diverse populations. This article reviews five sources that focus on different regions of the world. A common theme emerges from the colonial application of medicine and from the power imbalance that exploited the use of cheap labour. The combination of frenzied economically driven colonization, and the rise of modern medicine imposed European social constructs on Indigenous peoples, which caused them direct harm, and often fostered the spread of disease. Under a false concept of racial differences and implied hierarchy, European countries frequently failed their colonial subjects.*

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, European countries were at the vanguard of new technological advances in medicine. These modern advances helped strengthen national identities and allowed unprecedented economic expansion to faraway tropical lands. Competitive European imperialism is entangled with the rise of modern medicine. Alfred Reed, Chair of Tropical Medicine at the University of California, maintained that institutes like his own were the "advance agents of commerce."[1] The combination of frenzied economically driven colonization, and the rise of modern medicine imposed European social constructs on Indigenous peoples, which caused them direct harm, and often fostered the spread of disease. Under a false concept of racial differences and implied hierarchy, European countries frequently failed their colonial subjects. The journey of colonial medicine can be seen by the transition from Western self-preservation, to the growth of infrastructure that administered colonial subjects. The displacement of local populations due to economic activity furthered the spread of disease and forced the locals to live in unhealthy conditions. The reliance on the exchange of cheap labour

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[1] Alfred Reed, "Organized tropical medicine in the Western United States, *California and Western Medicine* 35 (1931): 185-9, quoted in John Farley, *Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 130.

for profit by remote Western institutes was so far-reaching that even traditional domestic roles were colonized.

Colonialism and medicine are both comprehensive topics on their own, and the intent here is to show how both subjects have interacted together in the recent modern era and produced harmful effects on diverse populations. By restricting the number of sources to a narrow range of five articles that focus on different regions in the world, a theme emerges on the commonality of colonial medicine. Whether the location is the Texas border with Mexico, Australia, Egypt, India, or Latin America, local populations endured similar negative consequences from the power imbalance inherent in colonial settings.

In the present day it seems obvious to reflect that the colonial age was the cause of much suffering, but it may not seem apparent that medicine would be complicit with this suffering. After all, it is generally recognized that humanity has benefitted from modern medicine. However, colonization is a multi-faceted process, and it influenced the application of medicine right from the beginning. As Europeans ventured farther away from home, there was great concern for the rising mortality rates among military personnel, travellers, and colonists as they came into contact with different people and environments. Additionally, in these expeditions "European physicians, travellers and missionaries offered their medicine as lifesaving drugs or as tokens of their benevolence and superiority to the colonized races."[2]

Lifesaving drugs were typically prescribed for the protection of white people when colonizing a foreign land, especially when tropical lands were the scene of white struggles. Initially, miasmic theories (the outdated belief that disease was caused by breathing in "bad air") were prevalent, along with the perception that the soil of the land was the source of disease.[3] An example of this occurred when the British colonized Australia and struggled to cope with the severe climate in the northern tropical area. Malaria was referred to as "Colonial Fever," and the use of "quinine generally seemed to act on white constitution to counter environmental influence."[4] However, this did not solve the problem, and whites felt they needed the assistance of non-local "tropical" residents whom they saw as more suitable to working the land. This ultimately morphed into the belief that these "other people" were disease carriers, promoting the cruel medical use of quarantine through isolation, with the expectation that disease transmission to Europeans would be prevented.

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[2] Pratik Chakrabarti, *Medicine and Empire 1600-1960* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), ix.
[3] Warwick Anderson, *The Cultivation of Whiteness: Science, Health, and Racial Destiny in Australia* (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 181.
[4] Ibid, 80.

The evolution of medicine from protecting settler's health to treating Indigenous peoples, can be seen in the development of hospitals in the colonies. John Farley notes that "before the First World War, tropical medicine was focused mainly on the health of British Colonial officials and American army personnel. But after the war, economic factors began to play an increasingly important role."[5] Hospitals were integral to improving profit because they were a way to keep cheap local labour free from disease. From a colonial point of view, hospitals were "there for purposes of development, not exploitation."[6] However, to colonial subjects, hospitals could be feared, as was the case in India where British officials were so culturally insensitive with their campaign against the plague that "people would prefer to die from the plague rather than consent or submit to the removal of their mothers, wives, daughters or sisters to the hospital."[7]

"Tropical Medicine" became a professional specialty, with governments, businesses, and educational institutes investing in research-driven initiatives. In South Africa, funding research took place over "seriously addressing the health problems of [mining] employees…[which could have been improved] by decent housing, good food, and humane policies."[8] It is cruelly ironic that the economic activities in colonial lands forced local people to work farther from their own homes, which in turn helped foster the spread of disease. The growth of colonial economies was frequently tied to the use of cheap labour. These workers would have to travel away from home and become dependent on their colonial masters for basic necessities. In Australia, colonial officials perceived Pacific Islanders as racially suited to tropical work, and "poor food, inadequate housing and medical neglect meant the Islanders…had a death rate four times higher than that of Europeans."[9]

With hindsight, it can be generally said that many disease outbreaks were caused by the unsanitary conditions that poor people were forced to live in. Although not a colonial takeover, the exploitation of migrant Mexican workers who travelled daily to work in Texas is a classic case of racial hierarchy and the short-sighted refusal to take proper steps to minimize the spread of disease. The border cities of El Paso in Texas and Ciudad Juarez enjoyed an open border for many years as Mexicans desperately sought work in part because of the Mexican Revolution, and Americans eagerly welcomed these workers for the most undesirable work.[10]

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[5] John Farley, *Bilharzia: A History of Imperial Tropical Medicine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 116.
[6] Ibid, 117.
[7] David Arnold, "Plague: Assault on the Body." In *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India,* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 214.
[8] Farley, 124.
[9] Anderson, 84.
[10] Ibid, 121-22.

Racial themes were prevalent including the statement that "the Mexican was considered the perfect stoop laborer because he [had the right body type]."[11]

This U.S and Mexico labour exchange became threatened when incidents of typhus drove the U.S authorities to instigate harsh measures at border crossings to prevent the disease from spreading. The death of twenty-six Mexicans in a Texas jail, due to a delousing method using a gasoline mixture as a bath, illustrated the inhumanity of quarantine methods.[12] Most of the Mexicans lived in impoverished settings, and the lack of proper sanitation was the catalyst for the rise and spread of typhus. The American solution of imposing border-crossing conditions ignored the fact that, if they wanted to enjoy the benefits of cheap labour, it would have made more sense to improve Mexican workers living conditions. They did not do so, and one of the consequences was the "subsequent rise of illegal immigrants, some of whom harbored infections or feared medical examinations of any kind."[13] Although Howard Markel was writing in 2004, it is striking that the hard border concept of a wall still resonates with labour dependence issues and racial concepts by the U.S.A.

The colonial impulse to avoid direct aid to the oversupply of cheap labour is a common theme throughout the world. In South Africa, medical experts knew that the rise of Bilharzia corresponded with colonial irrigation projects.[14] However, unhealthy workers could easily be replaced, and as a result, there was no incentive to improve working conditions. In contrast, when similar impoverished living conditions of white Boer farmers sparked a Bilharzia outbreak, "the response was immediate when white children were found to be infected."[15] Authorities instigated a quarantine-like summer camp program for the white children that involved medications and education. However, no similar effort was made for Black children and "South Africans were unwilling to spend money to treat Africans infected by Bilharzia [and] they were certainly not prepared to attack the economic factors that increased the seriousness of Bilharzia and other diseases."[16]

Part of the overall problem in assessing disease in colonies, was the institute's structure and philosophy that were formed around the concept of "Tropical Medicine." John Farley discusses the United Fruit Company's working relationship with Harvard Medical School's Department of Tropical Medicine. He notes that the department was formed at Harvard because of the fear that tropical diseases

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[11] Howard Markel. "Lice, Typhus, and Riots on the Texas Border." In *When Germs Travel: Six Major Epidemics That Have Invaded America Since 1900 and the Fears They Have Unleashed,* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2004), 122.
[12] Ibid, 113-14.
[13] Ibid, 139.
[14] Farley, 121.
[15] Farley, 137.
[16] Ibid, 139.

could arrive in the port city of Boston.[17] The United Fruit Company was the largest American company of its kind operating in Latin America and was very concerned about its interests in the tropics. The company felt that proper research should be done in the colonies. Harvard insisted that the real research should be done in Boston because researchers 'mental capacity could be diminished by working in the tropics.[18] As a result, remote authority could overrule local expertise and transmit incorrect theories and beliefs.

The imposition of remote authority on local agents can also be seen in British India, where the "political and social impact [of a late 19th century plague outbreak] was felt long before … mortality had reached its peak."[19] This command was caused by the governmental authorities in Britain, who formed policies in response to the fear of the plague coming to Britain.[20] Compounding this was the medical profession's self-image as "the principal agents and overseers of the British administration … and the Indian Civil Service were entrusted with overall control of plague operations."[21] British control was so overwhelming that important social structures based on caste and religion were ignored and seen as merely superstitious.[22]

As noted earlier, women in India were afraid of going to hospitals, in part because methods for preventing the spread of plague were so aggressive that "plague measures anticipated the arrival of the epidemic itself."[23] Furthermore, rumours began to circulate, and violent public reactions displayed a lack of confidence in Western medicine.[24] For Indian women, the biggest issue was that most of the doctors were male and white. Arnold points out that searching the female body for the plague was considered the equivalent of sexual molestation.[25]

The absolute failure of colonial powers to recognize social and cultural values can be seen in the British colonization of Egypt. Historian Hibba Abugideiri points out that, in the British initiative to modernize Egypt, gynaecologists extended their focus on the female body to activities in the home.[26] The Egyptian nation was generally viewed by the British as backward and in need of modernization to fulfill its potential. Egyptian doctors with their Western-based medical training were seen

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[17] Ibid, 124-28.
[18] Ibid, 129.
[19] Arnold, 202.
[20] Ibid, 205.
[21] Ibid, 208.
[22] Ibid, 204.
[23] Ibid, 237.
[24] Ibid, 218-24.
[25] Arnold, 214.
[26] Hibba Abugideiri. "Egyptian Doctors and Domestic Medicine: The Forging of Republican Motherhood." In *Gender and the Making of Modern Medicine in Colonial Egypt,* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2010), 187.

as vital for this transformation. Part of this transformation would be the radical role that doctors would play in modifying the domestic roles of Egyptian women. Traditionally Egyptian midwives were in the home assisting with breastfeeding and childcare, but the doctors overruled this practice and encouraged the "rethinking of the family and gender roles."[27] This domestic overhaul of Egyptian culture was based on Victorian bourgeois ethics.[28] The identity of the "Modern Egyptian Woman" was to be radically changed based on her motherhood, domestic role, grooming, and etiquette. Medical advice declared that the mother alone should breastfeed her child and the employment of midwives was prohibited.[29] It was also stated that the mother must teach and supervise her child as much as possible and oversee much of the domestic work done in the home.[30] The drive to build Egypt as an unequivocal modern state was so encompassing that the "gendered and moralistic view of doctors as regulators of women's social behaviour was a distinctly modern phenomenon."[31]

From today's perspective it certainly seems outrageous that medical professionals could have interfered so drastically into the family home. However, the real issue is about power, and women have typically had a lack of it, even to the present day. Colonialism was about power imbalance. It could dictate terms to people who were poor and impoverished. It could take advantage of people from around the world with its mantra of technologically modernizing the world by sheer force. The wrongfully obtuse construction of "racial" otherness reinforced economic imposition. Perhaps the greatest injustice was the colonizer's inability to see that it was their actions that gave rise to the spread of some diseases. It is much more than ironic, that the Hippocratic Oath, (interpreted as to do no harm or injustice to the patient), which Western medicine tries to emulate so much, was not upheld and indeed the colonial powers did much harm.[32]

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[27] Ibid, 188.
[28] Ibid, 194.
[29] Ibid, 200-04.
[30] Ibid, 205-11.
[31] Ibid, 187.
[32] Markel, 140.

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# THE CIVIL WAR RESULTED IN A CULMINATION OF ECONOMIC CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH

EUNICE ER

*This paper seeks to make clear the root of the American Civil War- economic problems. And in the meantime, dispel any notion that the War was a righteous fight for abolition. Before the war, the economies of Northern and Southern America were contrasting: the North had industrialized and no longer required laborious agricultural work, while the South's cotton industry was booming, and so were the profits. Of course, this was only possible due to the efforts of enslaved people. This essay also outlines how leading up to the War, conflicts between the North and South all had an economic basis.*

The cause of the American Civil War has been long debated, but this essay will make it clear that it resulted from economic conflicts between the North and South. Contrary to popular belief, the moral issue of slavery was far from being the central cause. In the 1800s, the economy of Northern and Southern America was becoming vastly different; the North had industrialized, and more Northerners began to have non-agricultural jobs, while the South continued to rely on agriculture, namely, cotton.[1] This difference created economic conflict between them and led to issues such as the South's secession, the opposition against slavery, and the fight for land. Ultimately, such economic issues brought forth the Civil War.

A common misconception is that the War started because the Republicans felt slavery was morally wrong and wanted to free the enslaved people in the South out of kindness. In actuality, the main cause of the Civil War had nothing to do with the morality of slavery. Lincoln, who famously issued the Emancipation Proclamation, once stated, "I have no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery where it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do

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[1] Carole E. Scott, "The Very Different but Connected Economies of the Northeast and the South Before the Civil War." *B>Quest*, January 2015, 14.

so, and I have no inclination to do so ... If I could save the Union without freeing any slave I would do it."[2] The Republicans also rejected abolition and swore not to interfere with the South's "peculiar institution" (slavery) when the war started.[3] Only after a year of fighting, when freeing the enslaved people "could prove a valuable asset for the North"[4] did their perspective change. Moreover, the abolitionists and radicals only made up 15% of the Northern population. Therefore, they had nowhere near enough power to "determine the policies of either the North or the Republican Party."[5] Lastly, the North and South had compromised for decades without conflict. Only when slavery began to threaten the North's economy, did it become a concern.

