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William the Hippo appears courtesy of the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 17.9.1
Cover image: Photo by Katelynn Lloyd, assisted by Aliya Klughammer and Alessandro Guidotti

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A LETTER FROM THE EDITORIAL TEAM

This year, we are pleased to present the sixth edition of *HiPo: The Langara Student Journal of History and Political Science*. This journal gives exceptional Langara students the opportunity to have their work published and gain hands-on experience in academic editing and publishing. Our editors worked closely with the authors to bring us this year's edition containing a diverse array of articles, including themes on the Age of Imperialism, the Cold War, Economics, and Languages.

We are thankful for all the amazing submissions we received; deciding which articles to include was a difficult decision. We would also like to thank our editorial team, whose phenomenal work ethic and editing skills put this journal together. Without the integral guidance and advice from Dr Michael Fulton, this journal would not be what it is today. We would also like to thank Dr Jennifer Knapp and the rest of the History, Latin, and Political Science Department at Langara; this journal would not be possible without your continued support. Lastly, we would like to thank our outstanding authors featured in this year's edition, whose words and ideas are the reason this journal can be published

CHARLOTTE AHERN, GABRIEL DEVRIES, KATELYNN LLOYD

A LETTER FROM THE DEPARTMENT CHAIR

I am honoured and delighted to be able to congratulate the editors of *HiPo* on another fantastic issue. The academic subjects addressed in the essays this year are highly-varied in terms of both geography and topics, making for a fascinating issue that will be of interest to a wide range of readers. On behalf of both myself and the department, I would like to express my immense gratitude to the editors and contributors who have worked so hard to bring this issue together. Thank you very much also to Dr Fulton for his tireless work as the lead faculty advisor, to the other faculty advisors and instructors who have assisted in the production of this issue, and as always to the college administration for their support of this endeavour.

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Department Chair
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TRUE SAVAGES: PERCEPTION OF INDIGENOUS CULTURES IN SPAIN AND ENGLAND DURING THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

CHARLOTTE AHERN

The 15th and 16th centuries were the age of exploration and exploitation for the Spanish and English, who colonized the new world. Written accounts shaped European perceptions about the Indigenous people they discovered from explorers such as Francis Drake and Christopher Columbus. Initially, explorers were intrigued by Indigenous people, but cultural bias increased, and ideas skeptically evolved as colonization progressed. This paper discusses the relationship between the evolution of perceptions and the extraction of wealth and growth in the colonies, suggesting that the Spanish and English influenced ideas about Indigenous culture to justify their ill-treatment. Europeans wanted uncontested control as they extracted wealth and resources from the new world. The argument put forth in this paper is that Europeans used the assertion that Indigenous people were inhumane, savage, or inferior as a justification for their mistreatment during colonization.

The late 15th and 16th centuries were an era of exploration in the early modern period. Spain and England established themselves as the two powerhouses creating colonies in the "new world". For the Indigenous societies of the Americas, what followed were centuries of ill-treatment and exploitation, where the consequences are still seen today. Although the establishment of Spanish and English colonies happened almost a century apart, their initial perceptions of Indigenous societies upon first contact were very similar. Modern interpretations of written accounts from early explorers who met Indigenous societies shaped European perceptions of Indigenous culture. Early explorers, like Christopher Columbus who discovered the "new world" for Spain in 1492, wrote that Indigenous people "were very friendly…the natives are an inoffensive people…a

simple race with delicate bodies."[1] Similarly, an early English account from Thomas Harriot, part of Walter Raleigh's first British colony in Virginia, said that Indigenous societies "are not to be feared…In respect of us they are a people poore, and for want of skill and judgement in the knowledge and use of our things."[2] Although the English and Spanish shared relatively mild perceptions, they reflected cultural bias because early explorers evaluated Indigenous cultures based on European standards, failing to recognize that these cultures were fundamentally different. English and Spanish perceptions of Indigenous cultures negatively evolved as colonization unfolded; Indigenous societies were perceived as inferior and savage to justify their ill-treatment and exploitation.

The colonisation of the Americas was not about understanding new cultures or societies; the Spanish and English sought wealth. Hernan Cortes, who conquered Mexico on behalf of Spain, wrote to King Charles V in 1529, listing the "many rare and wonderful objects"[3] he had found in Temixtitlan, Mexico. By 1545 the Spanish had discovered Potosi in Bolivia, described as "[the] singular work of the power of God…prince of all minerals, lord of 5000 Indians…foundation of treasures."[4] Potosi's silver mines increased the European supply by sixty percent.[5] "The Columbian Exchange" includes materials the Spanish extracted from the "new world" for their benefit: gold, silver, minerals, tobacco, and maize.[6] The Spanish were motivated by greed after discovering wealth and resources in the "new world". They sought absolute control over Indigenous societies, which allowed them to exploit the resources more fully and profitably.

Less than a century later, Francis Drake set out to discover El Dorado for the English; he did not find it, although he did discover a land rich in raw materials. From the first colony in Virginia, Thomas Harriot catalogued the "Merchantable Commodities" he witnessed in the "new world", including "Iron…furres…copper…pearle…suger canes…[and] allum."[7] Once England discovered the abundance of wealth available, like the Spanish, they wanted to dominate Indigenous societies to extract wealth more efficiently. Although

[1]"Christopher Columbus: Extracts from Journal," *Internet Medieval Sourcebook*, ed. Paul Halsall (Fordham University, March 1996), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/source/columbus1.asp.
[2]Thomas Harriot, *A Briefe and True Report of the New Found Land of Virginia* (Frankfurt, 1590), https://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/4247/pg4247-images.html.
[3]"Hernan Cortés: from Second Letter to Charles V, 1520," *Internet Modern History Sourcebook*, ed. Paul Halsall (Fordham University, June 1998), https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/mod/1520cortes.asp.
[4]Kendall Brown, *A History of Mining in Latin America: From the Colonial Era to the Present* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2012), 15-16.
[5]Brown, 15-16.
[6]Brian W. Blouet, Olwyn M. Blouet and Charles S. Sargent, "Historical and Cultural Geography," in *Latin America and the Caribbean: A Systematic and Regional Survey*, Brian W Blouet and Olwyn M. Blouet, ed. 5th ed. (Hoboken: Wiley, 2005), 75.
[7]Harriot.

British colonization in America occurred after that of the Spanish, their attitudes towards Indigenous cultures were similar. Early English explorers perceived Indigenous societies as "friendly"; however, as colonies became established, hostilities developed towards native societies.[8] The English, like the Spanish, used their evolving perceptions of Indigenous cultures to justify displacement, ill-treatment, and exploitation.

As soon as exploration gave way to colonization, the Spanish began to view Indigenous cultures as primitive and uncivilized. Conquistador Hernan Cortez said that Indigenous societies were "barbarous",[9] and it wasn't long until Spaniards described them as "dogs" and pursued unbridled exploitation.[10] Spanish colonization brought religion and authority with it from the start; they believed that spreading Catholicism by force was good,[11] and used religious idealism as a motive for conquest and the ill-treatment. The 1550 Valladolid debate in the Spanish courts disputed whether Indigenous inhabitants were human beings or not. Sepulveda argued that they were subhuman savages, which justified their conquest and subjugation.[12] Bartholomew Las Casas opposed Sepulveda's views and argued that mistreatment of Indigenous cultures would lead to their extinction. Las Casas advocated for the welfare of Indigenous societies.[13] Eventually, Spain passed "New Laws" for Indigenous people in 1542; however, they had little effect in the new world for many years.[14] The Spanish had such negative views of Indigenous cultures that they rationalized the killing, mistreatment, and exploitation of Indigenous peoples, who were subjected to forced labour and abuse in the encomienda system.[15] An encomienda was a labour system that allowed Spanish colonists in the Americas to force Indigenous people to work for them in exchange for "protection" and religious instruction. The Indigenous people were not paid and were often subjected to extreme levels of abuse, with many working themselves to death.

In the sixty years since the Spanish arrived in the "new world", their perceptions of Indigenous societies had drastically worsened. Colonists used their negative perceptions of Indigenous cultures to justify their atrocities, which they

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[8]Richard Tetek, "Relations between English Settlers and Indians in 17th Century New England" (Masters Thesis, Masaryk University, 2010), 24.
[9]"Hernan Cortés."
[10]Benjamin Keen and Keith Hayes, *A History of Latin America*, 7th ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2004), 101.
[11]John Charles Chasteen, *Born in Blood and Fire: A Concise History of Latin America*, 2nd ed. (Norton, 2001), 54.
[12]"Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda," Columbia College: The Core Curriculum, accessed November 19, 2022, https://www.college.columbia.edu/core/content/juan-gin%C3%A9s-de-sep%C3%BAlveda.
[13]Keen and Hayes, 102.
[14]Keen and Hayes, 102.
[15]Chasteen, 54-57.

documented and sent back to Europe, claiming they were motivated by moral and religious reasons to "save" Indigenous people through the imposition of "true religion".

The English also formed unfavourable views of Indigenous cultures, building upon the fundamental ideas established by the Spanish during their earlier voyages and conquests.[16] By the 16th century, Indigenous cultures had gained a stereotype with English colonists in North America, describing them as "treacherous", "brutal", and "malicious".[17] Captain John Smith, who was part of a Virginia colony, supported the use of violence and force when interacting with Indigenous peoples.[18] Wars between the English and Native Americans in the 17th century further accelerated negative perceptions of Indigenous culture. Supporting the notion that Indigenous people were "savage beasts" who performed human sacrifices and ate their own families.[19] These notions were comparable to the Spanish beliefs regarding Central American Aztec and Maya societies, which they annihilated. However, in contrast to the Spanish, the English did not force religion on Indigenous cultures with the same brutality as the Spanish. England offered more religious freedom because their priority was extracting wealth rather than reforming culture. Despite the lack of moral justification, the English persisted in using religious reasoning to rationalize their violent actions. In New England, the Puritans claimed that God supported their slaughter of the Pequot tribe as retaliation for the tribe killing some of their own members. God justified their bloodshed of "barbaric" Native Americans.[20] The unfavourable perceptions of Indigenous societies in England were founded on those introduced by the Spanish, resulting in English colonists feeling justified in their actions of displacement, oppression, and violence towards Indigenous peoples. The fact that Indigenous cultures were taken by force and made to conform to the cultural norms of outsiders was not acknowledged by the English. Their prejudice hindered them from comprehending that Indigenous hostility may have been a typical human response to exploitation and mistreatment by foreign invaders. The English and Spanish used Indigenous societies' natural defensive reactions as a pretext to vilify them, leveraging negative aspects of Indigenous culture to rationalize brutalities that benefited their respective colonies.

Both the English and Spanish considered the Indigenous cultures they encountered as inferior, and this perception served as a basis for colonization through exploitation. The categorization of societies as superior or inferior provided a rationale for the subjugation of the latter, who were deemed in need of "guidance

[16]Tetek, 24.
[17]Gary B. Nash, *Red, White, and Black: The Peoples of Early America*. 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1982), 38-41.
[18]Tetek, 25.
[19]Nash, 39.
[20]Alfred A. Cave, *The Pequot War* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1996), 40.

and leadership," which in turn facilitated the extraction of resources from the Americas by the Spanish and English.[21] European perceptions were also negatively impacted by bias, misunderstandings, and lack of knowledge about culture, customs, and ceremonies. Instead of learning to sympathize with or understand an Indigenous culture, the English and Spanish viewed them as wrong and uncivilized. Indigenous cultures exhibited significant diversity across regions, yet Europeans often lumped them together and judged them against their own cultural standards. This oversimplified view was bolstered by written accounts that portrayed Indigenous cultures in a bad light, leading to widespread negative perceptions. Colonizers then used these perceived negative traits to justify their mistreatment of Indigenous peoples, without considering the root causes of such behaviour.