The economic differences between the North and South during the 1800s were vast. Northern crops such as wheat, corn, and oats did not require as much labour as Southern crops, which allowed them to explore different industries.[6] Furthermore, the development of mechanical wheat harvesting allowed more people to have non-agricultural jobs.[7] For example, in New England, "the freeing of workers from producing food increased the number of workers available to work in factories."[8] They were also able to use the money earned to open cotton mills. By 1860, 90 percent of the nation's manufacturing output came from northern states, and were responsible for producing, "17 times more cotton and woollen textiles than the South, 30 times more leather goods, 20 times more pig iron, and 32 times more firearms."[9] The South, on the other hand, produced crops that were very labour intensive, like tobacco, rice, cotton, and sugar. Most notable of all was cotton, also known as "white gold."[10] Cotton was extremely profitable, to say the least. "By 1815, cotton was the most valuable export of the United States. By 1840, it was worth more than all other exports combined."[11] Their economy greatly relied on its agricultural exports, especially cotton, and eventually was producing two-thirds of the world's supply.[12] However this demand came with a price, paid by millions of enslaved people. In 1859, the population of enslaved people in slaveholding states was 32.3%, or around 4 million.[13] Slaveholding was even more apparent in the

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[2] Tim Stanley, "North-South Divide." *History Today* 61, no. 9 (September 2011): 35.
[3] Marc Egnal, "The Economic Origins of the Civil War." *OAH Magazine of History* 25, no. 2 (April 2011): 29.
[4] Ibid, 32.
[5] Ibid, 31.
[6] Scott, 8.
[7] Ibid, 8.
[8] Ibid, 8.
[9] Ibid, 14.
[10] Gene Dattel, "THE SOUTHS Mighty Gamble on King Cotton." *American Heritage* 60, no. 2 (Summer 2010).
[11] Scott, 14.
[12] Ibid, 14.
[13] James Huston, "Property Rights in Slavery and the Coming of the Civil War." Journal of Southern History 65, no. 2 (May 1999): 253.

cotton states, "South Carolina was 57.2 percent slave, Mississippi 55.2 percent, Alabama 45.1 percent, Florida 43.9 percent, Georgia 43.7 percent, and Louisiana 46.9 percent."[14] As much as the South relied on cotton, they relied equally on enslaved labour. By 1860, 84% of the South worked in agriculture, compared to only 40% of the North.[15] The difference in manufacturing ability was also significant, and the South held only 29% of the railroad tracks and 13% of the banks.[16] Clearly, the economies of the North and South are diverging, the former moving towards a commercial and manufacturing economy and the latter an agricultural economy.[17]

The issues leading up to the Civil War, such as the South's secession, conflicting views over slavery, and the fight for land, all had economic origins. Before the war, the North and South were already at odds. One problem they had was the issue of taxes, which was significant for both sides. The North's industrial development was financed through taxes placed on imported goods- taxes which the South paid a lot of because their agricultural machinery came from abroad.[18] This machinery was important to their economy, which was almost completely agriculturally-based. When the recession hit, Congress increased the import tax from 15 to 37%, which predictably outraged the South.[19] Feeling indignant, the South threatens secession, a massive problem for the North.[20] A quote from the Chicago Daily Times shows just how damaging secession would have been for the North, "...our foreign commerce must be reduced to less than one half of what it is now. Our coastwise trade would pass into other hands. One half of our shipping would lie idle at our wharves. We should lose our trade with the South, with all of its immense profits."[21] In the North's perspective, war was the only option.[22]

Before the Transportation Revolution, the U.S. was separated into different market areas.[23] But with the introduction of railroads, the North and South's market areas became connected.[24] This was an issue because their different markets conflicted with each other. The North's "free labor ideology stipulated that by hard work and intelligent activity a person could accumulate property, acquire a competence, and rise as far in society as his (never her) abilities could take him. The key to

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[14] Ibid, 253.
[15] Scott, 14.
[16] Ibid, 14.
[17] Ibid, 14.
[18] Stanley, 35.
[19] Ibid, 35.
[20] Ibid, 35.
[21] Ibid, 35.
[22] Ibid, 35.
[23] Huston, 273.
[24] Ibid, 251.

independence was earning property."[25] On the other hand, "in the South, the means of social mobility via property acquisition-the "fruits of labor"-was accumulating slaves."[26] Northerners feared the effects of slavery would spread, and "...the effects of the southern labor system could be transmitted to the North, depress the wages of its free laborers, and thereby upset its economy."[27] Therefore, restricting the expansion of slavery and its effects were of great importance to them, which the South found to be "an attack on their property rights."[28] The South's wealth came from slavery, and to say they relied on it would be an understatement. Before the War, the market value of 4 million enslaved was $4 billion, and the prices were projected to increase over 50% by 1890 compared to 1860.[29] Moreover, "the price of a slave was directly related to that of cotton."[30] Without slavery, Southerners would not have had cotton or its profits, which contributed $191 million of the total $333 million made from American exports in 1860.[31] In response to the restriction of slavery, the southerners "...demanded northern recognition of southern rights regarding slavery- thereby expanding property rights in slaves from the local to the national arena."[32] The South could not "...allow any attack upon the property rights that gave them wealth and income."[33] As expected, northerners did not like this response and felt it was ideological aggression; by allowing them to expand property rights northern society would be fundamentally changed.[34]

Other issues added to the growing animosity between the North and South, namely, the fight for land. The North's trade had begun to diversify and had reoriented to an east-west axis, towards the Great Lakes and the Erie Canal, rather than only trading on a north-south axis, via the Mississippi River.[35] The Republicans opposed slavery in the West to preserve free land for white settlers.[36] This ideal was supported by Lincoln, who said, "Now irrespective of the moral aspect of this question as to whether there is a right or wrong in enslaving a negro, I am still in favor of our new Territories being in such a condition that white men may find a home . . . where they can settle upon new soil and better their condition in life."[37] However, the South had different plans. Demand for new land increased for multiple reasons, to create more slave states and in turn keeping the balance of power in the Senate, for fear of a growing enslaved population in a closed off-

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[25] Huston, 257.
[26] Ibid, 257.
[27] Ibid, 251.
[28] Ibid, 252.
[29] Ibid, 15.
[30] Dattel.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Huston, 252.
[33] Ibid, 252.
[34] Ibid, 252.
[35] Egnal, 29.
[36] Ibid, 31.
[37] Egnal, 31.

society, and fear of soil exhaustion.[38] To continue expanding their economies, both sides needed more land, but neither wanted to give it up.

The Civil War erupted as a result of growing economic tension, which developed as the North and South's economy further diverged. It was not about freeing enslaved people, a view shared by the British press, summed up by Karl Marx, "The war between the North and South is a tariff war. The war is, further, not for any principle, does not touch the question of slavery and in fact turns on Northern lust for sovereignty"[39] and Charles Dickens, "the Northern onslaught upon slavery is no more than a piece of specious humbug disguised to conceal its desire for economic control of the United States."[40] As the North moved toward an industrial economy and the South an agricultural one, many differences were created. Not only did the North have more manufacturing ability, it was also cheaper for them:

> ...the Interstate Commerce Commission, approving a set of railroad rates which made it cheaper for northern manufacturers to ship raw materials from the South for their use than it was for southern manufacturers to ship raw materials for their use from the North; while it was cheaper for northern manufacturers to ship their finished goods to the South to sell than it was for southern manufacturers to ship their finished goods to the North to sell.[41]

The South, however, was devoted to cotton because of its incredible profitability; over 70% of enslaved people in America worked in cotton production.[42] Once Eli Whitney's cotton gin was introduced, which reduced labour and cost, interest in eliminating slavery died down.[43] Famously, James Henry Hammond, senator of South Carolina, said, "You dare not to make war on cotton. No power on earth dares make war upon it. Cotton is King."[44] Slaveholding in 1860 was estimated to have more value than railroads and manufacturing combined.[45] Without a doubt, slaveholding and cotton went hand in hand, and they were vital to the South's economy.

Unsurprisingly, slavery was also tied to the South's secession. Southern leaders felt their way of life was threatened under a government that was against "the expansion of slavery and whose leaders branded slavery a moral wrong that must eventually

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[38] Ibid.
[39] Stanley, 35.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Scott, 10.
[42] Dattel.
[43] Scott, 12.
[44] Dattel.
[45] Huston, 254.

disappear from American society", so they seceded.[46] Mississippi's Declaration of the Causes of Secession also supports this view:

> Our position is thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery-- the greatest material interest of the world. Its labor supplies the product which constitutes by far the largest and most important portions of commerce of the earth...There was no choice left us but submission to the mandates of abolition, or a dissolution of the Union, whose principles had been subverted to work out our ruin.[47]

Because the Southern states had cotton, which is comparable to today's crude oil, they had the confidence to challenge the North.[48] However, states that grew wheat and had commercial ties to the North (Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas) were against secession, and only after the fighting started did they join the Confederacy.[49] As previously stated, the North could not allow the spread of slavery because it would have lowered the wages of free labourers, hurting its economy. However, secession would have been even worse, therefore the North felt war was the only answer.

Though the main objective of the Civil War might not have been to end slavery, it undoubtedly created important changes in society. In the process, the war "forced on the nation a social and political revolution regarding race."[50] The issuing of the Emancipation Proclamation, a decree freeing all enslaved people in Confederate states, and the Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery in all of the U.S., happened during the Civil War.[51] Regardless of possible ulterior motives, the significance it represents and the change it brought on is undeniable.

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[46] Egnal, 29.
[47] "A Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of the State of Mississ." *Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce & Justify the Secession of the State of Mississippi*, August 2017, 1.
[48] Dattel.
[49] Jane Kamensky et. al., *A People and a Nation, Volume I: to 1877,* (Cengage Learning, 2018): 375.
[50] Kamensky, 373.
[51] Ibid, 391-392.

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# A REVOLUTION FULFILLED, OR BETRAYED? THE IDEOLOGICAL DYNAMICS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION

DECLAN BURKE

*The Iranian Revolution is often portrayed as the black sheep of revolutionary history: a triumph of right wing reactionaries over a relatively progressive - albeit despotic - authoritarian regime, and the popular revolt that sought to overthrow him for a more traditionally democratic system. This paper challenges this narrative in depth, arguing that the development of the Iranian Revolution can only be properly understood and contextualized within an Islamic framework that acknowledges the nationalistic struggle against Western imperialism underlying all of twentieth century Iranian history. Similarly, the consolidation of power by Ayatollah Khomeni and the Shi'ite ulama must be considered alongside the broader context of dissent and dialogue that characterize both the revolutions history, and Iran's present. While the present Islamic government remains unapologetically totalitarian, these factors nevertheless prove that the political plurality that led to the Shah's downfall remain a part of the revolutionary past, present, and future of Iran.*

Revolutionary breaks from an established order are never the clean affairs history often portrays them to be in retrospect. But no revolution has so surprised, nor baffled, conventional analysis like the Iranian Revolution of the late 1970s. Despite the rich and varied dynamics of Iran's political history, the revolution would consolidate a unique form of absolutist government: a theocratic republic rooted in Shi'ite Islam, with nominally modern democratic representative structures subordinated to an unelected executive council of clerics, and the supreme leadership of the religious Ayatollah. While theorists of various stripes have attempted to explain this outcome as the product of the exiled revolutionary theocrat Ayatollah Khomeini's unique influence, or the machinations of Shi'ite clerical hardliners, the origins of the Islamic Republic lay in the people of Iran themselves, and their long history of frustrated national ambitions at the hands of fundamentally alien impositions of Western ideas and systems that intensified

throughout the twentieth century. Thus, when considered in this context, the Iranian Revolution becomes the end product of a national effort to define Iran in truly Iranian terms; and while inarguably imperfect, the Islamic Republic should be viewed less as a victory of theocratic despotism over secular democracy, and instead as the Iranian emancipation from the monolithic idea of the West in and of itself.

The context of the Iranian revolution is often obscured by the strange insistence that its uniquely Islamic results need to be 'explained', particularly within the broader framework of revolutionary history and theory to which they seem largely at odds. The prominence of Islam as the defining basis of the revolution, as well as the implicit rejection of conventional left-right secular politics are treated as a unique feature that cannot be explained without special analysis. However, this assumption rests on a chauvinistic attitude that revolution is the province of the secular, Western tradition first and foremost. In fact, the antecedents of the 1979 revolution are deeply anti-Western and anti-colonial, and date back as early as the 1905-06 revolution against the Qajar dynasty: itself a response to increasing interference from European imperial powers in the economic and domestic affairs of what was then Persia.[1] The later collapse of the briefly democratic government of Mohammad Mossadeq's National Front in 1953 at the hands of an American and British orchestrated coup, and the naked imperialism of both Old and New World powers throughout the twentieth century, only further demonstrated the threat foreign influence posed to Iranian self-determination.[2] The fact that these events remained a part of the socio-political fabric of Iran was clear in the actions of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi when he attempted to counter them through a combination of material, and identity politics that began with the White Revolution. Initiated in 1963, the primary aim was to bring the material benefits of the state's alliance with the West to bear on the people, essentially buying their loyalty through prosperity.[3] While this had certain beneficial impacts on the urban middle classes, particularly those close to the Shah, it also increased inequality, particularly in rural agriculture where land was amassed by wealthy families at the price of small holders.[4] The reforms would also plant the first seeds of resentment within the ulama, who suffered from state appropriations of religious land.[5] This also created a large contingent of unemployed labourers, whose migration to urban centers in search of work resulted in expansive slums that surrounded Tehran and other cities by the 1970s: a potent reminder of the system's inability to disperse its wealth

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[1] Robin Wright, *The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran* (New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000), 11.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, "Reconsidering the Iranian Revolution Forty Years Later." *Current History* 118, no. 812 (2019): 343.
[4] Misagh Parsa, *Social Origins of the Iranian Revolution* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1989), 71-75.
[5] Ibid, 194-195.

equitably.[6] Combined with inflation and declining spending power, it was clear to Iranians that the 'benefits' of Western modernization were a far cry from what they had been promised.[7] Meanwhile, Iran's allies praised the regime as an exemplar of regional stability and prosperity[8], which when considered with the Shah's infamous 1971 celebration of 2500 years of Persian royal rule - of which he had no legitimate claim to whatsoever - served as a ready symbol of both the state's disconnect with the people it served, and the Shah's personal delusions of power and prestige.[9] With the many problems in Iran coalescing around the Shah, it was inevitable that he would become the focus of the coming revolution's objectives. However, the common focus of Iranian's ire was a deeper dissatisfaction with the repeated failures of western style modernization to produce genuine results for ordinary Iranians. The combined effects of 1905, Mossadeq, and finally the Shah, was that it created an undercurrent of desire for a truly Iranian state; a desire which would likewise give a critical advantage to one faction of the disparate revolutionary forces.

Understanding the outcome of the revolution requires a fundamental readjustment of our understanding of the ideological forces at play, and their origins in the unique landscape of Iran and its sociocultural and political history. Indeed, both the liberal and socialist opposition would fall victim to essentially the same fundamental mistake. In the case of the liberal National Front party, their attempts to spearhead calls for a liberal democracy proved too little too late, and were further undermined both by a lack of organization and resources, and an inability to maintain relevance as the revolution escalated.[10] Similarly, Marxist and secular socialist groups such as the communist Tudeh party and the Fedayeen militants failed to make any significant headway outside of radicalized students and urban workers, and often competed unhelpfully against each other.[11] Both also suffered heavily at the hands of police and intelligence agency (the SAVAK secret police) repressions, even after the crackdowns were lessened on nominally peaceful groups such as the National Front.[12] In comparison, the religious establishment benefitted from its position at the most important junctions in the development of the revolutionary movement in Iran: the mosques, and the ideological work of the Iranian revolutionary sociologist and theorist Ali Shariati. Despite their post-revolutionary image as a monolithic

[6] Ibid, 76-77.
[7] Peter Seeberg, "The Iranian Revolution, 1977-79: Interaction and Transformation." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41, no. 4, (2014): 487; Parsa, 141.
[8] G. Hossein Razi, "The Nexus of Legitimacy and Performance: The Lessons of the Iranian Revolution." *Comparative Politics* 19, no. 4, (1987): 453.
[9] Seeberg, 487.
[10] Parsa, 186-187.
[11] Zohreh Bayatrizi, "From Marx to Giddens via Weber and Habermas: The politics of social thought in Iran." *European Journal of Social Theory* 19, no. 4 (2016): 523; Parsa 180; Seeberg, 493.
[12] Ibid, 180, 183-184.

organization, the ulama of the 1960s and 1970s were a divided and factious group that played relatively little active role in fomenting revolutionary fervour.[13] In fact, outside of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini's agitation, the majority remained apolitical.[14] However, the mosques themselves became the lynchpin of revolutionary movements due to their relative safety from the regime's police apparatus, as well as a rallying point for the masses of disaffected labourers who increasingly formed the core of the revolutionary movement.[15] Within this environment, Ali Shariati's works would become the single most widely studied of the pre-revolutionary period. Combining influences from Marx to Bakunin to Sartre, along with anti-imperialism and Shia Islam, Shariaiti's philosophy formed the foundation of a truly indigenous Iranian ideology, based on a socialist reading of Islamic theology that advocated Islamic community (umma) as the basis of society.[16] The broad appeal of this socially minded, yet religiously evocative message created a climate in which nearly all Iranians could find common ground beyond simple opposition to the Shah.[17] These two components of Iran's revolutionary underground would not only provide the critical mass for the overthrow of the Shah, but also provide important context for the character of both the climax of the revolution, and the state building that followed.

The events of 1978 and 1979 that signaled the downfall of the Shah were more than the overthrow of a tyrant and his apparatus of oppression, in that they combined both symbolic and literal demonstrations of a popular judgement on the broader system of ideas and values that the Shah and his westernizing state represented. From the beginning of January 1978, the Shah's attempts to create a sense of popular legitimacy with pageants celebrating the White Revolution resulted in popular marches and prayer meetings at mosques that blatantly rejected the premise of endorsing the Shah's westernization program.[18] When protests turned violent after the death of a protester in Tabriz, the targets were explicit symbols of western influence on Iranian society: Western cinemas, boutiques, and banks.[19] As government repression turned deadly, the famous 40 day cycle began, where intervals between protests became standardized around the traditional period of Islamic mourning, following the death of a protester.[20] Thus civil disobedience developed a rhythm that both helped mobilize popular support, as well as further emphasize the implicit Islamic character of the protests and the movement itself.[21]

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[13] Ibid, 217-218.
[14] Baryatrizi. 218.
[15] Ibid, 190; Ghamari-Tabrizi, 343-344; Seeberg, 489.
[16] Bayatrizi, 523-524.
[17] Ghamari-Tabrizi. 344-345.
[18] Seeberg, 489.
[19] Ibid.
[20] Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution."
*American Sociological Review* 61, no. 1 (1996): 138; Seeberg, 490.
[21] Ibid.

In turn, when the Shah attempted to blame Islamists for the Abadan Cinema fire that killed 400 people, this was seen as a blatant provocation that further alienated the Shah from the protesters.[22] Similarly, his inconsistent pattern of police crackdowns, alongside later attempts at offering concessions and liberalization of the state led to a switch from defensive protests against state violence, to active demands for the abolition of the monarchy and the fundamental reorganization of the state.[23] As such, when repressions returned in November of 1978, all factions from white to blue collar workers, the bazaari merchant class, and religious organizations united behind the popular call for an end to the Shah's rule.[24] By the conclusion of the revolution against the Shah, over 12% of the population would directly participate in some form of popular action; and despite the underrepresentation of the rural population,[25] this share vastly exceeded the comparative percentages of both the French (2.5%) and Russian (1.5%) revolutions.[26] The result is that the Iranian revolution was never a battle between conventional ideological forces, united by convenience and circumstances to take down a common enemy; but instead a genuinely popular revolution rooted in a sociocultural landscape that implicitly rejected the premises of a culturally western, monarchal autocracy. In this sense, the outcome of the Iranian revolution was a foregone conclusion in that it would take on an Islamic character, since that was the implicit desire of the people from the outset. Thus, when evaluating the events that followed the departure of the Shah, and the state that arose in the place of monarchal Iran, they must be seen in this context.

In considering the organization of the post-revolution state of Iran, the 'victory' of the ulama, and the 'defeat' of liberal and socialist forces, can only be properly understood from within the framework of the Iranian Revolution itself. The initial confirmation of the Islamic nature of the Islamic Republic by referendum returned overwhelming support from nearly 90 percent of the eligible electorate.[27] While protested by several groups as undemocratic, the turnout demonstrated that Islamic governance of some kind was clearly the desire of the population. By the time the government had been established formally, it would attract strong criticism from the left, as religious requirements on elected representatives barred atheistic Marxists and many socialists from running for various offices, including president.[28] While the first Majlis (parliamentary) elections would reflect this handicapping of the clerics' main source of opposition,[29] the decline in voter turnout that began with the Majlis election and continued as crises compounded,

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[22] Seeberg, 490.
[23] Rasler, 146-148.
[24] Ibid, 147.
[25] Parsa, 2.
[26] Ghamari-Tabrizi, 344.
[27] Parsa, 252.
[28] Ibid, 255.
[29] Ibid, 255-256.

led to a shift in both action and rhetoric towards the left by the government and the Ayatollah himself.[30] In the following years and decades since the revolution, the seemingly incompatible blend of democratic and Islamic principles that make up the Iranian state have created a comprehensive and effective welfare state that has largely eliminated illiteracy, and provides effective health and welfare programs.[31] Similarly, despite the often hegemonic depiction of the Iranian regime, the protests over electoral fraud in 2009 demonstrate that Iranians are more than capable of voicing descent, and that the internal politics of Iran include substantive differences on the course the nation should take.[32] The endurance of the Islamic Republic, and of the imperfect political order it represents, is therefore a story of an evolving revolution in which political victory or defeat is a relative question. The only certainty is that this uniquely Iranian answer to the question of governance is far more deeply rooted and embraced by the people than the sum of its oft contradictory parts.

The Iranian Revolution is simultaneously an entirely singular event in history, while maintaining significant consistency with the broader themes of conventional revolutionary theory. It grew from very deeply rooted dissatisfaction with a system of governance that was as distant as it was oppressive to the national political and sociocultural aspirations of its people. In Iran, this was further compounded by the colonial dynamics which the country was constantly subjected to: imposed economic and cultural values, the priorities of powers and elites that ignored all popular input, and a government that never truly considered the people's wellbeing a priority. By the time the Shah's rule had collapsed, the revolutionary movement had encompassed a broader swathe of the population than any other popular revolt in history. The numerical scope of the revolution was matched only by the seeming diversity of its participants aims and goals. However, the common thread that underlay the ideological goals of every participant of the revolution was a rejection of the Western models and methods that had betrayed Iran's sovereignty and national culture to satisfy the interests of foreign powers and their ways. While it is inarguable that the new regime has been imperfect and excessive, and that many have suffered from the consolidation of the clerically dominated theocratic republic, Iran has achieved a genuinely revolutionary emancipation from its former international oppressors; and no people are better disposed to realize the potential their revolution still holds for the future, than the Iranians.

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[30] Ibid, 257-258.
[31] Ghamari-Tabrizi, 346.
[32] Saïd Amir Arjomand, "Has Iran's Islamic Revolution Ended?" *Radical History Review* 105, (2009): 136-138.

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# POSITIVE NEUTRALITY: NASSER'S MOST CONSEQUENTIAL POLICY

DOMENIC BIAMONTE

*Gamal Nasser was the President of Egypt from 1954 until his death in 1970 at age 52. He remains a hero in Egypt for gaining full independence after centuries of colonial rule, implementing sweeping social programs, modernizing its economy, and transforming Egypt into a regional political and military power. Extensive research involving a number of peer-reviewed articles and primary sources shows that Nasser required a vast amount of financial and military foreign aid to accomplish his goals. During the height of the Cold War, Egypt received substantial aid from numerous sources including the USSR and the United States. An examination of the main events before and during Nasser's reign reveals that he never wavered from his strict policy of positive neutrality, which involved cooperating, but never participating in formal allegiances with any foreign powers. This essay demonstrates that Nasser's positive neutrality policy was the central reason for his success.*

Prior to the 1952 Egyptian Coup led by Gamal Nasser's Free Officers, Egypt was in a state of political and economic chaos. 5% of the population had 95% of the wealth, and its constitutional monarchy was very dysfunctional. King Farouk, the Wafd Party, the Communist Party, and the Muslim Brotherhood were each seeking control of Egypt.[1] Although Mohamed Naguib was Egypt's initial president, Nasser was widely considered to be its effective leader.[2] This was confirmed when Nasser forced Mohamed Naguib to resign in 1954 to become president. Nasser began his reign with a number of clear goals that included modernizing Egypt's economy and military while implementing significant social programs such as universal free education and healthcare.[3] Nasser also insisted on strictly preserving Egypt's

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[1] Barry Rubin, "America and the Egyptian Revolution, 1950-1957," *Political Science Quarterly* 97, no. 1 (1982): 73-90.

[2] Ibid, 73-90.

[3] Nazem Abdalla, "The Role of Foreign Capital in Egypt's Economic Development 1960-1972," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 1 (1982): 87-97.

newfound independence by adhering to a policy of positive neutrality (cooperating but never having formal alliances with any foreign powers), which he never wavered from.[4] With minimal natural resources, Nasser was acutely aware that a substantial amount of foreign aid would be required to accomplish his goals. The aid would also have to be at favourable terms to avoid being deeply indebted to foreign powers, which had crippled Egypt in the past.[5] As shown through the major events of his reign, Nasser was able to accomplish his goals by receiving an immense amount of aid from the US, USSR and others at the height of the Cold War, primarily through the help of his positive neutrality policy.

Nasser's commitment to his positive neutrality policy was deeply evident during the planning of the 1952 Coup. The Truman administration's top secret NSC 129/1 policy involved covert operations geared towards developing alliances with countries in order to reduce the threat of Soviet influence.[6] Led by Kermit Roosevelt and the CIA, Project FF originally involved providing King Farouk with support to consolidate power and develop a similar relationship to the ones the US had with other monarchies in the region including Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Due to King Farouk's unwillingness to adhere to various US conditions, the CIA instead turned to the Free Officers and helped plan the coup. The US also guaranteed that there would be no interference from Great Britain, which resulted in a near bloodless coup.[7] During the planning of the coup, Nasser was clear about his positive neutrality policy and no formal alliance was formed with Egypt. Nevertheless, the Truman administration was satisfied that Egypt would have a staunch non-communist leader.[8]

The next years following the coup strongly demonstrated Nasser's commitment to keeping Egypt independent of all foreign powers. The Eisenhower Administration took over just three months after the coup. It maintained a positive outlook for US relations with Egypt, but its formal position was to gain substantial political control of Egypt by providing aid.[9] Both Naguib and Nasser leaned to the West over the USSR, but Naguib was far more willing to develop formal ties, which the US attempted to exploit.[10] In the next two years before Nasser formally became President of Egypt in 1954, Egypt aggressively requested economic and military aid from the US, but only a small amount of economic aid was provided, and Britain and France also rejected requests for military aid. Furthermore, in 1954, the US

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[4] Rubin.
[5] Abdalla.
[6] John P. Glennon et al., "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Near and Middle East, Volume IX, Part 1." *United States Government Printing Office Washington* (1986).
[7] Rubin.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Silvia Borzutzky and David Berge, "Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don't: The Eisenhower Administration and the Aswan Dam," *Middle East Journal* 64, no. 1 (2020): 84-102.
[10] Rubin.