One could argue that while the Spanish and English considered Indigenous cultures in the New World as savage, it was actually the Europeans who exhibited savage behaviour. The European colonization that led to the brutalities, enslavement, massacres, oppression, and extermination of an estimated 56 million indigenous people reveals the true inhumane culprits.[22] England and Spain's insatiable greed during colonization negatively influenced perceptions of Indigenous culture that became widespread in Europe. Those stereotypes have left lasting legacies observable to this day. Perceptions can justify brutality and tyranny, with lasting negative effects. Four hundred years after conquest, racism against Indigenous cultures in the Americas continues to persist, along with the consequences of greed and exploitation. The legacy of colonialism, including landlessness, corruption, rebellion, and poverty, remains deeply rooted and disproportionately affects the innocent.

[21]Nash, 24.

[22]Lauren Kent, "European Colonizers Killed so Many Native Americans That It Changed the Global Climate, Researchers Say," *CNN*, February 2, 2019, https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/world/european-colonization-climate-change-trnd/index.html.

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SPREADING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE THROUGH HEALTH INTERVENTIONS IN THE TROPICS

CARSON METANCZUK

This paper seeks to examine how European powers in the late 19th and early 20th centuries used health interventions in the tropics to expand their economic spheres and political goals through the examples of British government's health policy in Sudan and India, American policy in Panama, and Russian policy in Ethiopia. Although the motivations of individuals working on the behalf of colonial governments were numerous and sometimes humanitarian, the selected examples intend to illustrate that pure humanitarianism was not a sufficient motivator for colonial powers practicing medicine in the tropics even when their motives were presented as such.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries were a time of great change and advancement in tropical medicine.[1] Many world powers had territories in far-off regions of the world that presented great financial and political opportunities. The examples outlined here illustrate the motives at play for the ruling powers of the time and why those motives led them to intervene in tropical countries. During this period, European powers used health interventions in the tropics to achieve economic or political goals, while religious institutions employed softer approaches to spread their influence via health interventions.

The advances in tropical medicine that this period witnessed were accompanied by a shift in attitudes among colonial doctors. This period saw a shift from the theory of "racial immunity" of disease towards the idea that unsanitary conditions were

[1]Anna Crozier, Practising Colonial Medicine: The Colonial Medical Service in British East Africa (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, Limited, 2007), 62.

responsible for outbreaks.[2] On top of this, the idea that the tropics were a "white man's grave" was beginning to recede, and taking its place was the newly growing impression that the tropics presented a "tameable paradise" that modern European medical interventions could transform.[3] This shift in outlook encouraged young colonial doctors to take foreign posts in greater numbers.[4] Mingling with these factors was the public enthusiasm for imperialism that existed at this time.[5] All of this combined to make tropical regions much more appealing in the minds of colonial powers, both as a place to experiment with disease treatment[6] and as a new avenue for revenue.[7]

The emphasis colonial rulers placed on revenue can be seen through the Gezira Irrigation Scheme (GIS). The GIS was a series of irrigation systems set up in Sudan to increase the output of cotton exports in the region.[8] It was very successful, and as a result, time and money were invested in ensuring that disease outbreaks did not occur in the area due to the massive quantity of standing water introduced by the scheme.[9] Important to note here is the British government's involvement in the GIS. British funding accounted for most of the project's budget, and much of the profits were directed back to the British government.[10]

The GIS is interesting because it illustrates that British medical intervention efforts prioritized financial output over humanitarian factors, as illustrated by the way these interventions were implemented. The two main outbreaks caused by standing water in the GIS were schistosomiasis and Malaria.[11] Malaria was viewed as the more significant threat to the economic interests in the region since it also posed a threat to colonial officials; consequently, its prevention was prioritized.[12] Simultaneously, workers coming to the GIS from Western Africa were screened for schistosomiasis, but the screening process focused more on whether an individual was perceived to be healthy enough to work, rather than if they were actually

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[2]Heather Bell, "Disease, Quarantine, and Racial Categories in the Gezira Immigration Scheme," in *Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 112.

[3]Alexandra Minna Stern, "Yellow Fever Crusade: US Colonialism, Tropical Medicine, and the International Politics of Mosquito Control, 1900-1920," in *Medicine at the Border: Disease, Globalization and Security, 1850 to the Present*, ed. Alison Bashford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 46.

[4]Crozier, 65-67.

[5]Crozier, 76.

[6]Shobana Shankar, "The Social Dimensions of Christian Leprosy Work among Muslims: American Missionaries and Young Patients in Colonial Northern Nigeria, 1920-40," in *Healing Bodies, Saving Souls: Medical Missions in Asia and Africa*, ed. David Hardiman (New York: Rodopi, 2006), 283.

[7]Crozier, 60.

[8]Bell, 90-91.

[9]Bell, 90-91.

[10]Bell, 91-92.

[11]Bell, 90-91.

[12]Bell, 104.

infected with schistosomiasis.[13] The organization of the screening process was a manifestation of the British government's concern that medical intervention would interrupt the flow of labour and goods to the GIS.[14] This is well encapsulated by the words of Major B. H. H. Spence, who was a bacteriologist instrumental in organizing the quarantine station.[15] He stated "[it would] be just as reprehensible to paralyse the scheme by taking too elaborate hygienic precautions as it would be to wreck it by taking none at all."[16]

The economic motives underscoring colonial powers' involvement in tropical medicine can also be seen in the United States' efforts to eradicate yellow fever in Panama. The connection, in this case, is quite clear: the U.S.'s motivation for spearheading yellow fever eradication in Panama was to ensure that their ocean connecting canal project could be seen through to completion.[17] U.S. officials had the advantage of seeing how the disease had contributed to the French failure in completing their canal project, and attacked the problem of mosquito-transmitted diseases such as yellow fever head on.[18] Once again, it can be seen that underlying economic motives were the primary cause of investing so much money into their campaigns, with the U.S. spending nearly 6 million dollars on yellow fever eradication from 1914 to 1934.[19] Ironically, the reason the troublesome disease was able to become so prevalent in the region is likely because of the presence of many new non-immune bodies introduced by colonial migrations.[20]

Partly because of the success of their yellow fever irradiation campaigns in Panama, the United States began to be seen as the dominant cultural and scientific player throughout both North and South America.[21] Carried along with this new-found cultural influence was the system of racial hierarchy that was inherent to the U.S.' approach to building the canal itself,[22] since the U.S. led eradication efforts' successes were framed in such a way that justified seeing themselves as higher on the racial pyramid.[23] These events have consequences that bleed into this day, as tropical medicine in some ways still has the perception of being a "civilizing" and "sanitizing" force that should elevate countries in the regions referred to as the tropics.[24]

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[13]Bell, 106-107.
[14]Bell, 90-91.
[15]Bell, 107.
[16]Bell, 107-108.
[17]Stern, 46-47.
[18]Stern, 46-48.
[19]Stern, 41.
[20]Stern, 41-42.
[21]Stern, 41.
[22]Stern, 47.
[23]Stern, 50.
[24]Stern, 50-51.

The perception of sanitization as a colonial tool is perhaps best exemplified in the approach taken by the British colonial government in India. Like with the previous cases, a strong motivating factor for the British health interventions in stopping the spread of plague during the late 19th century in India was economical, as European countries would be unwilling to trade with British-governed India if the spread of plague were not curbed.[25] However, British motives for implementing such harsh and intrusive disease control measures cannot purely be explained by economic considerations.[26] British officials in India had previously shown resentment for the local rule,[27] and the public health crisis that plague constituted presented an opportunity for British officials to forward their political goals.[28]

Once again, the racial ideologies prevalent in colonizing nations of the time were used to justify the implementation of harsh disease control measures and take over control of the administering duties of local officials.[29] British officials perceived the people of India as being unsanitary. Their acts of resistance to British implemented plague control measures were viewed as a negative trait inherent to Indian society rather than a justified response to Britain's overbearing and culturally insensitive approach.[30] It took some time for the British to scale back their approach to plague control measures, and this was only done in response to their ineffectiveness, resulting from the wide-scale public opposition to the measures.[31] The result of the overzealous control measures was a break down of trust between the population of India and the British colonizers. It was only through the inclusion of the local population to help with the implementation that resulted in effective control measures materializing.[32] It is clear from this example that pushing disease control measures onto a population with little trust in their government leads to a multitude of problems, and British authorities eventually realised that a more conciliatory approach would be necessary to combat the spread of disease.[33]

Although economic factors often underscored the motives for health interventions by colonial powers in the tropics, sometimes motives were purely political. The use of medical missions to expand regional influence can be seen in the case of Imperial Russian efforts to establish hospitals in Ethiopia. From 1896 to 1913, the Russian

[25]David Arnold, "Plague: Assault on the Body," in *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 205.
[26]Arnold, 204.
[27]Arnold, 226-227.
[28]Arnold, 227-229.
[29]Arnold, 228-229.
[30]Arnold, 226.
[31]Arnold, 214-215.
[32]Arnold, 235.
[33]Arnold, 238-239.

Empire sent a series of medical missions to Ethiopia.[34] These missions stand out from the rest mentioned, as Russia was not in direct control of this region at the time and did not have any obvious connection to Ethiopia other than some commonalities in their religious beliefs.[35] However, as with the previous examples there is an underlying political motive in Imperial Russia's actions.

The initial motivation for Russia getting involved in medical missions to Ethiopia was to frustrate the efforts of Russia's rival in the region: Italy.[36] The Russians had been covertly supplying arms to Ethiopian forces. By providing free health care, they could indirectly support the war efforts of Ethiopia's Emperor Menelik II, who had been disrupting Italy's military in the region.[37] Alongside this motive, some Russian officials believed that the "prestige" of Europe needed restoring in the region.[38] The missions in the area may have turned out to be short-lived, had it not been for the efforts of Russian diplomat P. M. Vlasov,[39] who sent his thoughts on the mission back to St. Petersburg. He believed that the goodwill established by the missions could be the key to influencing Ethiopia to position its military on its borders. This positioning, combined with a military alliance, could help Russia in the event of a conflict with rivals in the region.[40]

In many ways, this mission proved to be a great success medically, providing free voluntary health care to Ethiopians of all classes.[41] It is worth noting that many of the doctors involved genuinely believed in the humanitarian nature of their mission.[42] The good that these missions provided cannot be denied, and the legacy of these institutions carries on into the present day.[43] The Russian example is tied to another common motive of institutions who chose to enter the area of tropical medicine: the religious motive.