Secretary of State, John Dulles, who had broken a number of promises to provide aid, asked Nasser to formally and publicly support the US Middle East policy as a condition to increase aid.[11] Despite tremendous pressure from the public resulting from not being able to deliver swiftly on his promises, along with the Communist Party, Wafd Party, and Muslim Brotherhood all still remaining threats, Nasser did not cave in. Yet, the US felt that it was just a matter of time until he yielded.[12]

In 1955, Britain and the US were very confident that they could finally gain a level of control over Nasser when they offered Egypt a prominent role in The Baghdad Pact. The Baghdad Pact was a military alliance led by Britain, meant to provide military and economic aid to its members and create a Western sphere of influence in the Middle East. The US was not a formal member until 1958 but was the provider of most of the aid. The Baghdad Pact deeply went against Nasser's policy of positive neutrality, and he flatly rejected the offer shortly after it was presented to him.[13]After the rejection, it was clear to Nasser that the Western countries would not deliver significant aid until a formal alliance was created.[14] Although he was a steadfast anti-communist, he saw the USSR as his only hope, and began negotiating an aid package. Negotiations were swift, and resulted in the USSR's satellite state, Czechoslovakia, providing an enormous $250 million military package that included military advisors and was nearly 10 times what he asked from the Western powers. The agreement came with no political conditions and had exceptional terms including payments in the form of cotton and Egyptian currency.[15] The aid package was strongly supported by the Egyptian population, instantly made Egypt a regional power and stifled political rivals.

The Czech arms deal was alarming to the US. They thought that Nasser could turn to the USSR for aid despite his anti-communist views, but the size of the package was unfathomable.[16] As a response, in March 1956, the US along with Britain pledged to put up approximately $400 million to complete the Aswan Dam project. The Aswan Dam was the centerpiece of Nasser's economic plan. When completed, it would control the Nile River flooding, add 20-25% of prime agricultural land and create a significant amount of electricity.[17] However, just three months later in July 1956, Dulles announced that the US was rescinding its offer. The announcement was a signal of the US's position on Egypt with Dulles publicly humiliating Nasser stating, "Egypt should get along for the time being without projects as monumental

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[11] Borzutzky and Berge.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Rubin.
[14] David W. Lesch, "Gemal Abd al-Nasser and an Example of Diplomatic Acumen," *Middle Eastern Studies* 32, no. 2 (1995): 362-374.
[15] Florence Gaub and Nicu Popescu, "Chapter 1 The Soviet Union in the Middle East: an overview," *European Union Institute for Security Studies* (2018): 9.
[16] Borzutzky and Berge.
[17] Ibid.

as the Aswan Dam".[18] To further illustrate how things may have gone had Egypt given into the US's alliance demands, during internal deliberations of the Aswan Dam financing, Dulles referred to Nasser as a "non-compliant colonial leader with Soviet sympathy".[19]

Shortly after the rejection of the Aswan Dam financing, Nasser shocked the world when he announced that Egypt would nationalize the Suez Canal and use its revenues to finance the project. The Suez Crisis was a major international incident that had the potential of escalating into a world war.[20] Israel, France, and Britain reacted by invading Egypt with the intent of retaking control of the Suez Canal. Although Egypt had no formal alliances, the USSR and other Eastern Bloc nations immediately responded by pledging to send troops in addition to bombing Tel Aviv, London, and Paris. These threats, and its public condemnation of the Hungarian Crisis that was happening simultaneously, forced the US to demand that Israel, France, and Britain immediately withdraw, which they adhered to.[21] The Suez Crisis was a major victory for Nasser. Not only did Egypt have control of the Suez Canal and its revenues, but Nasser was a hero to Arab nations and other recently decolonized countries for standing up to Israel and the former colonial powers.[22] Not long after, the USSR pledged that they would provide finance and expertise for the Aswan Dam project.

1959 was an important year for Nasser as Egypt repaired its relationship with the US, which resulted in an enormous economic aid package.[23] After the Suez Crisis in 1957, the Eisenhower Doctrine was revealed with the intent to provide support to Middle Eastern nations that were 'threatened' by international communism. The doctrine was also meant to thwart Nasser's growing power in the region.[24] With substantial anti-US sentiment in the region, the Eisenhower Doctrine was an immense failure, and the US foreign policy for the Middle East was in shambles by 1959. Consequently, the US was looking for a new strategy. Around the same period, Nasser had suppressed communist 'threats' in Syria with the formation of the United Arab Republic. Additionally, despite the aid Egypt received from the USSR, Nasser proceeded to publicly condemn communism in response to strengthening relations between the USSR and Iraq. The Eisenhower administration now viewed Nasser to be its best ally to resist communism in the Middle East.[25] To show its support, the US provided Egypt with an economic aid package that

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[18] Borzutzky and Berge, 84.
[19] Ibid, 87.
[20] Winthrop W. Aldrich, "The Suez Crisis: A Footnote to History," *Foreign Affairs* 45, no. 3 (1967): 541-552.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Lesch.
[23] Peter Mansfield, "Nasser and Nasserism," *International Journal* 28, no. 4 (1973): 670-688.
[24] Lesch.
[25] Ibid.

dwarfed any previous packages. The package had no political conditions, meaning that Egypt was free to receive aid from all sources including the USSR.[26]

1960 was a banner year for Nasser. He now directed the global non-aligned movement and was leading an expanded territory with the formation of the UAR. The USSR shrugged off Nasser's anti-communist comments and began construction of the Aswan Dam while Egypt began receiving an unprecedented amount of foreign aid.[27] Egypt's economic reforms and social programs were also working exceptionally well as confirmed by the envoys sent by the Kennedy Administration as a condition of the aid package. The envoys reported that Egypt's life expectancy and literacy rates were growing exponentially. The envoys also indicated that Egypt's rapidly growing middle class was flourishing, which was the direct result of the land reforms and other economic policies executed by the Nasser Regime.[28]

After Nasser's extraordinary success, he made several crucial mistakes, beginning with Egypt's disastrous intervention in the Yemen Civil War in 1962. The war was a disaster financially and politically, particularly due to Saudi Arabia supporting the opposition and Egypt's involvement being widely condemned globally. At the same time, as a response to the Syrian public viewing the UAR as an extension of Egypt rather than a true union, a successful coup resulted in Nasser losing control of Syria in 1962. His final mistake occurred in 1967 and made others seem small in comparison. Bowing to pressure in the Arab world, overestimating Egypt's military strength, and underestimating Israel's resolve, Nasser made a number of aggressive moves toward Israel that resulted in the Israelis attacking and defeating Egypt in a period of only six days. The defeat caused the closure of the Suez Canal from 1967 to 1975 and resulted in Nasser's resignation on June 9, 1967. However, with extreme public outcry, including mass demonstrations supporting him, Nasser rescinded his resignation.

With the mistakes behind him, from 1968, to his untimely death in 1970, Nasser focused domestically to repair the economic damage that the wars caused. The wars also resulted in the Johnson Administration dropping its aid program. However, this was more than covered by increased aid from the Eastern Bloc and the European Union. Additionally, the oil producing Arab countries provided approximately $250 million per year in non-repayable grants to cover the lost revenue from the closure of the Suez Canal. This new aid and Nasser's renewed domestic focus resulted in Egypt having surpluses for the first time in its history.[29]

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[26] Abdalla.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Douglas Little, "The New Frontier on the Nile: JFK, Nasser, and Arab Nationalism," *The Journal of American History* 75, no. 2 (1988): 501-527.
[29] Abdalla.

When Nasser's Free Officers gained power in 1952, Egypt was a near illiterate country in political turmoil with poor medical services. It was suffering from a staggering wealth gap and had been perpetually occupied by colonizers for hundreds of years. Within less than 20 years, Egypt became a fully independent nation with universal healthcare and education, a powerful military, and a thriving economy that was led by a thriving middle class due to Nasser's economic reforms. Egypt's transformation was a direct result of Nasser's vision and leadership, though it could not have been achieved without the vast amount of foreign aid it received during this period. Nasser's unwavering commitment to the policy of positive neutrality was the primary reason that Egypt was able to receive this aid. From 1952-1955, the US and Britain pushed Nasser very hard to engage in a formal alliance, and primarily used the tactic of holding back aid until an alliance was realized. Despite persistent political enemies and extreme pressure from the Egyptian public, Nasser resisted the temptation to take the easy way out and held firm to his non-alignment strategy. There is strong evidence that aligning with the West would not have gone well. Britain was one of Egypt's former colonizers, and the US had a formal strategy to gain significant control over Egypt's politics. Secretary of State Dulles made the US's stance clear by publicly belittling Egypt when he rejected Egypt's request for financial help with the Aswan Dam, and privately referring to Nasser as a "colonial leader". These factors, coupled with the US's ties with Israel, made a successful alliance with the US and Britain near impossible for Egypt. Also, had Egypt aligned with the West, they would not have received the enormous aid packages and support of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, who sought little in return There is no question that Nasser benefited significantly from his reign being at the height of the Cold War and having a global public discord towards colonialism. Nevertheless, this does not discount the fact that Nasser's adherence to the policy of positive neutrality was the primary reason for his success.

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# THE FALL OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE, THE MISMANAGEMENT OF PALESTINE AND SUBSEQUENT LAND GRAB

AMRAN ABDIRAHMAN

*The fall of the Ottoman Empire was heavily anticipated and watched by numerous European nations eager to gain authority. The 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between Britain and France pre-maturely divvied up the Ottoman Empire in the event of a collapse. Mandatory Palestine, as promised, would fall to the British. The nation quickly became a mangle of commitments to the Arab and Jewish community. The acquisition of Palestine was imperative to the introduction of a Jewish state, proximity to the burgeoning supply of Oil and the defence of India. Ultimately, the misconduct by the British led to many deadly riots and the land grab of Palestine.*

The decline of the Ottoman Empire was eagerly observed by many European nations, earning it the title "The Sick Man of Europe."[1] Like vultures surrounding the carcass of a dead animal, Europe and France carved and divvied up the empire among them. Prior to the 1923 dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement has established. The Sykes-Picot Agreement promised Britain and France spheres of influence if the empire was to fall. The French would gain mandates in Syria and Lebanon, on the other hand, Britain would gain mandates in Iraq, Palestine and Transjordan. Britain, at this time, had many colonial acquisitions and taking control over the falling Ottoman Empire would prove to be essential in protecting them. The end of the First World War saw the Middle East become "a tangle of promises which Britain had made to the Arabs, to the Jews, to France and to herself."[2] The mismanagement of Mandatory Palestine by the British by frequently suspending and re-introducing policies would ultimately lead to a deadly land grab that claimed the lives of many. The British extended their reach into the

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[1] Üyesi Fahriye Begüm Yildizeli, "The Expansion of the British Empire in the Middle East After the Ottoman Heritage (1882-1923)." *History Studies* 10, no. 6 (2018): 215-221.
[2] Ibid.

Middle East for imperialist gains, which provoked religious disputes in Palestine and led to the on-going Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Firstly, the fall of the Ottoman Empire resulted from intervention by the Entente Powers during the Great War and, ultimately, led to the British Empire becoming the "Heir of the Middle East"[3]. During the Great War, the Allies presented the Ottoman Empire with "a defence pact,"[4] which ensured the Empire would survive if they stayed neutral. Instead of joining the Allied powers, the Ottoman Empire sided with the Central powers. The country's rejection of the defence pact by the Allies meant they became "a target in the Entente powers strategies."[5] In order to destabilize and disrupt the Ottoman Empire, the Entente powers "us[ed] the nationalistic and independence rebellions."[6] For example, the first Arab Revolt of 1916 against the Turks was "led by the British-backed Sherif Hussein of Mecca."[7] Furthermore, propaganda was published within the Middle East and the West about the "fight for national liberation with Britain"[8] to reinforce the ideology introduced by the British. Britain portrayed its "eastern campaign"[9] into the Ottoman Empire as a fight for the repressed minority within the 'Middle East', a term used mainly by the British during the Great War to separate its geographical proximity to the East. Britain depicted itself as the "natural protector of small, oppressed nations and the guarantor of national self-determination."[10] In this reimagined version of the Middle East spearheaded by Britain, "Jews played a central role."[11] An example of British propaganda in the Middle East is the introduction of the "Arab national flag"[12] by Mark Sykes, a British diplomat, and was used to showcase the "Arab awakening under British protection."[13] Additionally, British interest in the Middle East came as a result of the regions significant supply of oil and "to maintain British Supremacy in an area considered vital to the defence of India."[14] There was a general knowledge that a perceived destabilization of the Ottoman Empire by the Central Powers could "see the [Suez] Canal fall into the hands of a hostile power, bringing Russia into the Persian Gulf in force."[15] The possibility of Russian

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[3] Yildizeli, 224.

[4] Ibid, 221.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

[7] James Renton, "Changing Languages of Empire and the Orient: Britain and the Invention of the Middle East, 1917-1918." *The Historical Journal* 50, no. 3 (2007): 654.

[8] Ibid, 655.

[9] Ibid, 647.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid, 655.

[13] Ibid.

[14] Yildizeli, 220.