Christianity has long had an interest in the treatment of leprosy (today known as Hanson's disease) because of the disease's biblical connotations.[44] For this reason, there was a wide push in the British empire to help those suffering from the disease, since the British empire ruled over more people suffering from leprosy than any

[34]Rashed Chowdhury, "Russian Medical Diplomacy in Ethiopia, 1896-1913," in *Histories of Medicine and Healing in the Indian Ocean World*, vol. 2, *The Modern Period*, ed. Anna Winterbottom and Facil Tesfaye (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 115-116.
[35]Chowdhury, 115.
[36]Chowdhury, 115-116.
[37]Chowdhury, 115-116, 133.
[38]Chowdhury, 122.
[39]Chowdhury, 123.
[40]Chowdhury, 130-131.
[41]Chowdhury, 134.
[42]Chowdhury, 129.
[43]Chowdhury, 138-139.
[44]Shankar, 281.

other nation on earth.[45] Deeply intertwined with the approach taken by leprosy treatment organizations was the belief that leprosy was associated with the Muslim religion.[46] As such, the missions set up by Christian organizations often tried to convert those suffering from leprosy in countries where the Muslim religion was predominant, such as Nigeria.[47] However, even though the initial mindset of some Christian organizations was to treat and convert, it can be seen in the case of the leproseries in Northern Nigeria that many individuals who chose to join hospitals that treated leprosy did not use coercive measures to convince patients to convert.[48] Rather, a softer approach was taken to bring in sufferers of the disease, since treatment in the hospitals was totally voluntary. However, even this softer approach led to issues about who was encouraged to stay long term since these hospitals did not want to get the perception of being full of "incurables," leading staff to take in less severe, more easily treatable cases, deprioritizing potential patients suffering from advanced cases of the disease.[49] Even though, in many senses, these religious missions were more altruistic than colonial governments intervening in healthcare to secure economic goals, these institutions often left former patients isolated from their religious communities following treatment.[50]

These examples illustrate that medical interventions undertaken in the tropics were often established to achieve economic, political, and religious influence. Pure humanitarianism was unlikely to provide the basis to undertake such costly endeavours. However, it is important to remember that these were often only the goals of religious organizations and colonizing countries, not the individuals partaking in medical practice. While many doctors chose to pursue a career in the tropics for economic, religious, or even imperial reasons,[51] on the whole individual motives are much harder to surmise. It remains worthwhile to examine the motivations at play in medical interventions of the past, as they have played a large part in shaping our current understanding of medicine.

[45]Shankar, 283.
[46]Shankar, 286-287.
[47]Shankar, 282.
[48]Shankar, 295.
[49]Shankar, 287-292.
[50]Shankar, 297-299.
[51]Crozier, 60, 72, 76.

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MORE THAN MEDICINE: WESTERN EMPIRES AND MEDICAL INTERVENTIONS IN THE TROPICS FROM THE LATE NINETEENTH TO EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES

NATALIE CHOO

Tropical medicine is the study and treatment of diseases that are endemic to the tropics, such as yellow fever and malaria. However, of historical interest to us are the ways in which this branch of medicine has been used to benefit its practitioners and interfere in the lives of the people most susceptible to tropical diseases. By analysing several scholarly sources on the topic, this paper attempts to explain some of the main motivations behind European and American-led disease eradication programmes, public health campaigns, and other 'medical interventions' in various tropical countries during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Taking the empire-building fervour of the period into account, this paper argues that imperialistic ambitions underlay the immediate personal, commercial, and cultural motivating factors behind medical interventions in the tropics.

European and American encounters with disease epidemics in the tropics spawned various medical 'interventions.' These interventions were aimed at containing and even eradicating tropical diseases during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Intuitively speaking, the containment and eradication of these diseases would benefit all people, especially those who were native to the tropics. However, the broader context in which these medical interventions occurred suggests less than altruistic motives behind such pursuits. Interactions between Western nations and the tropical peoples they colonised had increased to unprecedented levels during the Age of Imperialism, a period of rapid colonial expansion and empire-building that ran from approximately 1870 to 1914. The introduction of new diseases into the coloniser-colonised dynamic during this time reinforced the need for Western governments and medical practitioners to entrench themselves deeper

into the lives of tropical peoples. Western medical interventions into the tropics may have then been immediately motivated by pre-existing sociocultural beliefs and politico-economic interests, but scholarship on those various interventions points to an underlying enthusiasm for expanding and perpetuating imperial control over tropical lands and peoples.

It is first worth considering what could have possibly motivated Western doctors to partake in medical interventions. Medical interventionism would require doctors to pursue a career overseas, far from home and in an unfamiliar part of the world. A socially-motivated desire for adventure emerges as one stand-out answer, as historian Anna Crozier argues in her book *Practising Colonial Medicine: The Colonial Medical Service in British East Africa*. According to Crozier, the reason why British doctors entered the Colonial Medical Service was that they were fascinated by Africa as it was portrayed in magazines, travel books, and films.[1] These literary portrayals emphasised the hostile climate of the continent and the array of deadly diseases found there.[2] The language used to recruit these men into MS careers also portrayed the ideal medical officer as unwaveringly adventurous in the face of "unfamiliar scenes and strange conditions."[3] Altogether, the exotic imagery and recruitment language of the MS emphasised not only the otherness of Africa, but the challenges of working there. Crozier's explanation suggests that the portrayal of Africa as a dangerous and deadly place to live and work did more to attract young doctors to a medical service career than it did to dissuade them from one. After all, an MS officer could distinguish himself from his domestic counterparts by bravely surviving and prospering in an environment that the average White man could not withstand.[4] Therefore, a medical career in the tropics represented an opportunity for an individual doctor to be seen as an adventurer and a hero – as someone exceptional within British society, a status that could only benefit him in a continuously expanding global empire.

Medical interventions in the tropics could also be motivated by the desire of Western governments to facilitate White colonial settlement there at the expense of native and racialised peoples. A global yellow fever eradication campaign that was led by the United States in the early twentieth century is one such intervention. As Alexandra Minna Stern, describes in a book chapter about American yellow fever control efforts, sanitation teams that were dedicated to the extermination of the yellow fever-causing female *Aedes aegypti* mosquito were formed under US army physician William C. Gorgas in order to eradicate mosquito breeding sites in

[1]Anna Crozier, *Practising Colonial Medicine: The Colonial Medical Service in British East Africa* (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2007), 63-64, 66.
[2]Crozier, 63-64, 66.
[3]Ralph Furse, *Aucuparius: Recollections of a Recruiting Officer* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), 221, quoted in Crozier, 64.
[4]Crozier, 64.

Panama and elsewhere in Latin America.[5] Gorgas' teams prioritised the sanitisation of white neighbourhoods and residences over black West Indian ones, leading to poorer health outcomes and higher mortality rates for the latter group.[6] This uneven application of mosquito control measures in Latin America, as described by Stern, carried two implications. One of them was that White people's health mattered most. The other was that the presence of Black people, much like the yellow fever mosquitoes themselves, was also an obstacle to long-term White colonial settlement in Latin America. A racial disparity in yellow fever survival rates favouring White victims of the disease would, in theory, free up land and jobs for White colonials. This line of thought may explain why some Western governments conducted medical interventions. In the case of the US yellow fever crusade, they were trying to eliminate disease and its vectors, but also, in a way, other human beings as obstacles to their colonisation efforts.

Oftentimes, though, medical interventions in the tropics were not motivated by a desire to displace, but to culturally 'improve' or westernise native populations, which constituted a form of imperial control. The Russian Red Cross mission to Ethiopia in 1896, as analysed by Rashed Chowdhury in the book *Histories of Medicine and Healing in the Indian Ocean World*, is one particular case that demonstrates this notion. Chowdhury, who describes the Russian Empire of this period as having an enthusiasm for "[Western] scientific medicine,"[7] writes that the Russian Red Cross Society dispatched a medical team to Ethiopia following a battle between the latter and Italy in an ongoing war between the two countries.[8] The reason for this aid, as given by Russian army doctor M. I. Lebedinsky, a primary source on this medical mission, was that "medicine on the Abyssinian side was completely absent."[9] Lebendinsky's explanation for a Russian medical presence in Ethiopia could be suggestive of humanitarian concern for a country with few resources. It is more likely, however, given the positive reputation of Western medicine in Imperial Russia, that Lebendinsky viewed traditional, decidedly non-Western medicine in Ethiopia as illegitimate.[10] The logic went that Russia, a more scientifically advanced country, had a paternalistic responsibility to introduce Western medicine to Ethiopian society. Ethiopians were, in the minds of the

[5]Alexandra Minna Stern, "Yellow Fever Crusade: US Colonialism, Tropical Medicine and the International Politics of Mosquito Control, 1900–1920," in *Medicine at the Border: Disease, Globalization and Security, 1850 to the Present*, ed. Alison Bashford (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 44-45.
[6]Stern, 50-51.
[7]S. B. Chernetsov, "Éfiopskiĭ dvnevnik russkogo vracha," *Vestnik Vostochnogo instituta* 5.2 (1994): 4, quoted in Rashed Chowdhury, "Russian Medical Diplomacy in Ethiopia, 1896-1913," in *Histories of Medicine and Healing in the Indian Ocean World*, *Vol. 2: The Modern Period*, ed. Anna Winterbottom and Facil Tesfaye (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 122.
[8]Chowdhury, 117-118.
[9]M. I. Lebendinskiĭ, "'Pervyĭ gospital' v Abissinii," *Istoricheskiĭ vestnik* 11 (1912): 812, quoted in Chowdhury, 117.
[10]Chowdhury, 117.

Russians, less forward-thinking than themselves, but still had the potential for 'improvement' under Russian imperial influence.[11] The tangible medical aid that Russia provided to the Ethiopian people in this particular case conveniently obscured any underlying imperialistic motives. Therefore, medical interventions like the Red Cross mission were ways of spreading Western science and ideas of 'civilisation' to tropical countries, which was closely intertwined with this aforementioned imperialist notion of Western superiority over non-Western tropical peoples

Yet another motivating factor for medical interventions in the tropics was a sense of Christian duty and moral righteousness over non-Christian peoples. This religious motivation for medical interventions is suggested by Shobana Shankar's research on Christian missionaries involved in leprosy work in early twentieth-century Northern Nigeria. According to Shankar, Christian missionaries used medical missions in the Arab world to "combat an Islamic worldview that they perceived as despotic and backward – a cause of poor health and hindrance to reform."[12] This battle between Christian and Islamic religious ideologies played out in the missionary-run leprosaria, where many of the patients were young Nigerian Hausa men who, prior to seeking leprosy treatment from the missionaries, were Muslims who had been engaged in Quranic studies.[13] Although the time spent in a mission-run leprosarium did not always lead to religious conversion, it did encumber the typical patient's return to his previous life.[14] The reason why, according to Shankar, is that residing in a leprosarium equated to physical *and* ideological segregation from Hausa religious beliefs and cultural traditions, and thus an increased proximity to Western Christian ones.[15] Some former leprosaria patients in Northern Nigeria ended up working for the missionaries or the colonial government there out of necessity, but also because of the economic and educational opportunities that those career paths offered them as well.[16] It is unknown if the Christian missionaries in Northern Nigeria fully appreciated the social consequences of their leprosy work with Hausa patients in the leprosaria. Intentional or not, they managed to mitigate the Islamic religious and cultural influences in the region that they saw as a threat to both Christianity and the Western imperial values it was closely associated with.

Commercial motives certainly factored into the decisions of Western empires to medically intervene in the tropics. One medical intervention that was motivated by

[11]Chowdhury, 128-129.
[12]Shobana Shankar, "The Social Dimensions of Christian Leprosy Work among Muslims: American Missionaries and Young Patients in Northern Nigeria, 1920-40," in *Healing Bodies, Saving Souls: Medical Missions in Asia and Africa*, ed. David Hardiman (New York: Rodopi, 2006), 287.
[13]Shankar, 295-296.
[14]Shankar, 294, 297.
[15]Shankar, 294.
[16]Shankar, 295, 297.

commercial interests was concerned with disease control, specifically the prevention of schistosomiasis and malaria outbreaks among labourers for the Gezira Irrigation Scheme, which was a major source of foreign investment in early twentieth-century Sudan and key infrastructure for the British cotton industry.[17] As elaborated on by Heather Bell in her book *Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan*, *1899-1940*, medical dispensaries were a source of immediate healthcare that were concentrated most heavily in and around the Gezira.[18] The implementation of this particular disease control measure supports the idea that the unimpeded construction of the Gezira scheme was of the utmost importance.[19] Since healthcare access in the Gezira was abundant compared to elsewhere, disease among the labour force could be detected early, and those capable of recovery could return to work as soon as possible, thus minimising any loss of profits.[20] Migrant labourers from Egypt were initially quarantined in the city of Wadi Halfa, and were subjected to compulsory vaccinations and invasive physical examinations.[21] Placing these workers under quarantine was believed to have eliminated the possibility of diseases entering the Gezira. An infected labour force would jeopardise the construction of the scheme and its profitability, thereby undermining British imperial influence over Sudan.[22] Although the pre-existence of malaria and schistosomiasis in the Gezira complicated the logistics of disease control in the scheme,[23] the severity of the control measures implemented there demonstrate that commercial infrastructure, and the wealth and imperial prestige generated by it were vastly more important than the well-being and dignity of the colonised peoples who built them.

Finally, one may argue that medical interventions in the tropics had political motivations, namely the preservation of Western imperial control over native homes and bodies as colonial subjects. To argue this point is historian David Arnold in his book *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India*. Arnold elaborates on how the British-controlled Government of India passed the Epidemic Diseases Act of 1897, officially sanctioning the extensive use of public health measures designed to control the spread of bubonic plague in the country.[24] These public health measures included the detention and segregation of suspected plague victims, the inspection of corpses, house searches, and the prohibition of religious festivals and

[17]Heather Bell, *Frontiers of Medicine in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1899-1940* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 90.
[18]Bell, 95-96.
[19]Bell, 91.
[20]Bell, 91
[21]Bell, 106-107.
[22]Bell, 106.
[23]Bell, 103, 107.
[24]David Arnold, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth-Century India* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 204.

pilgrimages."[25] Cities known for strong anti-colonial sentiments like Pune were also disproportionately targeted.[26] Although the plague's transmissibility and high rates of infection merited legitimate health concerns,[27] the restrictive nature of these public health measures and their uneven application across India indicates another purpose: the domination and suppression of the native Indian population. Why exactly the Government of India would implement these public health measures makes sense in the context of imperialism. Local Indian customs such as those relating to the segregation of women[28] and the treatment of the deceased[29] undermined Western culture and practises. Due to the plague, these local customs could be banned under the pretext of lowering disease transmissibility. The heavy-handed treatment of popular dissenters like those in Pune could also plausibly be justified in the name of public health and safety, though political vengeance may have been the real reason why.[30] The restrictive and oppressive nature of these plague control measures, then, demonstrates how medical interventions could be, and were used to compel native populations to conform to Western standards of health and civilisation. Medical interventions were an effective way of spreading medicine and scientific knowledge across the globe, but in many cases, they also seemed to constitute a step towards a larger goal of expanding imperial control over the tropical regions of the world.

Imperialism was not the only factor to motivate medical interventions in the world's tropical regions, but millions of people during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries lived and laboured under imperial rule, and it permeated all aspects of life and society. It was during this period of enthusiasm for imperial expansion and the human interactions and disease epidemics that resulted from it that tropical medicine developed and flourished. Due to the prevalence of imperial ambitions among Western nations like the United States and Great Britain, and the integrality of human health to all the aspects of maintaining an empire—be they economic, political, or cultural—medicine could never be fully concerned with the study and cure of diseases for altruistic purposes. In an age of empires, medicine would always as a means of controlling the lands and human bodies in which they were often found.

[25]Arnold, 204.
[26]Arnold, 215, 226.
[27]Arnold, 201-202.
[28]Arnold, 213-214.
[29]Arnold, 216.
[30]Arnold, 215.

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CONTRASTING AMERICAN AND SOVIET POST-WAR ECONOMICS: FORESHADOWING THE FATE OF THE SOVIET UNION DURING THE FIRST DECADES OF THE COLD WAR

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Although much has been said of the successes of the American Marshall Plan, the Soviet response, known as the Council for Mutual Economic Aid (COMECON), is seldom discussed. This paper explores the relative successes and failures of these parallel economic policies, and their impacts on the geopolitical outcomes of the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The implementation of the Marshall Plan and COMECON, and their economic, social, and political outcomes, are examined in the context of their intended overt and covert goals. Research demonstrating COMECON's abject failure to produce economic growth, beneficial inter-state partnerships, or goodwill towards the Soviet Union strongly contrasts with evidence showing the Marshall Plan's massive economic and social success. While the Marshall Plan brought the United States and much of Western Europe economic prosperity and provided the foundation for modern European unity, COMECON destabilized Eastern Europe around the Soviet Union and led to the significant political distance between former member states and the Soviet spiritual successor, Russia.

Examinations of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union tend to focus significantly on the successful economic policies of Reagan's America, and the not-so-successful policies of Gorbachev's USSR. However, another set of US and Soviet economic strategies, which are not so often framed in this light, had what is potentially an even more significant impact on the geopolitical outcomes of the Cold War. When contrasted against that of the US, it is clear that the Soviet economic strategy in the immediate period following the Second World War failed to generate financial prosperity or sustainably beneficial economic partnerships;

this failure brought economic and social instability to the USSR, which continued to challenge the leaders of Soviet nations through and beyond 1991.

The impetus of American postwar economic policy was not simply the desire for economic growth; but a plethora of political and economic factors rooted both externally and internally. While this is true for any nation's economic policy at any moment, the diversity of driving factors is noteworthy. Thus, a specific focus on a limited number of primary factors dictated by the policy is explicitly necessary for this analysis. At the forefront of US policy was the perceived need for America to assist in the recovery of the utterly devastated European region. As the acting US Secretary of State George C. Marshall explained during an address at Harvard University in June, 1947, "The truth of the matter is that Europe's requirements… of foreign food and other essential products-principally from America-are so much greater than her present ability to pay that she must have substantial additional help, or face economic, social and political deterioration of a very grave character."[1] Marshall then acknowledged the European situation's potential threat to the American economy. The postwar US economy, though several times larger than even the second largest economy in the world,[2] was threatened by the colossal wartime manufacturing industry which it had built and used to such great effect. With peace spreading across the globe, American economic policy would have to grapple with the urgent need to transition this industry into a peacetime economy, or face the devastating atrophy of significant capital investments made during the war.[3] As Marshall alluded to, European destitution endangered the American economy; foremost through the absence of an otherwise significant global market for consumer goods and other commodities, which America would soon be producing en masse. US economic policy, as with all of its national policy at the time, would also need to be designed to assist the fight against the spread of communism. Western Europe in the mid 1940s was experiencing a growth in the popularity of communism to the extent that both France and Italy were at risk of electing communist parties to majority rule.[4] Communist rule in Western Europe was a potential future that would catastrophically undermine all US interests in Europe, and which would virtually signal the loss of the fight against communism. The late 1940s presented several seemingly separate challenges for American policy planners; how to resolve them all as fluidly as possible was the question of the day.

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[1]George Marshall, "The Marshall Plan Speech," Marshall Foundation, Harvard, 1947, https://www.marshallfoundation.org/the-marshall-plan/speech/.
[2]David Hein, "The Marshall Plan: Conservative Reform as a Weapon of War," *Modern Age* 59 (2017): 14.
[3]Joe Majerus, "Creation by Destruction: America and the End of the Pacific War in Light of Economic Reconversion and Post-war Reconstruction," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 32 (2021): 62.
[4]Hein, 12.

The Soviet circumstance, while vastly different from that of America, similarly presented economic planners with a multifaceted challenge in the postwar period. As was necessary within the American context, the factors that drove Soviet postwar economic policy must be reduced to a small number of primary concerns for this analysis. To begin with, all Soviet policy of this period must be understood as being at least partially driven by one factor: the ideological prerogative to advance socialism globally, ostensibly to form a "World Union of Soviet Socialist Republics uniting the whole of mankind."[5] In the early years of the USSR, this drive to grow socialism went hand in hand with Bolshevik fears of "capitalist encirclement,"[6] a dynamic that would be echoed in Soviet policy throughout the following decades. Exacerbated by feeling as though he had been abandoned at the outset of the war, insufficiently supported during the war, and cornered in negotiations on the outcome of the war, the innate socialist fear of "capitalist encirclement" manifested in Stalin as an increasing distrust of the West -in particular the United States- in the postwar period. This distrust generated fear of a looming conflict with the West, creating an urge for economic policy that prioritized Soviet security. The desire for increased national security played into another driving factor of Soviet economic policy at the time. Unlike the United States, the USSR was not burdened by a postwar excess of capital industry. Rather, it faced a lack thereof and, more broadly, the need to rebuild from a population and a GDP that had each shrunken by a fifth as a result of the war.[7] Reconstruction, modernization, and rapid growth became significant economic priorities within the lens of Soviet security needs; all priorities which Soviet policy planners would attempt to begin to address in the coming years.

George Marshall's speech on European recovery was well-heard and quickly evolved into American policy addressing the time's primary political and economic concerns. Rooted deeply in his speech, and more broadly, his ideology, the policy would eventually become Marshall's namesake, universally known as the Marshall Plan. Officially designated the European Recovery Program (ERP), the Marshall Plan was, at its most basic, a system for providing US foreign aid to European states. Beginning in 1948, the United States provided consumer goods, capital goods, and bulk necessities like grain, fuel, and steel to European governments, who would in turn sell the goods to businesses and individuals.[8] The money that a government accumulated from these sales would be known as a "counterpart fund," and was intended to be spent on reconstruction, infrastructure investment, or on

[5]Comintern International, *The Program of the Communist International: Together with the Statues of the Communist International* (London: Modern Books, 1929), 4.1.
[6]Cristian Bente, "Economic Evolutions During the Cold War - Romania in the COMECON (1949-1965)," *Studia Universitatis Economics Series* 30.4 (2020): 124.
[7]Lyubov Lazareva et al. "USSR in the post-war years: the struggle for economic independence (1945-1953)," *E3S Web of Conferences* 210 (December 2020): 2.
[8]Armin Grunbacher, "Cold-War Economics: The Use of Marshall Plan Counterpart Funds in Germany, 1948-1960," *Central European History* 45 (December 2012): 698.

paying off war debt.[9] At face value, this addresses the basic moral desire to aid Europe in its recovery. However the details of the ERP and its implementation allowed it to serve much deeper political and economic purposes. In his speech Marshall asserted that European nations should have to decide together the specifics of what aid was required and how it would be distributed, among other details, before America would provide aid.[10] Thus, the Committee for European Economic Cooperation (CEEC) was established between the 16 aid-receiving countries to establish these details. Beyond deciding the specific needs and logistics of the ERP, the CEEC laid down goals within the ERP timeline for internal European cooperation. Consistent commodity production levels, the reduction of internal trade and transport barriers, and the stabilization of internal finance and currency to facilitate commerce were all targets of CEEC internal policies.[11] Despite requiring Europeans to decide on details of the aid they would receive, American aid did not come to Europe without American interests. The ERP was structured such that the United States largely dictated the expenditure of counterpart funds. Thus this often went in the direction of American benefit.[12] Furthermore, the projects on which counterpart funds were spent were plastered with signage pointing out that they were "supported by Marshall Aid."[13] This posturing was part of a larger American political strategy behind the ERP. Despite being sold as "directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos,"[14] Marshall Aid was, as David Hein expressed, "an instrument of Soviet Containment;" by increasing European economic prosperity, cooperation, and connection with the United States, the Marshall Plan was designed to "prime the pump in order to enable European democracies to stand on their own and resist Soviet pressures."[15]