[15] Geoffrey Hamm, "British Intelligence in the Middle East, 1898–1906." *Intelligence and National Security* 29, no. 6 (2014): 893.

enlargement threatened the "corridor linking Britain to India."[16] Britain's interest in the Ottoman Empire was further reinforced with the emersion of oil, which could be used for military purposes. In order to acquire more oil, it became apparent that Britain would need to secure "control of the Middle East's burgeoning oil industry."[17]

Secondly, Britain introduced the Balfour Declaration for imperialist gains in Palestine. Following World War 1, the League of Nations provided Britain with a mandate over Iraq and Palestine. Britain was to report to the Permanent Mandates Commission, which was created by the League of Nations. Britain would then go on to present the Balfour Declaration in 1917, which promised the introduction of a "Jewish national home"[18] in Palestine. The League of Nations accepted the proposal and was to oversee the mandate to "protect the population as a whole."[19] Sir Mark Sykes, who helped negotiate the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916, believed that the annexation of Palestine was deemed necessary "in the defence of the Suez Canal against attack from the North and as a station on the future air-routes to the east."[20] In response to this potential threat to Britain's colonial possessions, the idea of a Jewish buffer state in Palestine was introduced. Although the proposed Jewish buffer state would be weak, it would be beneficial to Britain as long as it did not disturb "Mohammedan sentiment."[21] The proposed Jewish buffer state in Palestine would "become home to a new, self-sustaining European settler community,"[22] which would add to Britain's imperialist gains. Moreover, in the annual reports filed to the Permanent Mandates Commission, Britain advised they were achieving their goals to protect the Arab population while promoting a Jewish national home in Palestine, which was not accurate. Before the introduction of the Balfour Declaration, the Jewish population in Palestine was 10%. The 90% Arab majority was firmly against the introduction of an "outside population… that would threaten the[ir] status"[23] and took up arms to stop the mandate. In a 1921 visit to London, the Palestine Arab Congress delegation requested the introduction of a national government in Palestine and the renouncement of the Balfour Declaration. The British Cabinet in 1923 decided to re-assess the project and concluded that they could not confidently establish a Jewish national home and protect the "Arab

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[16] Ibid.
[17] Anand Toprani, "An Anglo-American 'Petroleum Entente'?: The First Attempt to Reach an Anglo-American Oil Agreement, 1921." *Historian* 79 no. 1 (2017): 56–79.
[18] John Quigley, "Britain's Secret Re-Assessment of the Balfour Declaration - The Perfidy of Albion." *Journal of the History of International Law* 13, no. 2 (2011): 249–84.
[19] Ibid, 250.
[20] William Mathew, "The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate, 1917–1923: British Imperialist Imperatives." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 40, no. 3 (2013).
[21] Ibid, 243.
[22] Ibid, 247.
[23] Quigley, 251.

population"[24] as Palestine moved towards independence. In an attempt to appease the Arab population in Palestine, the cabinet "proposed the creation of an Arab Agency."[25] For example, the Arab Agency consulted in immigration. The Arab agency was only promised if the Anti-Balfour Declaration sentiment was to end in Palestine. The Cabinet did not notify the League of Nations of their findings "for reasons relating to its own interests"[26] and continued its "promot[ion] [of]a Jewish national home."[27] Additionally, in 1924, the Colonial Office prepared a "confidential government memorandum"[28] that stated that the Balfour Declaration was introduced as an attempt to gain "the sympathy of influential Jews and Jewish organizations all over the world… at a time of acute national danger."[29]

Thirdly, intervention in Palestine from western powers provoked religious disputes between co-existing religions. Before the promise of a Jewish national home in Palestine, the major religions co-existed. 'Alami, A Muslim Arab, recalls a time in the "beginning of the Mandate Era"[30] where "Jews were peaceful… and cooperation with them was common."[31] 'Alami then goes on to discuss the stark difference in Muslim-Arab relations during the 1929 riots "when the Jewish community which had lived there peacefully since the earliest of times, was literally decimated within two hours."[32] The 1929 riots, also referred to as the Western Wall riots, took place from August 23rd to the 29th, wounded many, and claimed hundreds of lives. Although the deadly riots were indirectly affected by the policies introduced by the British, the cause for the riots was the fight for "custody over the Western Wall/al-Buraq of the Temple Mount/ Haram al-Sharif in Jerusalem."[33] The struggle for control over the Western Wall and other religious sites in Jerusalem erupted due to challenges brought on by Zionists to gain dominance from the Muslims since the induction of the Mandate. The riot started in Jerusalem but extended into Hebron and Safad, which has been home to "Palestine's oldest Jewish communities."[34] The Jewish inhabitants of the old communities were long-time members of the "Palestinian Arab Society… [and] were largely disconnected from the growing Zionist presence in Palestine."[35] The unparalleled violence that spawned the last week of August forced the "British Mandate authorities to re-

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[24] Quigley, 250.
[25] Ibid, 278.
[26] Ibid, 250.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid, 257.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Alex Winder, "The "Western Wall" Riots of 1929: Religious Boundaries and Communal Violence." *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42, no. 1 (2012): 6-23.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Ibid, 6.
[34] Ibid, 7.
[35] Winder.

evaluate and temporarily suspend their policies."[36] Moreover, as a result of the Western Wall Riots, the British authorities concluded that it was necessary to uphold their influence in the region by constructing and enforcing new boundaries that ultimately benefited the Zionist community. The geographical separation of Arabs and Jews was backed by "British state violence."[37] Violence from both sides was used in an attempt "to reinforce, redefine or re-establish boundaries"[38] of the Balfour Declaration. As a result, this fueled Zionist movements among the Jewish population and increased nationalism among the Arab community in Palestine. Ultimately the rise of Zionism and the growing feeling of nationalism in Palestine is directly related to the British government's inability to control the region and its inhabitants.

Lastly, tensions brought on by the introduction of British policies in the Middle East led to the on-going land dispute between the Jewish and Palestinian people even after the policy was suspended. The 1929 riots in Palestine came as a result of increased frustration from the Arab community in response to the "Mandate's Jewish National Home policy."[39] Furthermore, increased immigration from Jewish people across Europe and "Zionist land purchases"[40] applied economic pressure on and exasperated the Arab community. The purchase of land by newly immigrated Jews meant the creation of "a landless and discontented class"[41] of Palestinians. A year later, in 1930, in response to the unforeseen violence of the 1929 riots, the British government released the "Passfield White Paper"[42], which restricted Jewish immigration into Palestine. The purpose of the white paper was to temporarily halt the creation of a Jewish national home to prevent further violence from erupting. The white paper shortly after its induction was reversed. Some believe the reversal was due to Zionist lobbying in the British Government. Furthermore, the lack of meaningful interjection or policy changes by the British government led to further violent revolts. The Arab Revolt of 1936 was a nationalist uprising by the Palestinians that lasted until 1939. The revolt saw a "British counter-insurgency campaign"[43] that ultimately crushed the rebellion with "violence, torture, collective punishment, mass detention and diplomacy."[44] Also, the British army and Jews in Palestine supported local "peace bands"—militia— which was operated by the

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[36] Ibid, 6.
[37] Ibid, 20.
[38] Ibid, 8.
[39] Ibid, 6.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Carly Beckerman-Boys, "The Reversal of the Passfield White Paper, 1930–1: A Reassessment." *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 2 (2016): 213-33.
[42] Ibid, 214.
[43] Matthew Hughes, "Palestinian Collaboration with the British: The Peace Bands and the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936–9." *Journal of Contemporary History* 51, no. 2 (2016): 291-315.
[44] Ibid, 292.

"pro-Government Nashashibi family."[45] Additionally, in 1937, the Peel Commission introduced the idea of a two-state solution, which would split Palestine between the Arabs and the Jews. The report was submitted and approved by the League of Nations. Although Jewish leaders wanted to enlarge the area, they ultimately agreed to the solution. On the other hand, Arab leaders disagreed with the arrangement and believed that "the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine will be a strong attack on the Arabs and a threat to peace."[46] Ultimately, the two-state solution was not accepted by either parties, which resulted in another war breaking out in the region. The Jewish victory in the war meant the proposed "Jewish State [was] much bigger than any proposed partition plan."[47]

British mismanagement of Mandatory Palestine led to the on-going land dispute between the Arab and Jewish community, which has taken many lives and left countless people displaced. Intervention by the Entente Powers through destabilization methods like the support of rebellions within the crumbling Ottoman Empire ultimately played a crucial part in its fall. British interest in the Middle East came as a result of the regions supply of oil and its proximity to their colonial asset—India. Furthermore, British imperialists introduced the Balfour Declaration for reasons relating to their interests. The declaration promised a "Jewish national home"[48] and Arab independence. Although the achievements of both objectives were not within reach, Britain continued. Also, intervention from Western powers, specifically Britain, provoked violent religious disputes between once co-existing religions. Increased immigration from European Jews and the fight for control over land ultimately led to many violent riots, which claimed the lives of many. Increased violence within Palestine fueled the rise of Zionism and Arab Nationalism. The results of the Arab Revolt of 1936 saw the introduction of a two-state solution, which was not mutually agreed upon and incited another war. In the end, Britain withdrew from the region, but its negligence is still felt in Palestine today.

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[45] Ibid, 292.
[46] Shaul Bartal, "The Peel Commission Report of 1937 and the Origins of the Partition Concept." *Jewish Political Studies Review* 28, no. 1/2 (2017): 64.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Quigley, 249.

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# THE ROAD TO CAESAR: ESTABLISHING THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC

COREY MORRELL

*This essay will focus on the primary reasons for Rome's transition from a Republic to an Empire. Much has been said about this period, most of which emphasizes Caesar as the primary focal point. However, only by analyzing the events and people that led to Caesar's rule can we gain a more comprehensive understanding of the collapse of the Roman Republic. The later stages of the Republic culminated centuries of turmoil between the people of Rome and their government. Rome's citizens now demanded more control of their lives through independence. Meanwhile, in the political sphere, the same idea of individualism sparked rivalries between men like Marius, Sulla, Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar—with Caesar ultimately gaining control over the Republic. Consequently, these men all attributed to the destruction of western democracy, and the creation one of the most powerful empires the world has known.*

No clear date in history can be pointed to as the fracturing of the Roman Republic and the beginning of the Roman Empire. Nevertheless, looking back to specific events and people does help to clarify why there was a change in political structure to begin with. In the first century BCE, a struggle for power lasting hundreds of years between people of all classes and political ideologies came to an inevitable point of no return when Caesar announced his own word as law.[1] Leading up to this, the Republic—plagued by war and agricultural instability[2]—fought to survive during a time of imbalanced power within the government. Adding to this internal conflict, a demand for civic rights among the population was growing steadily. A struggle for dominance between the patricians and plebeians were early inklings of the changes to come, the populares' and optimates' constant fight for political control was like nothing seen before, Marius and Sulla's rivalry shattered political

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[1] Suetonius, *Lives of the Caesars, Volume I: Julius. Augustus. Tiberius. Gaius. Caligula,* trans. J. C. Rolfe. Intro. K. R. Bradley. Loeb Classical Library 31. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1914), 77.

[2] David Shotter, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2010), 13.

norms, and Pompey would come out of it all on top… for a short time. All of this eventually led to the end of the prosperous Republic and the start of something new. By examining these political and social changes of the late Republic era, the reasons for its collapse become much more apparent when considering the various men who contributed to it. Indeed, the Republic's collapse can be attributed to the natural reactions caused by not one but several Roman leaders contending for their own complete and authoritative control over Rome.

Although Rome's common people were living in relatively prosperous times during the Republic, there was a collective feeling of imbalance between them and their leaders that served as early warning signs of a significant shift in society. While the Republic lacked a central source of power, it prided itself on the three political pillars of which the power was dispersed: the consuls, the senate, and the people.[3] Although technically an essential part of the trifecta, the latter realized they realistically held little to no power when it came to politics, the economy, military, or religion.[4] As the backbone of Rome, the working class served as a vital component for the economy, yet almost every aspect of their lives was out of their control and in their leaders' hands. As for the bottom of the civil hierarchy—the poor—the rich were taking away their homes. Cheap land available for the poor soon became out of reach when wealthy landlords started to raise their rent, eventually forcing many of the tenants out.[5] A law was later enacted disallowing any one person to hold more than five hundred acres of land at a time. This law meant the rich were obligated to keep people in their homes.[6] However, the wealthy neighbouring landlords soon took control of these lands, leaving the less fortunate to fend for themselves. Once again, the commoners were at the mercy of the higher-ups. It is no surprise then that people "no longer showed themselves eager"[7] when the military inevitably came calling. Refusing to go to war sparked the start of a new age of independence for the common people of Rome—an age that gave them a voice that would shake up the political landscape and draw attention to the ones who had ignored them for hundreds of years: the consuls. Once alienated, the people of Rome were open to a new political structure, and their support would be instrumental in building the Empire to be.

Along with the general population demanding more individual freedom, Rome was also struggling regarding agriculture and territorial expansion. This struggle resulted in opposition within the consul and set the stage for a division in leadership that Rome had not experienced since the abolishment of the monarchy. With Rome

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[3] Shotter, 1.

[4] Ibid, 2.

[5] Plutarch, *Lives, Volume X: Agis and Cleomenes. Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus. Philopoemen and Flamininus,* trans. Bernadotte Perrin. Loeb Classical Library 102. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1921), 8.

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

constantly expanding to outlying provinces and a military growing exponentially, the number of overall magistrates grew out of necessity.[8] The nobility saw this as a problem, but the solution led to a failure in leadership that played out in the Carthaginian wars.[9] Ultimately, Rome required a new system of leadership, a system that neither the "consuls [or] the praetors could provide."[10] Governing authorities of provinces refused to fall back into anonymity after their roles were meant to end. This was a change from the times when they would silently fall back into the shadows after they had completed their duty.[11] Thus, the concept of individualism in government was beginning to overshadow the previous practices of leadership. While internal conflict preoccupied the government, Rome was expanding, and it needed a decentralized government to grow beyond its current state. Meanwhile, the wars with Hannibal led people to question their loyalty toward the Republic, as some felt they were on the wrong side.[12] The relationship between the Romans and the Italians became hostile, creating a new problem concerning Roman citizenship for Italians. What is more, as people abandoned their land, agriculture continued to suffer immensely.[13] Rome was now seeking new leadership, new citizens, and new reforms.