While it may come as a surprise that the USSR was invited to attend an early, formative meeting on the Marshall Plan, it is likely not surprising that the Soviet government declined this offer. Not content with simply refusing this invitation on behalf of the USSR, when Czechoslovakia received and agreed to attend the meeting, Stalin summoned the nation's foreign minister to Moscow to chastise him himself. It should come with equally little surprise that Czechoslovakia renounced its attendance at the meeting shortly after that.[16] Stalin saw the Marshall Plan for the threat that it was: "He could not countenance a scheme that would revive trade between Eastern and Western Europe and in the process deprive the Soviet Union

[9]Grunbacher, 698.
[10]Marshall.
[11]A.A. Berle Jr., "The Marshall Plan in the European Struggle," *Eighteenth Anniversary of Social Research* 82 (2015): 208-210.
[12]Grunbacher, 699.
[13]Grunbacher, 715.
[14]Marshall.
[15]Hein, 13.
[16]Berle Jr., 207.

of its newly created sphere of economic interest. Nor could he acquiesce in a process allowing a supranational body to determine priorities and quotas for the Communist bloc. So he clamped down on Eastern Europe and ended the remaining coalition governments there."[17] 1949 brought Stalin's direct response to the Marshall Plan: the COMECON. The creation of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), as it was alternatively known, was a Soviet policy decision intended to kill several birds with one stone. Under the guise of *mutual* economic assistance, the COMECON primarily addressed Soviet economic and security needs.[18] The COMECON economic directive called for the transition of member states away from global trade. Toward trade within, the implementation of collectivization and central planning reminiscent of the Soviet system, and the rapid development of general heavy industry throughout the COMECON bloc.[19] Increased internal trade and especially the demand for rapid industrial development generated significant dependence on the USSR among COMECON states. Members of the bloc were forced to import a majority of necessary raw materials from the USSR. In Czechoslovakia's case this meant importing 90% of its nickel and 75% of its iron ore from the USSR during the 1950s.[20] While providing the Soviet Union with important cash flow which otherwise would not have been available to a nation so shut-off from the global economy, sustaining the COMECON bloc's economic dependence also served Soviet security needs. The economic and political control over neighboring states gained by the USSR through the COMECON effectively granted Stalin the Soviet buffer zone against the capitalist West for which Soviet leadership had been searching for decades; one which was established years before the formalization of the WARSAW pact.[21]

The Marshall Plan, although cut short by US internal politics, was monumentally successful. The plan's outcome met or exceeded all the American policy goals that had incited its creation. At home, the Marshall Plan assisted the transition of the American manufacturing giant from wartime to peacetime; manufacturing would be driven by the need to produce goods for delivery to Europe in the massive quantities elected by the ERP. The successful end of the program led to a natural desire for imported American goods in the successfully resuscitated European economy, completing the transition of US manufacturing to consumer exports. While it is a practical description, it is almost an injustice to describe the effects of the ERP as a "resuscitation" of the European economy. Internal European economic cooperation, incited as a prerequisite of American aid, gained enough momentum to continue without outside direction. European cooperation expanded to such an extent that it could be argued as amounting to an epochal transformation in the

[17]Hein, 14.
[18]Bente, 137.
[19]Bente, 138.
[20]Bente, 135.
[21]Bente, 134.

European economy. Historically absent prior to the ERP, cooperation between France and Germany led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951; a spiritual successor of the internal integration championed by the CEEC under the Marshall Plan. The ECSC proved that independent European cooperation was possible and beneficial, leading to the Treaty of Rome and the birth of the European Economic Community: the grandfather organization of today's European Union. Increased European unity and prosperity brought by the ERP also inspired a confident, hopeful vision of Europe's future among its population.[22] The tangible effect of this emotional shift was the decline of communism as a serious political player in the elections of Western Europe. Newfound assurance in the direction of Europe is directly attributed to averting the emergence of a Communist government from Italy's 1948 elections.[23] Furthering the growing distaste for communism. The Soviet Union was the strong contrast apparent to Western Europeans between the benefits they were experiencing under the ERP, and what could be seen of the negative impact of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. Increasing contrast between the economic situations in the East and the West, along with Marshall Plan propaganda ranging from signage and films to a touring "ERP train,"[24] led to a broadly positive perspective of America among Western European populations.[25] Amicable political connections and the positive image of America's involvement in Europe thanks to the Marshall Plan allowed for the successful establishment of NATO,[26] an organization which would become the vanguard of the West through the rest of the Cold War.

The success and prosperity present throughout the legacy of the Marshall Plan are starkly contrasted by the dissatisfaction and destitution associated with the history of the COMECON. From the outset, the COMECON policy of rapid industrialization within the bloc caused significant trouble. Failure to plan around available resources led to member states all being dictated to invest in the same industries at once. This overlapping development caused crippling resource shortages, and led to the oversaturation of these sectors once projects were completed.[27] While certain industries received overzealous attention, COMECON policy also saw agriculture and light industry, including the production of consumer goods, receive no investment whatsoever. The resulting food shortages and dropping of quality of life experienced within the COMECON member states prompted widespread civil discontent.[28] Wary of the potential outcome of this discontent, and with some newfound freedom after the death of Stalin, the early 1950s Soviet planners undertook a restructuring of COMECON policies. The

[22]Hein, 15.
[23]Hein, 15.
[24]Grunzbacher, 699.
[25]Hein, 15.
[26]Hein, 15.
[27]Bente, 138.
[28]Bente, 140.

necessity of this effort to better the economic conditions and quality of life within the member states[29] was so high that in 1953 even the CIA was aware of what was looming:

> …the living standard [within the satellite states] is falling and, consequently, mistrust toward the Soviet system is increasing. If Moscow wants to keep these states in submission, she will sooner or later be compelled to make certain concessions, especially of an economic character, which will raise the living standard of the local population. The question is whether or not the USSR is able to solve these difficulties at all. It is apparent already today that the establishment of the Economic Council (Council for Mutual Economic Aid - CMEA) in Moscow brought to the satellite states only disadvantages and not advantages.[30]

Attention was given to the low agricultural output, and more significantly, the problematic industrial inefficiency of COMECON at this point. Mandates known as "agreements for specialization" were implemented throughout the COMECON bloc dictating what each member state would manufacture, generally limited to the realm of capital goods and processed materials.[31] Diversification of manufacturing, achieved through these agreements, was intended to increase inter-member trade which had all but died out as a result of the parallel manufacturing investments and oversaturation caused by earlier COMECON policy.[32] The restructured COMECON policies were also riddled with difficulties. The collectivization of agriculture to increase output was executed painfully slowly. Only one member state surpassed 50% collectivization by 1955, while others consistently hovered between 30% and 10%,[33] resulting in any potential benefit to agricultural production failing to manifest. Meanwhile, overzealous implementation of "agreements for specialization" rendered it impossible for a state to manufacture goods, no matter the efficiency benefit, if that good had already been assigned to another state. Despite this increasing inefficiency, perpetual dependence on the USSR for raw materials ensured that member states would not and could not attempt to split off the path of specialization that had been dictated.[34] Public discontent within the COMECON bloc came to a head in 1956. Populations were no longer willing to tolerate desperately poor quality of living, partially resulting from inefficiencies and failures of COMECON. It was clear that Soviet governance was responsible for the situation, thus, anti-communist popular uprisings appeared in both Poland and Hungary. The Soviet response was a defining factor in COMECON's legacy as a failure. Almost immediately the Soviet military was

[29]Bente, 141.
[30]Artyom A. Ulunyan, "The CIA's Estimates and Forecasts on Soviet Economic and Foreign Trade Policy in COMECON (early 50s-mid 60s of the XXth Century)." *Codrul Cosminului* 24 (2018): 243.
[31]Bente, 141.
[32]Bente, 138.
[33]Bente, 136.
[34]"The Rise of COMECON," *Time Magazine*, April 7, 1960.

mobilized in Poland and Hungary, and the uprisings were violently ended. The mass civil discontent with, among other things, the economic situation within COMECON states, and the resulting murders by the Soviet Union, made clear to the world that the COMECON was not the successful Eastern response to the Marshall Plan it purported to be. While many of those assisted by the Marshall Plan saw America as a savior, the Soviet Union would now forever be seen as the oppressor of those within COMECON states, virtually sealing COMECON's legacy.

Parallel to the contrasting outcomes of the ERP and COMECON within the immediate postwar period, the contrast between their respective impacts on the current day economic and geopolitical stage can only further conclusions about their relative successes and failures. Closing on 75 years after the onset of the Marshall Plan, its impacts are still plainly visible. Currently, the European Union continues to grow and integrate further, NATO remains the largest defense pact in the world, and America continues close diplomatic and economic cooperation with Western Europe- now one of the wealthiest regions in the world. The current day impacts of the COMECON are far less apparent. No Russia-aligned defense pact or economic treaty originated out of the COMECON. Organizations that may appear to be Eastern counterparts to the West's NATO and EU, such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and European Economic Union (EEU), are distinctly based in the ex-Soviet states, not the ex-COMECON states. Today every single former COMECON satellite state in Europe, including both offspring of Czechoslovakia, is a member of NATO, and all but one are members of the European Union. It is not only a testament to the lasting fundamental prosperity and cooperation generated by the Marshall Plan, and the successful ventures built off of it, but it also demonstrates that the immediate failures of the COMECON contributed to the ever-present economic and diplomatic isolation of the former Soviet Union.

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ALIGNING ON NON-ALIGNMENT: ADDRESSING THE ROLE OF THE NON-ALIGNED MOVEMENT IN COLD WAR STATE SECURITY AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

EMMA SHANDRO

During the Cold War, anxieties surrounding the American and Soviet conflict engulfed the international community. After a split from the Soviet bloc, Yugoslavia and many recently decolonized states faced the threat of direct intervention from the Cold War superpowers and sought a Third Way. Emanating from this, the Non-Aligned Movement was formed, allowing previously unaligned states to preserve their sovereignty without compromising their ideological positions. The Non-Aligned Movement further concerned itself with an active peaceful resolution, conflict mediation, and nuclear non-proliferation. Yugoslavia's partnership with India, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia solidified the Movement's place in global affairs and further represented the diverse opinions within the Non-Aligned states. The Non-Aligned Movement's goals had varying degrees of success, but was its greatest success was in offering states an alliance without subjugation or domination.

Following the polarization of global power between the superpowers of the USSR and the USA, the Non-Aligned Movement was born out of a desire for a third path. States that had been recently decolonized were eager to remain independent and did not want their sovereignty undermined by the interests of the American or Soviet nations. However, this alliance was not single-minded in its goals and welcomed states with differing ideologies, governing systems, and political structures into its ranks. This type of supra-national collaboration was still relatively uneasy during the era in which it came to be, and it was not long before that the League of Nations failed to prevent the Second World War. In more recent memory, the first atomic weapons had been used in combat, completely altering state conceptions of security. The Non-Aligned Movement's goals were largely

concerned with peace and humanitarianism. As such, they devoted many of their resources to protecting state sovereignty in recently decolonized states and global interest in nuclear non-proliferation. This paper argues that the presence of the Non-Aligned Movement's voice of dissension towards the totalizing American and Soviet empires was necessary to ease tensions and slow the polarization process. Although their goals of state sovereignty and nuclear non-proliferation were not complete successes, the Non-Aligned Movement significantly impacted the development of the Cold War.

The Non-Aligned Movement officially began in Belgrade. Following the events of the Bandung Conference, many nations, especially those still in the developing stages and those decolonized after the World Wars, sought an alliance and collective security that did not rely on the strong-arming of the American or Soviet Superpower states. The Bandung Conference led to further discussions, and six years later, the Belgrade Conference served as the first official meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement. The concern over alliances was especially palpable in Yugoslavia, one of the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement, who saw the Communist and Capitalist blocs as equally threatening following their split with the Soviet Union in 1948.[1] Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia's leader, recognized the nation's precarious position. The breaking of ties with the USSR meant that Yugoslavia was effectively unprotected. In Tito's eyes, they were vulnerable to intervention from either the West or the Soviets, who might take advantage of their unattachment.[2] This existential concern created the search for a "Third Way" and eventually became part of the *raison d'être* of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). It was perhaps fate that Yugoslavia and India formalized their diplomatic relationship in the same year as the Yugoslav-Soviet split. It was the personal connections between the leading members of the NAM (specifically, Tito and Jawaharlal Nehru, then-president of India, and Tito and U Nu, the prime minister of Burma) that cemented the bonds within the movement.[3] Alongside these personal connections, NAM nations shared a concern about being voiceless on international matters, especially about nuclear conflict.[4]

Yugoslavia, Egypt, and India are key members of the NAM with their cooperative relationship being traced to their time as non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council from 1950-51. During this period, these nations were

[1]Svetozar Rajak, "No Bargaining Chips, No Spheres of Interest: The Yugoslav Origins of Cold War Non-Alignment," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 16, no. 1 (2014): 147, 149.
[2]Rajak, 147.
[3]Aleksandar Životić and Jovan Čavoški, "On the Road to Belgrade: Yugoslavia, Third World Neutrals, and the Evolution of Global Non-Alignment, 1954-1961," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 85.
[4]Lorenz M. Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961-1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18, no. 4 (2016): 98.

directly involved in decisions about the Korean War.[5] Beyond Tito's interpersonal skills, it is also relevant to remember that Yugoslavia's history is not one of colonialism, and as such, decolonized nations felt that the nation was trustworthy and unlikely to be exploitative.[6] The Movement also did not necessarily aim to distance itself from the two blocs completely; that would have been essentially impossible, given the intensity of global relations. Instead of non-involvement, the members of NAM were interested in self-determining and cooperation. Rather, the NAM "urged restraint between the two superpowers, seeking to burn bridges with neither."[7]

As many of the members of the Non-Aligned Movement sought a foothold in global affairs, the idea of re-colonization through the subjugation to American or Soviet wills was, to put it lightly, unappealing. Rather, the Non-Aligned Movement was a means by which states could pursue a third option for collective security. The post-colonial dimension of many of NAM's member states necessitated an anti-imperial, anticolonial approach from the movement.[8] While physical security was paramount, NAM had a diverse, progressive understanding of security. Since many of the members of NAM had previously been colonies, they were familiar with the more insidious ways to exert imperial control. As such, the organization had additional concerns surrounding cultural imperialism and economic security.[9] For Nasser, the economic dimension of non-alignment was particularly attractive, as Egypt was still finding a foothold after independence from the British.[10]

Beyond Egypt, the NAM's formation period was when much of Africa and Asia were abruptly decolonized. While this is a massive gain for the sovereignty of these nations, the decolonization process was often not conducive to positioning the newly independent states well in the international community. Vieria describes this condition as "ontological anxieties," wherein the states perceived a direct threat to their continued existence.[11] The "sub-systemic" or "regional" proxy conflicts of the Cold War represented the intersection of many of these concerns- colonial domination, ontological security, and the threat of nuclear conflict- and as such, the NAM was deeply concerned about them.[12] These fears were made real in the case of Afghanistan in the 1970s, which, after a chain of revolutions and coups, was

[5]Životić, 80.
[6]Bojana Piškur, "Yugoslavia: Other Modernities, Other Histories," *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 20, no. 1 (2019): 133.
[7]Robert B. Rakove, "The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961-6," *International History Review* 37, no. 5 (2015): 997.
[8]Piškur, 131-132.
[9]Piškur, 133.
[10]Životić, 83.
[11]Marco A. Vieira, "Understanding Resilience in International Relations: The Non-Aligned Movement and Ontological Security," *International Studies Review* 18, no. 2 (2016): 296.
[12]Lüthi, 100.

occupied first by the Soviet Union and later by the United States. Insofar as the NAM considers collective security to be one of its main concerns, the case of Afghanistan represents a failure. Despite this shortcoming, the NAM supported Egypt earlier during the Suez Canal Crisis, further cementing the movement's commitment to anticolonial principles.[13]

As part of its commitment to security, the NAM consistently emphasized the importance of peaceful conflict resolution. The Movement was also adamant that they were not, as they are often mischaracterized, neutral or passive in the face of conflict, but that the role of the NAM was an active and positive one, with the foundational goal of collective peace at its forefront.[14] The Non-Aligned Movement stressed that peace was an "active engagement",[15] and, to live up to this ideal, often played the role of mediator in international disputes. As a trusted figure, Tito also acted on occasion as a mediator between leaders of the Third World.[16] Rakove notes that "key leaders [in the movement] thought Cold War mediation both a moral responsibility and a human necessity."[17] However, the NAM's role as a mediator was not always welcome, and, America was generally unreceptive to attempts from the NAM to mediate when US-Soviet tensions were high.[18] Nonetheless, the NAM's involvement in mediation was necessary to open doors to communication. During the United Nation's 15th General Assembly in 1960, Tito, Nasser, Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno, and Ghanian President Kwame Nkrumah coordinated discussions to persuade the United States and the Soviet Union to resume direct dialogues in the interest of increased international stability.[19] Ghana and Indonesia were, at this point, also members of the NAM. This plea came one year before the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1961, after which the two nations finally listened and set up direct lines of communication. Relating to the Cuban Missile Crisis, talks that were facilitated by a representative from Guinea, another member of the NAM, had also opened between the United States and Cuba.[20] The Attwood-Lechuga Talks sought to reach a diplomatic understanding following the Cuban Missile Crisis, but were cut short following American President John F. Kennedy's assassination.[21]

As the Cuban Missile Crisis made unquestionably clear, mediations were only part of the necessary efforts to prevent a nuclear conflict. Many members of the Non-Aligned Movement were committed to nuclear non-proliferation due to the

[13]Životić, 88-89.
[14]Rajak, 168.
[15]Rajak, 175.
[16]Rajak, 177.
[17]Rakove, 993.
[18]Rakove, 994, 1008.
[19]Životić, 94.
[20]Rakove, 998.
[21]Rakove, 998.

existential threat that nuclear weapons posed in the hands of the USSR and the USA. As such, the Non-Aligned Movement often pushed the international community for stricter nuclear weapons regulations. However, the heterogeneous ideologies within the NAM created certain complexities with this. According to the UN, the Non-Proliferation Treaty "rest[s] on three pillars- disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy."[22] At the time the Non-Proliferation Treaty was first negotiated, only the USA, the UK, the USSR, France, and China had openly tested nuclear weapons. Certain terms of the NPT were seen as problematic by certain members of NAM, as the Treaty would prevent other nations from matching the military power of these five states.[23] Though NAM has generally taken an antinuclear stance, the Movement is right to point out that any iteration of nuclear power exacerbates certain inequalities. When any states are "locked out" of nuclear power, this triggers an immediate imbalance- how would any non-nuclear state be truly able to confront a state with nuclear capabilities if it had to? Many members of NAM, including Tito, saw peace as a global issue- not a regional one- especially in the nuclear age.[24] The Non-Proliferation Treaty was considered a good start but by no means a finished project.

Another breakthrough limitation on nuclear weapons was the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT) I, signed in 1972, and discussions surrounding it opened soon after the NPT was formalized. Unlike the global reach of the NPT, SALT I (and later, SALT II) was an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the NAM certainly supported a reduction in the nuclear tensions between these two nations, the consensus from the NAM was that SALT did not go far enough. Rather than a limitation, the NAM called for complete disarmament.[25] This basis of critique was characteristic of the NAM, especially in nuclear proliferation. Another instance of dissension from the NAM occurred in 1995 when the NPT had reached the term in which it was to discuss an indefinite extension. The Non-Aligned Movement expressed that it and many of its members, especially those who were non-nuclear, had concerns about extending the NPT indefinitely and were reluctant to sign if these concerns were not addressed.[26] Among these concerns was that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had not been completed and that there was a lack of legislation around banning the stockpiling of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons.[27] The major concerns that the NAM was

[22]"Thematic Seminar on Pillar III (the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)," *United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs* (Dec 11 2019), https://www.un.org/disarmament/update/thematic-seminar-on-pillar-iii-the-peaceful-uses-of-nuclear-energy-of-the-treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-npt/.
[23]Thomas Graham Jr., "Nuclear Nonproliferation: Time to Make It Permanent." *Issues in Science & Technology* 11 (1995): 57.
[24]Rajak, 167.
[25]Lüthi, 144.
[26]Graham, 58.
[27]Graham, 59, 60.

trying to address were not only the existence of nuclear weapons but also the possibility of an arms race and how certain economic inequalities might manifest themselves if such an event were to reoccur. While the NPT was extended indefinitely, many of the concerns that the NAM raised during these discussions have seen some progress since the extension.[28]

However committed the NAM was to de-nuclearization initially, not all its members had reached a consensus on abstaining from nuclear weapons technology. Though Tito, Nasser, and Nehru had come to their own consensus about the necessity of peaceful use of nuclear energy,[29] this was challenged when India refused to sign the NPT in 1968. In this case, India had its own national security interests in mind. Therefore, the NAM was not unified on non-proliferation and had to grapple with that.[30] India would not be the only NAM member to develop nuclear capabilities. However, it is worth mentioning that the number of NAM member states that chose (and still choose) not to pursue nuclear weapons far outweighs the number of states that did.

Since the Non-Aligned Movement contained a veritable kaleidoscope of nations with varying and often competing ideological frameworks and ideals, the fact that the Movement was ever able to present a unified voice is in and of itself an accomplishment. Part of the Non-Aligned Movement's broad appeal, and part of why it has maintained so many members, is that many states also felt that they had a responsibility to contribute to the solution of many global issues, regardless of whether or not they were instigating the conflict.[31] The international context of the Cold War, in which the NAM was formed, made collective security a necessity, especially given the precarious positions that newly independent states found themselves in. Above all, the NAM provided a means of expression to states that felt they had been robbed of their voice on the international stage. Despite the noble character of many of the NAM's ideals, the goals of collective security and nuclear disarmament were not complete; in some cases, members of NAM acted against these goals. It would not be unfair to critique the Movement on these points. Indeed, there are many areas in which the NAM was unable to uphold its ideals to their full extent. However, the steps it was able to take were necessary. Had the Movement never begun, there would truly have been no alternative to American and Soviet dominance. It would have likely also been necessary for any states wishing to remain unaligned to develop nuclear weapons for their assured security, significantly setting back non-proliferation. States that wished to abstain from nuclear weapons, the alternative is to subjugate themselves to a bloc that would limit their newly earned sovereignty. The greatest success of the Non-Aligned

[28]Graham, 57-60.
[29]Životić, 86.
[30]Lüthi, 127.
[31]Lüthi, 98.