The future of Rome would depend entirely on the ability to stabilize the Republic after this time of internal turmoil and division.[14] At the forefront of this conflict were two men whose feud would catalyze Rome's earliest civil wars: Gaius Marius and Cornelius Sulla. Marius (a popularis) and Sulla (an optimatis) clashed in a rivalry that had their respective sides of government at war with one another. When Sulla, a man with a reputation for his "elimination of political rivals,"[15] marched into Rome for the second time, there was no question who the victor would be. Sulla became dictator—the first person to do so in over one hundred years—and there was now no limit on the extent to which he could hold office.[16] For the first time during the Republic, one man controlled Rome. Now came the realization for other ambitious leaders that a dictatorship was something within the realm of possibility. Much to the surprise of the Romans, Sulla's reign was short-lived, as his rule came to an abrupt end when he unexpectedly retired. His absence left an opportunity for others to contest for the position by solidifying their spot as dictator.

In the absence of Sulla, a new rivalry developed between Pompey and Crassus. However, it was soon put on temporary hold as they set their egos aside to form a

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[8] Shotter, 11.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid, 12.
[12] Ibid, 7.
[13] Ibid, 13.
[14] Ibid, 38.
[15] Ibid, 41.
[16] Ibid, 41.

political alliance in order to acquire more power with their combined wealth and military influence.[17] In addition to this, the new duo dismantled Sulla's reforms along the way. Contrasted with Tiberius's later reforms, when people were "by their wrath and contentiousness to hate the law-giver,"[18] a sudden adjustment of political undoing was generally well-received by the public. The joint consulship's ability to destabilize and undermine the Senate left room for Pompey take full advantage. As he rose to greater heights, he promised stability for Rome, gaining a significant amount support along the way.[19] One of his supporters, a man with much influence, would provide the missing link for the alliance. An ambitious yet unassuming Julius Caesar now aligned himself with Crassus and Pompey, and the First Triumvirate was born.

The consolidation of power for Pompey assured him and future rulers' dictatorship over Rome. This achievement would be the beginning of the greatest empire to have ever dominated the known world, all leading to the rise and fall of Caesar—a man bigger than Rome itself. By constituting his own laws and reforms—some of which were welcomed, others not so much[20]—Caesar alienated himself from the people he relied on most: the Senate. Suetonius, in his famous compendium *Lives of the Caesars*, conveyed the significance of Caesar's downfall when he stated that his failure was not only due to the extravagant and unjust honours such as dictator for life and "uninterrupted consulship… but [that] he also allowed honours to be bestowed on him too great for mortal man."[21] There was no longer any room for such self-gratification in the Republic. By 31 BC—13 years after Caesar's assassination—Octavian's success in defeating Mark Antony would diminish any remaining thoughts of the old Republic. By securing victories over his enemies and captivating the Roman world with his charismatic personality, he put an end to the divisiveness between traditional government and individual determination within the political sphere.[22] The Republic was shattered, and in its place, the looming Empire picked up the pieces.

The idea that a single man could be thought of, either by himself or by the people, as larger than the Roman world itself, is ultimately the mindset that led to the formation of the Roman Empire after Caesar's death. Sulla, Marius, Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar were only a handful of rulers with this mindset who changed the political direction of Rome. Nonetheless, they each played a significant role in building a legacy that would span centuries, and would inform and influence the ways in which future leaders would make their mark on the world. These were the

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[17] Shotter, 48.
[18] Plutarch, 9.
[19] Shotter, 52.
[20] Suetonius, 41.
[21] Ibid, 76.
[22] Shotter, 94.

men who ensured the end of the Roman Republic and led to the start of something that no one could ever have predicted: the greatest, most expansive empire ever to rule the world. It was, in all of its glory, success, and failure, the beginning of the end for the Roman Republic.

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# ADORNMENT OF A HELLENISTIC MAENAD: A GOLD HAIRNET IN CONTEXT

ASHLEY LAVANCHY

*An ornate goldwork hairnet from the Hellenistic period that is currently in the Metropolitan Museum of Art has not been the primary subject of any published research prior. This paper intends to analyze the stylistic elements of the hairnet, and how these attributes reflect the many cultural changes occurring in the time that the jewellery piece was produced. The hairnet's possible artistic links to the influence of the Ptolemaic dynasty as well as the growing public fascination with the mystery cult of Dionysus are explored. Developments in the domestic and public roles of women, including those within the religious sphere are of particular interest.*

The conquests of Alexander the Great expanded the Greek world by claiming new land from his victory over the Persian empire and establishing settlements throughout the Mediterranean and in territories beyond such as the Middle East and Central Asia. The period of cultural interaction which commenced from these conquests made the Hellenistic world far more interconnected and cosmopolitan than the world that had existed prior. People travelled within this expansive new empire spreading the customs and religion of their own culture, and the exchange of artistic conventions was facilitated by the establishment of new trade routes. Greek art and architecture adopted elements from foreign cultures which often resulted in the eventual syncretisation of traditions. These cultures also became Hellenized through prolonged exposure, as regions that had come under the direct influence of Greece began to synthesize aspects of Greek culture with local traditions. The process of Hellenization is especially prominent in Egypt following the foundation of the Ptolemaic dynasty, where the new Greek settlers of the area replaced the previous native Egyptian aristocracy despite representing a minority in the population. It was under these circumstances that an impressive piece of material culture was produced.

Figure 1: Gold openwork hairnet with medallion. ca. 200 – 150 BCE
Currently in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Accession 1987.220.[1]

The piece known as "gold openwork hairnet with medallion" is currently kept at The Metropolitan Museum of Art, and its elaborate metalwork is suggestive of a variety of different cultural shifts that contributed to changes in the traditional roles and statuses of women during the Hellenistic period (see Figure 1).[2] The hairnet is dated to the Ptolemaic period, ca. 200-150 BCE, although this is an approximate time, likely based entirely on the comparison of artistic trends that are not always consistent across geographical locations or restricted to any specific period. This approach however is necessary, given that the hairnet was donated to the museum by Norman Schimmel, a prominent collector of Mediterranean antiquities.[3] For this

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[1] "Gold openwork hairnet with medallion," The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.

reason, where the object was discovered and at what point in time is not indicated by the museum and is likely not known. Unfortunate predicaments such as these are common with antiquities, especially with those that hold substantial economic value. Though critical archaeological information on this object has been regrettably lost, the decorative aspects and iconography of this piece can still be analyzed to provide thematic insight on the social developments of the Hellenistic world, especially those that concern women.

The most pronounced aspect of the hairnet is the medallion that presents a portrait in high relief framed by intricate filigree. High relief is identifiable due to the sculptural form protruding forth from the medallion's base to a significant degree, as opposed to being rendered by means of shallow indentations, which is categorized as low relief (see Figure 2 for side profile of portrait). Medallions of this type are an innovation of the Hellenistic period with known examples having been dated to the second century BCE onwards.[4] The portrait is thought to represent a maenad, one of the "raving" female followers of the god Dionysus, because of the surrounding use of Dionysian motifs. The figure's face is youthful and round, while the projection of the cheek bones emphasizes a sense of depth that is characteristic of Hellenistic portraiture. The serene facial expression echoes Classical art traditions while the large and wide-set eyes along with the small mouth and prominent chin reflect artistic conventions of the Greek world.

The portrait itself is achieved by repoussé, which generally entails hammering a relief into the reverse side of a metal sheet.[5] To keep the thickness of the metal uniform in high relief work, it became necessary to work both sides of the metal.[6] Similar to other examples of Hellenistic goldwork medallions, this example appears to consist of two individual pieces of metal, given that the relief needed to first be "worked on a separate disc of sheet gold" that was then applied "to the centre of the medallion" and subsequently bound together.[7] The hairnet's finish appears nearly "satin-like" which is a feature of much Hellenistic jewellery. This finish is due to the goldsmith's repeated processes of burnishing and heating which effectively assists in preserving the original appearance of the goldwork, and thereby minimizes the need for significant conservational efforts to be taken with these pieces.[8]

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[4] R.A. Higgins, *Greek and Roman Jewellery* (London: Methuen and Co Ltd, 1961), 156.
[5] Herbert Hoffman, and Patricia F. Davidson. *Greek Gold Jewelry from the Age of Alexander* (Boston: Museum of Fine Arts, 1965), 234.
[6] Higgins, 10.
[7] Hoffan and Davidon, 223.
[8] Ibid, 48.

Figure 2: Gold openwork hairnet with medallion. ca. 200 – 150 BCE
Currently in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, Accession 1987.220.[9]

Since the face of the subject is fairly androgynous, and considering Dionysus is frequently depicted with more delicate or "feminine" features, it is difficult to conclude with any certainty whether the medallion depicts a worshipper or the god himself. Distinguishing mortal from divine in art often poses difficulties, because devotees are commonly depicted with the same motifs as those that are employed to signify the god they serve.[10] In Hellenistic art, attempts to make these differentiations definitive are further complicated due to the emergence of ruler cults that utilized sacred imagery to equate kingship with divinity.[11] This correlation of the ruling class to divine authority was already an established custom in areas such as Persia and Egypt, and was a practice adopted by Alexander the Great during his lifetime. In the case of this object, the medallion's figure has presumably been identified as a maenad, rather than Dionysus, simply because the hairnet itself is something that would have been worn by a woman. However, this alone does not decisively exclude the possibility of the portrait being of the god, given that the gender of the owner is unlikely to always be synonymous with the gender of the artistic subject matter of an object.

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[9] "Gold openwork hairnet with medallion," The Metropolitan Museum of Art.
[10] Joan Breton Connelly. *Portrait of a Priestess: Women and Ritual in Ancient Greece.* (Princeton University Press, 2007), 108.
[11] Ibid.

The figure wears a wreath of vines and bunches of grapes over their ears, indicative of the production and consumption of wine. As one of Dionysus' predominant domains, wine would induce his worshippers to experience either a pleasant alleviation of anxieties or a state of madness through intoxication. The Greeks credited Dionysus with teaching humans the cultivation of the vine and as such, grape harvest and winemaking were indicators of culture and civilized behaviour. Wine was as a substance as multifaceted as the god himself; it was what the Greeks used to distinguish themselves from the non-wine drinking barbarians and it was the inciter of the untamed states of ecstasy that are most associated with maenads. Dionysus was a chthonic deity with a connection to the cyclicity of nature as observable through the death and rebirth of vegetation that he embodied. As such, the use of ivy leaves in association with Dionysus were a symbol of the "protection of the deceased" signifying the assurance of "a happy life after death" from the god.[12] Other examples of Hellenistic jewellery, such as necklaces and earrings that use similar imagery of vine wreaths, seem to confirm an artistic popularity of maenads as a reflection of the widespread fascination with the mystery rites of Dionysus during this time.[13]

A crisis of succession followed the death of Alexander the Great. Conflicts amongst his generals and relatives, otherwise known as the Wars of the Diadochi, were a source of political unrest and uncertainty as many fought to gain control of the empire that Alexander abruptly left behind. These disputes influenced those who claimed to be a successor of Alexander to connect themselves to him visually as a way of legitimizing their claims to authority.[14] Examples of this custom survive in Hellenistic coinage which depict potential successors with the inclusion of features that imitate the most prominent characteristics of Alexander, such as his easily recognizable hairstyle. For this reason, Ptolemy I, who had acquired control over Egypt after Alexander's death, formed his own connection to Dionysus as a means of further affirming his association with Alexander, who also promoted himself as a descendent of Dionysus.[15] The Ptolemies avid propagation of the cult of Dionysus for political purposes was partially responsible for its growing prominence under the influence of their dynasty, contributing to a socio-cultural atmosphere in which such an accessory would be crafted.

Festivals held for Dionysus became exceedingly extravagant with the encouragement of the Hellenistic monarchs that gave occasion for displaying the

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[12] Dorota Gorzelany, "The Symbolism of the Architectural Forms, Painted Decoration and Furnishings of Tombs in Macedonia." Oxford: Archaeopres (2019), 146.
[13] Hoffman and Davidson, 12.
[14] Jordi Pàmias, "Dionysus and Donkeys on the Streets of Alexandria: Eratosthenes' Criticism of Ptolemaic Ideology." *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 102 (2004), 2.
[15] Ibid.

wealth and prosperity of their kingdom.[16] Rituals for Dionysus retained the pre-Hellenistic era theatrical essence, and the processions dedicated to him were grand events that included hired musicians as well as actors that would use costumes to embody figures of significance in connection to Dionysus.[17] Many roles in these processions were open to women, who could have had a part as a maenad, while men would impersonate satyrs to formally represent the mythological retinue of Dionysus.[18] Ritual re-enactments of mythical narratives are thought to have been a vital aspect of the Mystery cults that would assist in creating a perceived bond between worshipers and their god.

Mystery cults, such as that of Dionysus, also gained popularity from people of varying social statuses. Participation in mystery religions required initiation and additionally, the promise of maintaining the secrecy surrounding their sacred rites, making reliable information on these practices incredibly scarce. Contrary to state-sanctioned religions, involvement in mystery cults was not a mandatory civic duty but an individual choice. People sought a close spiritual connection with the deities they worshipped, and gradually became more inclined to favour gods that seemed more suited to offer fulfilment for their own personal needs. Appeasing the gods and placating their anger for the sake of the state had previously been of primary significance within Greek religious structure.[19] Dionysus was uniquely enticing in this regard because he brought relief from the mundanity of daily life's tiresome responsibilities through his festivities. Initiates of his cult were also drawn to Dionysus' perceived role as a provider of a better afterlife that countered the eternal state of dread and despair that would await them in the Underworld otherwise. This aspect of the cult of Dionysus, and of mystery religions in general, was crucial to its appeal because the promise of salvation in the afterlife was a concept that was largely absent from Greek religious belief.