Movement was that it created an environment in which states that would have otherwise gone unheard could affect change.

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REASONS FOR THE START OF CULTURE REVOLUTION IN CHINA AND THE AFTERMATH

LILY RUAN

This paper examines various reasons for Mao Zedong to start the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, as well as the impact of this event on China's education system and economy. By exploring the political dynamic between Mao and his potential competitors, it can be concluded that the Cultural Revolution was not simply a result of Mao's fear towards revisionism as the official statements have claimed, but also an attempt by Mao to eliminate his opponents within the country. As a result, the education system was disrupted as millions of students were sent to the countryside to conduct manual labour on farms, and children's literature was reduced to merely being used as a tool for spreading propaganda. Although China boasted economic growth during the Cultural Revolution, there was a decline in citizens' quality of life as many suffered in poverty.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, or Cultural Revolution, was widely known as a massive political movement led by the Chinese Communist Party leader Mao Zedong that caused the death of countless citizens. Two decades after the end of this event, Beijing announced that the causalities during Cultural Revolution were in the millions. Furthermore, around 100 million people were victims of this movement[1] with detailed numbers still unknown to the public. It greatly impacted the education system and economy of China, forcing Chinese citizens to drop out of school[2] and halted the economic productivity of the nation.[3] According to Chinese officials, the initial purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to prevent the spread of revisionism within China.[4] It was supposed to be a

[1]Lucian W. Pye, "Reassessing the Cultural Revolution," *The China Quarterly*, no.108 (1986): 597.
[2]Xueguang Zhou and Liren Hou, "Children of the Cultural Revolution: The State and the Life Course in the People's Republic of China," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 1 (1999): 12.
[3]Zhou and Hou, 12.
[4]Ellis Joffe, "China in Mid-1966: 'Cultural Revolution' or Struggle for Power?," *The China Quarterly*, no. 27 (1966): 124.

movement that "subject[ed] reactionary bourgeois ideology to criticism,"[5] which would stop the potential growth of capitalism. However, historical evidence suggests alternative reasons for Mao starting the Cultural Revolution which are related to the internal conflict within the Chinese Communist Party as well as Mao's desire to quell the resistance from intellectuals who questioned his political ambitions. This essay argues that the reasons for the Cultural Revolution were not only because Mao feared the potential spread of revisionism within China, but also because he wished to use this revolution as a political tool to seize absolute power within the Communist Party and the country itself, purging anyone who might become a threat, which unintentionally led to a devastating impact on China's education system and economy.

The idea of Cultural Revolution was initially brought up in a meeting among CCP Central Committee members in 1965 where Mao specifically targeted the issue regarding potential growth of reactionary bourgeois ideology and revisionism.[6] A key element that Mao used to justify his reasoning was the mellowing attitude of the Soviet Union towards maintaining continuous economic growth under communist influence, which suggested a possibility for this giant communist nation to return to a bourgeois society.[7] This later led to propaganda in China that promoted the idea of how the Soviet Union had fallen to revisionism and how "the experience of the Soviet Union was no real value as that country had begun to stagnate at the socialist stage."[8] Meanwhile, the failure of the Great Leap Forward heavily damaged China's economy, forcing China to slow down its pace in economic development.[9] Mao possibly saw these factors as potential threats, as they might lead to the rise of revisionism within China once the pace of revolution is stalled.[10] This may negatively impact the promotion and continuation of communism in China. Thus, a new round of revolution that could cleanse all possible potentials of such threat was necessary, resulting in the official justification of the Cultural Revolution.

The fear of revisionism was indeed one of the reasons why the Cultural Revolution started, but it was also Mao's desire to eliminate his rivals from within the party and to prevent intellectuals from overthrowing him. Although Mao was the head of the party, there were several officials who had different ideological perspectives, and may have served as a reason for why Mao decided to undermine the party that he had tried so hard to build. Liu Shaoqi was the Premier of China, second in power

[5]Joffe, 125.
[6]Vijay Bahadur Singh, "China's Cultural Revolution," *The Indian Journal of Political Science* 29, no. 4 (1968): 329-330.
[7]Singh, 330.
[8]Singh, 331.
[9]Joffe, 125.
[10]Singh, 330.

to Mao, before he and his supporters were purged during the Cultural Revolution.[11] Byung-joon Ahn, a leading scholar in the field of Chinese politics, argued that although both Mao and Liu shared similar principles in communist ideology, Mao emphasized spiritual revolution and mass participation while Liu highlighted the importance of combining ideologies with reality to focuses on solving practical problems.[12] When Mao's persistence in advocating radical revolutionary ideologies was met with the party's preference of incremental reforms under Liu's influence,[13] it is unsurprising that Mao chose to cripple his own party in order to eliminate any political oppositions from powerful officials in order to further stabilize his power within the nation. Similarly, Peng Zhen, an important member of the decision-making body Politburo as well as the mayor of Beijing, was denounced as "a 'counter-revolutionary revisionist', guilty of just about every anti-party crime in the catalogue".[14] The accusation against Peng was unreasonable based on his past characteristics as a supporter of Mao,[15] which made it highly unlikely for him to be a true revisionist. It is true that Peng was against some of Mao's policies,[16] but other officials who had the same opinions were treated very differently.[17] A more likely explanation would be that Mao feared the power of Peng within the party, as Peng was also seen as one of the possible successors of Mao during that time.[18]

Aside from high rank officials, Mao was also suspicious of the intellectuals in China. Before the Cultural Revolution, there was a short period of liberalization from 1960 to 1962 where intellectuals "criticized the Party and its policies of the Great Leap Forward,"[19] which may be a potential reason why Mao focused on reforming the educated population during the Cultural Revolution. Chinese communist leaders including Mao believed that intellectuals were "influential in shaping the pattern of thought of the nation by virtue of their work and their social status as 'thinkers',"[20] yet their liberal tradition was incompatible with Mao's preference for a uniform political faith.[21] To Mao, this raised the possibility of the intellectuals encouraging the masses to resist his ideologies if they were given too much power and freedom. A complaint by Mao in 1964 stating that the publications from intellectuals "had not reflected the socialist revolution and construction" and

[11]Byung-joon Ahn, "The Cultural Revolution and China's Search for Political Order," *The China Quarterly*, no. 58 (1974): 267.
[12]Ahn, 254.
[13]Ahn, 258.
[14]Joffe, 127.
[15]Joffe, 126.
[16]Robert F. Dernberger, "Radical Ideology and Economic Development in China: The Cultural Revolution and Its Impact on the Economy," *Asian Survey* 12, no. 12 (1972): 1055.
[17]Joffe, 127.
[18]Joffe, 127.
[19]Joffe, 125.
[20]Sylvia Chan, "Political Assessment of Intellectuals before the Cultural Revolution," *Asian Survey* 18, no.9 (1978): 894.
[21]Chan, 895.

"even slid to the verge of revisionism"[22] shows that Mao did not favor the political ideologies of the intellectuals. As mentioned earlier, Mao's enthusiasm lay in leading the mass population,[23] and achieving this requires a unified stable political belief, especially in a communist society. The potential disturbance or even resistance from the intellectuals could pose a huge threat to Mao's regime, since both sides specialized in appealing to the mass population. The decision to send millions of students and intellectuals to work in rural areas in 1968, commonly known as the "send down" policy,[24] was arguably Mao's strategy to repress the political power and social influence of the intellectuals while preventing young students from becoming future liberal thinkers. Thus, Mao's desire to suppress the intellectuals and party officials along with his concern for revisionism can be seen as three major reasons why he started the Cultural Revolution. As this movement unfolded, its impact on the nation was devastating.

The Cultural Revolution arguably dealt a crippling blow to the education system in China. Starting from 1968, no classes were offered in Chinese schools and students "could not graduate from or advance in school."[25] The disruption of education led to a negative impact on "the human capital accumulation of affected cohorts, with long-term consequences for labor productivity, inequality, and intergenerational mobility."[26] By 1968, merely 2 years after the Cultural Revolution officially started, more than 6 million secondary school students were no longer in school and remained unemployed, driving many of them joining the "Red Guards" which was a student based revolutionary group who took over government offices and occupied schools.[27] The disruption of education implies the halt of growth in the literacy rate nationwide, which could heavily affect the development of technology and economy in the long run.

On top of paralyzing the education system, Mao also issued the "send down" policy, which can be seen as a form of persecution towards the students. This policy involved sending 17 million urban youth, who had been receiving an education in the cities, to live and work on rural farms.[28] According to the official statements, this was meant to "help young people get in touch with the revolutionary origins of the party and to contribute to the country's rural development."[29] However, in

[22]Joffe, 125.
[23]Byung-joon Ahn, 254.
[24]Xueguang Zhou and Liren Hou, "Children of the Cultural Revolution: The State and the Life Course in the People's Republic of China," *American Sociological Review* 64, no. 1 (1999): 13.
[25]Zhou and Hou, 12.
[26]John Giles, Albert Park, and Meiyan Wang, "The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, Disruptions to Education, and the Returns to Schooling in Urban China," *Economic Development & Cultural Change* 68, no. 1 (2019): 131.
[27]Zhou and Hou, 15.
[28]Zhou and Hou, 13.
[29]Giles, Park, and Wang, 138.

reality, most people were forced to send their children away under the pressure from the government,[30] and those with unfavourable family backgrounds, such as children of intellectuals, were specifically targeted.[31] Not only were the children generally prohibited from visiting their family in the cities, many were also forced to perform heavy manual work which lasted for more than 12 hours a day.[32] Faced with such intense labour, it would be difficult for these youth to maintain their academic mindset if they hoped to self-study at all, not to mention the lack of access to education resources in rural areas making it almost impossible for them to obtain any educational materials. On average, these youths were away from home for 6 years and a stunning 19.3 percent of them did not return for over 10 years.[33] The longer these youth stayed in rural areas, the more they were influenced by the "send down" policy later in their lives.[34] This proves that the impact of the "send down" policy was not limited to the period of time when it was in effect, but it also affected the futures of the millions of students who were victims of this political movement. For those who were away for a longer period of time, they had to face the difficulties of adapting to urban life once again after nearly a decade. Among those who later resumed their studies, many had to face fierce competition for limited slots in college entrance exams because the population that wished to pursue post-secondary education accumulated throughout the years.[35]

Another major change related to education that occurred during the Cultural Revolution was the content of children's literature. Children's literature bloomed after the initial establishment of the new China, where as different genres such as fairy tales and nursery rhymes were popular among the general public.[36] However, as the Cultural Revolution began, many of these stories were soon labeled as being "against realistic principles of socialist literature,"[37] causing them to be banned. Even worse, as the state recognized that children's literature "can mold children's outlook on the world and life,"[38] they soon used it as a tool for spreading Mao's propaganda to citizens at an early age.[39] The stories published during the Cultural Revolution were oriented around class struggle and most of them were dry and dull, leading to the majority of children disliking them.[40] Since the stories solely focused on propaganda, children were either brainwashed into becoming loyal believers of

[30]Zhou and Hou, 16.
[31]Giles, Park, and Wang, 139.
[32]Zhou and Hou, 16.
[33]Zhou and Hou, 16.
[34]Zhou and Hou, 28.
[35]Giles, Park, and Wang, 139.
[36]Anfeng Sheng, "Children's Literature During China's Cultural Revolution: A Critical Review," *Comparative Literature Studies* 52, no. 1 (2015): 99.
[37]Sheng, 108.
[38]Sheng, 98.
[39]Sheng, 100.
[40]Sheng, 107.