As this hairnet is a clear indicator of wealth and status, it is worth examining the contexts under which such jewellery might have been worn along with the societal shifts that would have sanctioned women to present themselves in this manner. Interestingly, owning such a luxury object of adornment arguably lacks the idealized Greek conception of female modesty. The increasing demand for women's luxury items during the Hellenistic era may be partially attributed to the diminishment of pre-existing legal restrictions of the Greek world concerning women's inability to have access to or sole control over their wealth.[20] Thus, this development allowed women of the upper-class some liberties that enabled them to

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[16] Glenn R. Bugh, *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World.* (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 211.
[17] Connelly, 107.
[18] Ibid.
[19] Bugh, 211.
[20] Jane Rowlandson, Editor. *Women & Society in Greek & Roman Egypt.* (Cambridge University Press, 1998), 35-36.

spend without the supervision of a husband or male relative.[21] This was especially the case for the queens and princesses of the Ptolemaic dynasty who followed the conventions of Macedonian royalty, which permitted women to own and manage their own property.[22] These social developments created an increase in opportunities for women to make contributions in their name for the benefit of religion which could garner them recognition and even acclaim as the benefactresses of specific cults or sanctuaries.[23]

Women had always held vital roles in traditional Greco-Macedonian worship in which their participation within the religious sphere demonstrated their contributions to their state and the overall welfare of society, generally through their association with fertility in conjunction with their reproductive capacities. However, during the Hellenistic period, the roles of a priestess increasingly became a means for women to obtain public honour by occupying a position of communal prestige.[24] Therefore in certain circumstances, women's involvement in the religious realm became less anonymous and more worthy of individual praise. However, the "glory and civic honour" awarded to women who acted as patrons to their communities "also extended to their entire family line" and as a result, benefitted their husband and male relatives.[25]

Positions of authority within a religious context were still predominantly limited to women who came from prominent or affluent families.[26] Competition between noble families for jurisdiction over priesthoods was not unusual, but elite women with sufficient financial resources at their disposal could independently secure and manage priesthoods.[27] Other specific requirements often needed to be met by those seeking to purchase a priesthood, such as being of able-body which was regarded as a perceivable signifier that an individual had not been "cursed" by the gods.[28] Such requirements are indicated by "inscriptions that advertise the sale of priesthoods" from the Hellenistic period.[29] It gradually became more commonplace for women to hold roles of religious influence and by the late Hellenistic period, men frequently held office in conjunction with their wives.[30]

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[21] Ibid.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Sharon L. James, and Sheila Dillon, *A Companion to Women in the Ancient World* (Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2012), 247.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Connelly, 44.
[27] Ibid.
[28] Ibid, 45.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid, 42.

The majority of recorded Hellenistic jewellery has been found in tombs dated to the "late fourth or early third century" BCE, coinciding with the abundant quantities of gold in Greece at this time.[31] As such, one of the most consistent functions of jewellery is as an assertion of familial wealth and status made by the surviving relatives of a deceased individual. The lavishness of grave gifts from burials of women from across the Hellenized world, that include, amongst other items of religious significance, jewellery. Such surviving examples of jewellery present iconography that is connotative of service to a specific god, and have consequently been speculated by scholars to represent the owner's former "priestly status" in life.[32] Deeds of civic benevolence could qualify a woman to be commemorated after her death in the form of a costly burial, or in some exceptional cases, a public burial ceremony.[33] Public burial for women in the Greek world was a tremendously rare event, as it was one of the "greatest civic honours" achievable, even for men who had more public presence and political influence in every sense.[34] In the Hellenistic period these mortuary rituals were most commonly held for women who had been civic office holders, patrons, or priestesses.[35]

The gold openwork hairnet at The Metropolitan Museum of Art is a reminder that Hellenistic jewellery is never purely ornamental, as its uses of religious imagery and the quality of its workmanship can be placed within the context of historical developments to interpret the ways in which these drastic changes impacted the lives of individuals. The gold hairnet provides a glimpse at how adornment was used to communicate the worth and virtues of women, as well as their religious piety. The motifs employed by jewellery have intention beyond decoration, which are often deliberately suggestive of the values of the wearer and of her family, and could therefore be an indicator of wealth and status for the living as well as the deceased.

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[31] Higgins, 157.
[32] Connelly, 226.
[33] Connelly, 224.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid.

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# CLOTHING AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION: A FASHION TREND ANALYSIS

AUSTIN EVERETT

*Fashion is an ever-changing expression of values, culture, beauty preferences and technological advances. This paper delves into how the economic disparity of the Great Depression had an intense and lasting effect on fashion trends. It highlights how human creativity is apparent and adaptable through clothing and how fashion is a priority for many people despite their socio-economic status. This paper also highlights how history may be told through clothing and trends. Little has been documented when it comes to sack-flour dresses nor has much been said of well-known 30s style dresses and how they came to be. This paper analyzes these and more historic art expressions and shows how unexpected business partnerships blazed a trail for future fashionistas.*

An era's history is told through a myriad of expressions such as architecture, music, literature and paintings yet historians continue to discover cultural details that provide further insights into the past. Fashion and trends are an additional looking glass into an era providing a unique detailed perspective of a slice in time. Fashion reflects social events, be it in times of tragedy or success, war and peace even during severe economic depression. A costume historian for example, views clothing as an honest reflection of culture and an expression of the social environment revealing cultural patterns of the time.[1] When analyzing society during the economic crash of 1929 and the Great Depression in its wake people adapted and changed, perhaps as dramatically as the nosedive of the economy. Investments and purchases of stocks and shares from borrowed money during the 1920s with a hope to pay it off later were mostly lost along with people's life savings. Despite the economy, fashion continued to flourish and evolve while still reflecting the cultural patterns of its time. Clothing trends developed and conquered the economic hurdles of the thirties while employing some of the most unique sustainable fashion

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[1] Kendra Brandes,"Feed Sack Fashion in Rural America: A Reflection of Culture," *Online Journal of Rural Research and Policy* 4 no. 1 (2009): 59.

solutions of the 20th century. The challenges such as unemployment, poverty, and hunger of the Great Depression revolutionized the fashion industry and paved the way for new materials in clothing design. It inspired and brought about individual creativity, unique make-shift clothing solutions and fashion business deals that we continue to practice today. Depression brought on conservative themes in trends which was an intense contrast from the recent decade of the 1920s. With the economy in such a state clothing mirrored a world that was turned upside down. It was a world that was surviving not thriving, but with survival unique methods to stay afloat prevailed with fashion being a huge part of the story. Style and clothing truly reflected the depressing and unique struggles of an era which was surrounded by disasters.

Any and all products that could be salvaged were— making way for fashion that demanded creativity and in some respects a team-up of agricultural manufacturers and textile designers. It didn't start with the Great Depression, but it certainly trended into popularity and became widely acceptable in rural American society. In this era the result of this team-up became known as feed sack fashion. Having experienced extreme monetary loss and hardship families were desperate as most could only afford what was necessary— clothing was rarely viewed as a luxury good. With the creativity of feed sack fashion women and children continued to update their wardrobes to keep up with the fashions of the day. The unstitching of one or more feed sacks to be sewn into anything from adult dresses to kids' overalls began as early as 1890[2] but it wasn't until the disparity of the depression that the trend really took hold. Unique patterns such as gingham with a variety of colours were printed on flour and feed sacks by the merchants. This made it possible to have variety in the wardrobe without feeling outdated or poor.[3] In 1936 the Staley Milling Company of Kansas City, Missouri teamed up with the Percy Kent Bag Company and created what was called "tint-Sax." These flour bags and sacks were sold in 11 varieties of pastel shades and were created with higher thread count material. They were primarily made out of cotton percale— a higher end cotton fabric— and print cloth.[4] This was more than just a unique way to recycle and the pre-depression uninteresting farm wife became a fashion influencer. The textile industry began to take notice of her. These textile industries began offering farm women the very best in cotton fabrics and disguised it not so subtly as flour sacks.[5] Another clothing item that came in vogue was an apron house-frock hybrid robe. The dress was nicknamed a "Hooverette" after President J. Edgar Hoover whom

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[2] Margaret Powell, "From Feed Sack to Clothes Rack: The Use of Commodity Textile Bags in American Households from 1890 – 1960" *Textile Society of America 13th Biennial Symposium Proceedings, Washington, DC, September 18- September 22, 2012.* (University of Nebraska, 2012), 3.

[3] Ibid, 3.

[4] Brandes, 5.

[5] Ibid.

Americans largely blamed for the Depression.[6] It was created with any fabric that could be found around the house and was designed so that if one part of the garment got dirty it would simply need to be re-tied so that the dirty part faced inward looking good as new. These apron-like dresses became popular in part because of their easy maintenance and conservation of laundry soap. Fabric along with water consumption was also minimized as washing them didn't require the same frequency as a standard dress. The *Gettysburg Times* in Pennsylvania wrote February 9, 1937 that these wrap-around style dresses could even be worn for "after-dusk glamour."[7] These frocks which pre-Depression were seen as home-only dresses evolved dramatically becoming even glamourous. For an economically struggling American and Canadian woman of the day this evolution would have provided ample ways to stay on trend and look up to date for a night out. The Depression also made it appropriate for fashionistas to re-use a garment in different ways. Previously in high societies the re-wearing of garments wasn't a popular trend, but Greta Garbo in the film *Susan Lenox, Her Fall and Rise* popularized the idea and made it acceptable. Garbo, as directed, wore the same sweater in varying ways throughout the movie which glamourized the "make-do" approach with fashion.[8] Certainly on Garbo anything would be acceptable and glamorous, but the movie-watching public related with her poor character and took the idea and ran with it. As such, in an attempt to bring already owned garments up to date inexpensive fabrics such as cottons were purchased at department stores and sewed onto older clothing.[9] As a result, hems lowered as the flapper style and provocative garments of the roaring 20's became more conservative and modest.

The Great Depression suppressed the progress of the forward-looking light-hearted attitude in the 1920s and made way for a more conservative-looking approach to fashion designs. The earlier decade's traditions of flapper dresses and exposed legs for women were abandoned and knee length skirts crept in vogue. The 1929 runways of the coveted Paris couture foresaw these lower hemlines and flowy cuts, but many women could not afford them. Being inventive American women updated their shorter-length skirts by adding lengthening bands across the bottom hemline and to their sleeves— often fur or contrasting fabrics. These small inexpensive additions to preowned clothing gave the impression their outfits had been purposely designed this way and was not a desperate means to be up to date.[10] Colours also reflected what was going on in the era. They were conservative and darker than

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[6] Catherine Bradley, *Servants, housewives, vixens, and the ever-changing apron. Cuizine: The Journal of Canadian Food Cultures/Cuizine: revue des cultures culinaires au Canada* 3, no. 2. 2012, paragraph 11.

[7] Marian Martin Jiffy, "YOU CAN SEW THIS YOURSELF." *Gettysburg Times*. February 9, 1937.

[8] Linda Welters and Patricia Cunningham eds, *Twentieth-century American Fashion* 6. (Berg Publishers, 2005), 87.

[9] Maria Costantino et al., *Fashions of a decade:1930.* (New York: Facts on File, 2007), 7.

[10] Ibid, 7-10.

what had been previously seen and conveyed a subdued mood, as if personifying the economic disaster itself. Navy blues and blacks accompanied city wear; browns and greens for fall; afternoon and evening wear took on black and pastel shades of peach, pink, green and blue.[11] Colours that were all muted, downplayed and conservative. Another incident that resulted in a more conservative style for women was a business decision by the McMullen Company of Glens Falls in New York. This well-known manufacturer and designer of men's tailored poplin shirts was one of the first to popularize what became known as the shirt-frock, later to be called the shirtwaist dress.[12] McMullen during economic hardship was in search of more clientele and turned to a new demographic; women. The company hired designer Dorothy Cox who translated the traditional men's collared shirts into a one- or two-part dress.[13] Because they were made from inexpensive fabrics such as cotton broadcloth, chambray and wool flannel wholesale prices were affordable and as such were widely purchased throughout America.[14] These dresses were available to the average American consumer at a price of $4.75 to $12.75 ($58.99 to $158 today) and quickly became the newest must-haves.[15] The company soon became known as a "Shirtmaker to Women."[16] The nature of a men's tailored style shirt on a woman took on a very conservative approach, adding to the conservative-like trends of the decade.

Expensive designer Art Deco era fashions were trending in the 30s. Despite these trends, inexpensive ready-to-wear clothing prevailed, with price dives giving more people access to a designer-like wardrobe. U.S. department stores canceled orders of their overseas luxury garments and introduced affordable ready-to-wear lines. Luxury goods like designer clothing seen in Paris became attainable because the industry made it accessible for all by using fabrics that anyone could afford. The industry knew that during these harsh conditions consumers would trend away from purchasing high-end goods so they turned the luxury good into a normal one.[17] It was something local designers could create themselves minimizing production costs and gaining higher profits. The patterns were simple and the fabrics inexpensive.[18] The popular belief that only expensive things could be designer-like quality was beginning to fade, and affordable fashionable looks began to emerge. Though this concept first appeared with Art Deco in the 20s, it was popularized during the Depression and was experimented with by designer Coco Chanel. She was one of the first to capture the spirit of inexpensive fashion and made it available

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[11] Ibid, 10.
[12] Welters et al, 93-94.
[13] Ibid, 94.
[14] Ibid, 93.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Kim Eundeok, Ann Marie Fiore, Hyejeong Kim *Fashion Trends: Analysis and Forecasting*, (Bloomsbury Publishing: 2021), 6.
[18] Costantino et al, 38.

to the market. Using cheap fabrics such as cotton she designed simple looking clothing such that the average housewife who knew how to sew would be able to recreate.[19] Magazines inserted patterns of the designer's couture looks for women all over the world to mimic. Chanel also brought about the use of inexpensive plastics in jewelry creation making it possible for women to wear and own these things. Women could be seen walking the streets with plastic made jewelry and clothing. It became not only chic because of the novelty of the idea but also was widely used for its relatively cheap value. It was capable of mimicking materials such as ivory, ebony, jade or coral giving the moderate-income woman a chance to be designer-chic.[20] Ideas throughout the Art Deco era though conceived during an economic disaster were by no means suffocated by the strain of it. One of the most profound initiatives that came out of the Art Deco era during the Depression was streamlining.[21] By employing faster simpler and cheaper working methods, streamlined fashion became a marvel of the modern age. Through the efforts of designer Norman Bel Geddes streamlining or Streamline Moderne became an acceptable style.[22] It was a reflection of the austere economic hardships of the time and reflected shapes and lines inspired by the aerodynamics of art deco.[23] Streamlining was also interpreted as a symbol for a better future beyond the Depression. It was also another way to embrace the newly discovered machine age.[24] Heavy tariffs were also a huge factor that contributed to inexpensive designer-like looks and culture. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 had a huge impact on America. The tariff raised import duties to protect American business and farmers by an average of 20 percent, and as such gave American designers fast track access to their own market.[25] They also turned Parisian-luxury-chic clothing to mass produced accessible clothing for any average American.[26] Certainly, those who were rich enough to afford a 20 percent tariff on original Parisian garments would continue to purchase it, but it wasn't widely popular. With the French couture market in America drying up, the void in the market created by the once Parisian designed clothing companies gave way to American designers. This brought popularity to women's designer sportswear. These garments were made out of inexpensive non-European imported goods. They were mass-manufactured and much more versatile, an aspect Americans loved during the time of depression.[27] Thus, sportswear was starting to be popularized as an answer to high

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[19] Ibid, 38.
[20] Costantino et al, 38.
[21] Ibid, 36.
[22] Ibid.
[23] Ibid.
[24] Ibid.
[25] Sheryl Ann Farnan, " 'It is a Profession that is New, Unlimited and Rich!': The Promotion of the American Fashion Designer in the 1930s." (PhD dissertation, Iowa State University, 2005). Retrospective Theses and Dissertations.
[26] Ibid, 2.
[27] Welters et al.

tariffs afflicting importations. Another consequence of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff was the cooperation of film directors and clothing retailers. To counteract loss of income with poor sales in retail stores, fashion designers and movie producers worked together to advertise clothing.[28] Because of tariffs halting international products, Americans began looking at New York and California instead of Paris for fashion advice, which presented a perfect way to advertise new "American" styles. With this novel team-up, anyone could buy the designs their favourite celebrity icons wore. Patrons would go to a movie, marvel at the outfits of Joan Crawford for example and seamlessly, replicas of these outfits would appear in retail stores right after the screening.[29] People had direct access to designer-looking clothing without bottoming out their bank accounts. We still see this culture going on today.

Social culture influenced by the economic crash of 1929 did have a profound and lasting impact on the world of fashion and the story of an era was told. It was a story that presented to us a narrative of poverty in a 20th century crisis, yet it wasn't just about the lack of funds in society it was about creativity and innovation. It taught us the desire of people despite their circumstances to be fashionable and how important the outward expression of clothing truly is for humanity in the western world. Menswear exclusive clothing companies turned their tailoring specialties to women and created the shirtwaist dress. Farm-folk became a spotlight for style with the inventive conversion of flour sacks to clothing. Designers' use of inexpensive materials revealed in greater depth the poverty and desperation of the time. The social climate of the Great Depression not only paved a way for novel materials to be used in fashion but ensured these changes would continue in the decades that followed. Fashion innovations and new ideas survived during an extreme period of suffering and poverty. People became creative, companies intuitive to their consumers and fashion trends were ground-breaking and new as a result while people still found joy in fashion. Most were able to update their wardrobes despite the devastating circumstances that surrounded them. They perhaps without knowing it, were creating a whole new way of doing things that forever curved the fashion world and told us a story we'll always remember.

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[28] Ibid, 95.
[29] Welters et al, 95.

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# BOOK REVIEWS

# *THE PERSIAN BOY* BY MARY RENAULT

LILY BAKER

*The Persian Boy*, a novel by Mary Renault, depicts the dramatic historical figure of Alexander the Great, the renowned king of Macedon. In his lifetime, Alexander expanded his empire into Greece, Persia, and then India, taking the titles of Pharaoh of Egypt and Lord of Asia (among other monikers). With a deep sense of empathy and compassion for his losses and hardships, *The Persian Boy* is a thoughtful, in depth look at Alexander's many years on campaign, which depicts him as distinctly human in the face of extraordinary, seemingly divine, deeds. The novel is told through the eyes of Bagoas, a Persian bed slave who was an actual historical figure. Focusing on his life and relationship with Alexander, Renault has an excellent, nuanced understanding of each character, displayed through a lovely variety of moral greys. Alexander, who is depicted as an honourable and generous man who desires to love and be loved above all else, is also responsible for great horrors which the book does not shy away from. Bagoas, a slave who suffered abuse and terrors from the tender age of seven, has not been warped and jaded by his experiences and is instead gentle and loving despite, and possibly because of, the tragedies of his past. In antiquity, where trauma would be a common occurrence, there would likely only be the option to adapt and move on, or break and die.

Aside from insight into the possible personalities and motivations of historical figures, cultural distinctions and parallels between Persians, Macedonians and Greeks are made abundantly clear. The superiority which both sides feel, whether subtle or incredibly obvious, is artfully illustrated through Bagoas' perspective as a Persian, an outsider whose ignorance of Greek customs is a source of both conflict and insight. Among the cultural commentary are smaller historical details which speak of the author's love for history and brings the characters to life through Bagoas' narration. An accomplished historian herself, Renault uses reputable primary sources such as the Greek author Arrian, while warning the reader away from more dubious sources such as the works of Curtius, a Roman historian. As a result, her work is a mix of logical fiction and many references to reputable sources regarding Alexander the Great.

Notably, considering the typical Greek attitude of superiority that many of his generals and soldiers express, the respect Alexander shows his enemies and foreign troops could easily be confused with a tolerant ideology for other cultures. Realistically, in a time of virulent nationalism and intolerance of foreigners, such a perspective would be wholly inappropriate or, at the very least, a view held by the very few and very unique. That said, Renault's characterization of Alexander does not superimpose modern values, and his respect instead stems from an exceptional regard for anyone who maintains a high sense of honour and/or military skill.

According to Plutarch's *Life of Alexander*, this characterization could be spot on. Plutarch alleges that the same man who took troops and slaughtered the citizens of Thebes before burning the city to the ground and selling the survivors into slavery, allowed a Theban woman to go free simply because of her "calm and fearless bearing…[which filled Alexander] with admiration".[1] This single event exemplifies this characterization of Alexander, by highlighting the obvious brutality he was capable of in contrast with an unusual desire to reward excellence: whether the exemplary figure be man or woman, fellow Greek or rival Persian. The charismatic and passionate personality of Renault's Alexander matches the vision of many scholars. He was a man whose personality alone "had carried an army more than 10,000 miles"[2] from their home and even persuaded his enemies to join his ranks. His charisma and excellence was so extraordinary that the mother of the Persian king, Sisygambis, grieved Alexander's death "as if she had lost another son"[3] and ultimately starved herself to death in response.[4]

Aimed at a wide variety of readers, Renault's novel is suitable for academics, casual fans of the classics, or anyone with an interest in historical romance and war. It is, of course, worth mentioning that virtually all the sources are filled with bias and uncertain events. Her efforts at historical accuracy are extensive, but, keeping in mind how little we know, it is impossible for anything to be entirely factual. Considering that, *The Persian Boy* is as historically authentic as one can expect, and Renault does a wonderful job of maintaining historical contexts and perspectives. Overall, Mary Renault's novel is an excellent example of what could have been, and *The Persian Boy* is as much truth as anything else.

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[1] Plutarch. *The Age of Alexander*. Translated by Ian Scott-Kilvert and Timothy Duff. (England: Penguin Classics, 1973), 292.
[2] Edward Anson. *Alexander the Great: Themes and Issues*. (Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 181.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.

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# THE UNKNOWN REVOLUTION: 1917-1921 BY VOLINE

DECLAN BURKE

Revolutions are inherently attractive in their romantic sense of adventure and possibility. They are also the most common victims of historical oversimplification. In the case of Russia's 1917 Revolutions, and the Civil War from 1918-1921, this has resulted in the diverse forces on the revolutionary side of the conflict being homogenized into the singular force of the 'Reds', typically represented by the Bolshevik led Red Army. Narratives of Red forces duelling across two continents with equally monolithic counter-revolutionary 'White' armies, have thus drowned out some of the revolution's most important voices. Indeed, while Nestor Makhno and his anarchist Black Army are acknowledged as an important component of the military defeat of Anton Denikin's southern White Army, their broader program of social and economic innovation in southern Ukraine's "Free Territory" are either omitted, or drastically oversimplified as a glorified supply network incapable of any real long-term sustainability.[1] The question of how anarchist theorists and activists impacted the wider revolution is even more woefully underrepresented, and most often completely ignored.

As such, Vselovod "Voline" Eichenbaum's *The Unknown Revolution: 1917-1921* provides a critical perspective on one of the most fascinating and tumultuous turning points in world history from one of its least studied factions. A committed anarchist and active participant in both the 1905 and 1917 revolutions, Voline traces the history of the revolutionary age of the Russian state from the Decemberist revolt of 1825, to the collapse of Makhnovist Ukraine and the fall of the Kronstadt rebellion in 1921. The book serves as a combination of historical analysis, political theory, and memoir for Voline's own experiences; from Petersburg in 1905, to his work with the Ukranian Maknovists from 1918 to 1920.[2] Supported by a wealth of historical evidence, excerpts from periodicals and letters, and autobiographical recollections of Russia and Ukraine during the revolutions and civil war, *The*

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[1] Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century.* New York, NY: Harper &. Row Publishers, 1969), 95-97.
[2] Rudolph Rocker, "Voline", in *The Unknown Revolution: 1917-1921.* (Oakland CA: PM Press, 2019), 9, 11-13.

*Unknown Revolution* is a unique, readable and engaging history that does not shy away from critical reflection and analysis of the anarchists and their failures in the period.

Voline combines scholarship and firsthand experience in the first 'Book' of *The Unknown Revolution*, covering the events leading to the October revolution in 1917. His anarchistic lens on historical and ideological development in Russia from 1825 (the year of the Decembrist revolt against the coronation of Tsar Nicholas I) to 1905, make excellent comparative reading with more mainstream accounts, such as Bolshevik Leon Trotsky[3] and democratic socialist Alexander Kerensky[4]. Voline then provides a firsthand account of Russia's first popular revolution in 1905, including the formation of the 1905 Petersburg Soviet - Russia's first, albeit short lived, revolutionary government - in the wake of the Putilov factory strike.[5] The rest of Book One provides a summary and appraisal of the political dynamics at play in the inter-revolution period between February and October of 1917. Book Two shifts to the events of the October Revolution and Civil War, with Voline's account of Russia's anarchist revolutionaries and their attempts to navigate and promote their ideology under the increasingly repressive Bolshevik regime. Given the often detached and statistical ways that Bolshevik suppression is discussed, even by its critics,[6] Voline balances emotive passion for his beliefs with composed academic rigour in detailing the revolutionary landscape and forces he documents. The result is a book of excellent historical and political value in academic study of this period.

The final - and perhaps most important - book focuses on two key moments in the Revolution that are commonly understudied: The Kronstadt Uprising of 1921, and the Ukrainian Makhnovists from 1918-1921. While not present himself, Voline makes the case that Kronstadt, its people, and their rebellion against Bolshevik hegemony were fundamentally anarchist in action. Citing the tensions that grew throughout the revolution between Kronstadt and the Bolsheviks, Voline offers an effective refutations of the worst Bolshevik lies about the sailors and their reasons for revolting, even if his ideological claims are overly enthusiastic. The history of Nestor Makhno's anarchist Black Army in Ukraine, combining both direct accounts and later research, paint one of the most complete pictures of the Makhnovists available. Far from being uncritical of Makhno and his forces, Voline offers context and analysis of their failings and short comings, but also insight as to why the shadow of anarchism continued to haunt the Bolsheviks in Ukraine well into the

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[3] Leon Trotsky "The Motive Forces of the Russian Revolution", in *The Basic Writings of Trotsky,* ed. Irving Howe (New York, NY: Schocken Books, 1976 [1922] ), 43-61.

[4] Alexander Kerensky, *Russia and History's Turning Point* (New York NY: Meredith Press, 1965), 37-114.

[5] Voline, *The Unknown Revolution: 1917-1921* (Oakland: PM Press), 89-101.

[6] An example: Arthur Koestler, "Soviet Myth and Reality," in *The Yogi and the Commissar* (London, Johnathan Cape LTD, 1945), 136-200.

New Economic Policy (NEP) period in 1924-1925, long after their supposed 'liquidation'.[7]

Thus, *The Unknown Revolution* is a worthy edition to any bookshelf, in particular those who want a greater understanding of the real diversity at play in the Russian Revolutionary period of 1917-1921. This review is based on the 2019 PM Press edition, which also includes an extensive 87 page introduction by anarchist researcher, author and editor Iain Mackay, as well as original appendices that include summaries of the parties of the period, a bibliographical sketch of the era, and a particularly enlightening encounter between Voline and Leon Trotsky in April of 1917.[8] Mackay's introduction is an excellent companion to the original text, expanding Voline's account with recent historical information and broadening its context within the wider revolution and history. His research and ideological credentials are well utilized in sophisticated counters to both Trotskyite and Leninist attacks on Voline and the anarchists that help to clear away any preconceptions the reader may have.[9] That said, while useful for historians and political scientists, Mackay's academic style may be detrimental for those who are unfamiliar with the basic history of the revolution and its key players. Luckily, the appendices and Voline's own writing are extremely approachable for any reader, making Mackay's introduction a helpful - but not necessary - addition for advanced readers that does not detract from a more casual reader's experience.

The full text is also available online from several anarchist sources. Regardless of the edition, there are few books that will so thoroughly enlighten a reader on the Russian Revolution as Voline's.

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[7] Viktor Savchenko, "The Anarchist Movement in Ukraine at the Height of the New Economic Policy (1924-1925)." *East/West Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 4, no. 2, (2017): 176-177, 179, 184.
[8] Voline, 713-715.
[9] Ian Mackay, Introduction to *The Unknown Revolution: 1917-1921,* (Oakland: PM Press, 2019), lviii-lxv, lxxiv-lxxix.

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