Mao or lost interest in literature and no longer read them. The fact that this literature "did not pay much attention to knowledge acculturation and science education"[41] suggests an era where children would have a lesser understanding and interest towards science and knowledge. This had potential to influence their view on discussions such as the necessity of public education and the importance of technology development even after the Cultural Revolution had ended.

Although China boasted strong economic growth during the Cultural Revolution period, the majority of citizens actually suffered from a decline in quality of life. In the case of China, within a centrally planned economy where the government controls the allocation of resources, it is easy for the government to boast of their country's economic growth if they set a fixed price for goods and focus on mass industrial production instead of producing consumer goods.[42] In other words, the prices of industrial goods would never fall even if they were over-produced. This would cause the country's national economic growth to be falsely inflated on official reports if China produced a large quantity of industrial goods and then multiplied this quantity with their fixed price to reflect their gross domestic product (GDP). At the same time, since most of the resources for production were focused on the industrial sector, not much would be left for producing consumer goods that were essential for citizens' day to day lives. This led to a "deterioration in living conditions"[43] and eventually forced people into poverty. Data shows that although the production of coal increased during the Cultural Revolution period, the amount consumed per person actually decreased.[44] This is a sign of a decline in the quality of life since resources became scarcer for civilians. There was also major deterioration in housing conditions in urban areas, where the average residential housing area per person fell from 4.5 square meters to 3.5 square meters.[45] This suggests that citizens might have had to sell land due to economic issues, or land was developed by the government for industrial use instead of civilian use. In either situation, the living conditions for citizens was negatively affected. Unfortunately, the evidence for this negative impact was offset by the gains in the industrial sector in official reports, and thus was never acknowledged by the officials in China during the Cultural Revolution.

Aside from government decisions that impacted citizens' quality of life, there were also social issues that were destructive to the economy. During the Cultural Revolution, conflicts between local governments and the Red Guards caused disruption to the railway system.[46] A disruption of major transportation systems

[41]Sheng, 107.
[42] Gene Chang, Shenke Yang and Kathryn Chang, "The Immiserizing Growth During the Period of China's Cultural Revolution," *The Chinese Economy* 51, no. 5 (2018): 388.
[43]Chang, Yang, and Chang, 395.
[44]Chang, Yang, and Chang, 394.
[45]Chang, Yang, and Chang, 394.
[46]Dernberger, 1058.

would naturally lead to negative impacts to the economy since it would be difficult to ship raw materials and labour to production sites. Similarly, end products could not be shipped to consumers, which reduced national economic growth. There were also physical conflicts which "led to the temporary closing of many production units, construction projects, and transportation facilities."[47] This would cause mass unemployment, which is another major factor that can lead to a decline in economic growth. By the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1978, "30.7% of the rural population lived below the poverty line, lacking basic food and clothing,"[48] and the national economy was at the "brink of collapse".[49] Thus, it can be concluded that the official economic reports of China during the Cultural Revolution did not reflect the actual living conditions of its citizens, but was instead used to produce an illusion of economic success.

It is plain to see that the reasons for starting the Cultural Revolution were complicated. Although officials tried to justify the movement as a purge of potential revisionism, it is easy to observe that the "revisionist" label soon became an excuse to punish those who were either against Mao's ideologies or threatened his position of power in the party. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge Mao's frustration towards the changes in the Soviet Union, indicating that the fear of revisionism was indeed one of the core reasons for this revolution. The potential spread of revisionism, the rising power of other political figures, and the criticism from intellectuals all contributed to Mao's final decision to launch this political campaign. The movement itself caused turmoil in the education system not only because it disrupted schooling for millions of youths, but also because the impact of the "send down" policy and changes in children's literature would linger for decades. Despite the apparent increase in national economic performance, the quality of civilian lives drastically decreased during this period due to the reduction in resources allocated for producing consumer goods. Some scholars argued that there were positive outcomes from the Cultural Revolution, mainly because the rural reforms that happened later were developed by scholars who experienced the harshness of rural life.[50] However, these positive outcomes came at the cost of countless lives – intellectuals and officials among them – and many other victims who endured pain and suffering. The economy was about to collapse, making it more difficult for Chinese citizens to mentally and financially recover from this traumatic period in history. The nation may heal over time, but it cannot be denied that the Cultural revolution left a scar on the history of China and can be remembered as one of the most devastating political movements ever recorded.

[47]Dernberger, 1058.
[48]Chang, Yang, and Chang, 387.
[49]Chang, Yang, and Chang, 387.
[50]Zhou and Hou, 33.

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THE ACID ASPECT: PSYCHEDELIC DRUGS AND COUNTERCULTURE IN THE SIXTIES

ALEXANDER MACDOUGALL

'The Acid Aspect' is an exploration of psychedelic drug use as exemplifying a significant focal point of sixties counterculture. Psychedelic drug use vivified countercultural ideals, inspired a reanalysis of contemporary American idealism, formed a reimagining of religious beliefs, and fundamentally altered popular music of the decade. To achieve these conclusions, this paper is divided into four major analyses that focus on: contemporary attitudes and opinions, 'psychedelic-Americanism,' psychedelic influences on Western theology, and the effects of psychedelics on popular music as codifying the experience of sixties counterculture.

Whether by the esoteric prophesizing of the Delphic oracles or the incoherent ramblings of a tipsy patron outside The Roxy, intoxication has proven itself to be a mainstay of civilizations throughout history. During the 1960's, psychedelic drug use became synonymous with counterculture's flagship stereotype: the hippie. The use of hallucinatory drugs meant laziness, apathy, and a misunderstanding or rejection of contemporary Western society in the eyes of many. Alternatively, sixties counterculture largely embraced psychedelics as a vessel for protest, spiritual liberation, and political freedom. Psychedelic drugs became a significant focal point within sixties counterculture, vivifying countercultural ideologies, inspiring a reanalysis of contemporary American idealism, a reimagining of religious beliefs, and fundamentally altering popular music of the late sixties. Four analyses will be made to support the theory that psychedelics were critical to several aspects of counterculture. First, the attitudes of preceding generations, counterculture's more militant elements, and proponents of psychedelia will be explored. Then, parallels drawn between historical American idealism and hallucinogenic drug use will be examined. Furthermore, the reimagining of Western religion as inspired by psychedelia and Eastern theologies (a blanket term popularly used amongst authors of countercultural literature that typically refers to

specific or amalgamated Taoist, Buddhist, and Hindu beliefs) will be assessed. Finally, an exploration of psychedelic drug use and its effects on popular music will conclude this paper, demonstrating a sonic aspect to counterculture and deduced via an analysis of Jimi Hendrix. This essay will illuminate the significance of psychedelia within counterculture, explaining how it was both central and complementary to political, spiritual, and artistic movements.

For many within the broad counterculture of the 1960's, psychedelic drug use entailed its own form of protest, enhancing contemporary social theories. While discussing the use of LSD by members of the Weathermen, a militant offshoot of the University of Michigan activist organization Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), journalists Bruce Shlain and Martin Lee claimed, "LSD does not make people more or less political… it reinforces and magnifies what's already in their heads."[1] It stands to reason that this logic may apply to sixties counterculture overall. The rejection of constraining fifties culture had perhaps become more vivid to those who ingested hallucinogenic drugs. As Shlain and Lee suggested regarding the Weathermen, members of the Black Panthers supposed drugs like LSD, marijuana, and mescaline to be "instrumental in developing the revolutionary consciousness of the people."[2] Notions of psychedelia inspiring a revolutionary mentality must have certainly drawn ire from America's more conformational segments of society, especially racist whites standing in opposition to the Black Panthers. Such resistance would only give further justification for their use by those associated with counterculture.

The idea that psychedelics reinforced the counterculture of the sixties may also be found in its denunciation by generations preceding the baby boomers, "proving to the counterculture that dope use must be ethical."[3] For sixties youth, the use of drugs was its own form of protesting the plainly visible moral faults of contemporary American society. Largely perceived as complacent in institutional racism, global conflict, and the continuation of strictly defined gender roles, youth of the era held a dim view of their parent's generation. Shifting attitudes toward psychedelic drugs by early promoters of their use may have also enflamed the counterculture's drive for alternative notions of society and reality. While testifying before a congressional committee on the topic of psychedelic legality, Sidney Cohen, who conducted initially positive clinical research on LSD in 1960 but later redacted his pro-psychedelic position in 1962 over his concerns with non-medicinal

[1]Chris Elcock, "The Fifth Freedom: The Politics of Psychedelic Patriotism," *Journal for the Study of Radicalism* 9, no. 2 (2015): 23.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Russell Duncan, "The Summer of Love and Protest: Transatlantic Counterculture in the 1960s," in *The Transatlantic Sixties: Europe and the United States in the Counterculture Decade,* ed. Grzegorz Kosc et al. (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2013), 164.

use and patient harm,[4] described an issue "more alarming than death in a way… the loss of all cultural values… these people [hippies]… lead a valueless life… they are decultured, lost to society, lost to themselves."[5] Despite a tone of marked negativity towards counterculture, Cohen's diatribe paradoxically explains the root of counterculture: that intense scrutiny or outright rejection of contemporary values, culture, and society were central to radical change. Counterculture's embracing of psychedelia in the face of growing resistance, from prior generations and prior proponents alike, would ultimately form a libertarian-esque political movement that emphasized American idealism.

Featuring "pronounced ideological overtones,"[6] psychedelic-Americanism can be found in both the reactions of counterculture towards the dawning illegality of their use, and in the hallucinations of those experiencing a 'trip.' Parapsychologist Stanley Krippner described his first psilocybin experience as a journey throughout the geographic and temporal New World, interacting with figures like Thomas Jefferson, Edgar Allan Poe, Abraham Lincoln, and John F. Kennedy.[7] While writer Chris Elcock tentatively ascribed Krippner's experience to derive from "national myths… firmly rooted in the American psyche,"[8] the parapsychologist's experience was perhaps forged out of a subconscious reimagining of contemporary political events; namely, the assassination of J.F.K. This interpretation stands in line with prior assertions of psychedelics as magnifiers or reinforcers of what is already known to the user.[9] Whatever the true psychological origin of Krippner's experience was, his profoundly American hallucination purports a degree of Americanism within the contemporary psychedelic experience.

While proponents such as Timothy Leary "became the symbol[s]… of separation from so-called American values,"[10] hippie counterculture and Western individualism overlapped in some ways. One such overlap is found in the paralleling of the cowboy and hippie archetypes. Paradoxically, hippies would embrace aspects of the Western gunslinger. While the cowboy might represent "imperialism, cultural genocide, and other unsavory aspects of westward expansion"[11] in American History, hippies drew on the *mythological* cowboy to

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[4]Steven J. Novak, "LSD before Leary: Sidney Cohen's Critique of 1950s Psychedelic Drug Research," *Isis* 88, no. 1 (1997): 87.
[5]Morgan Shipley, "'A Necessary but Not Sufficient Condition': Psychedelic Mysticism, Perennial Liminality, and the Limits of Supernatural Theism," *Preternature: Critical and Historical Studies on the Preternatural* 3, no. 2 (2014): 373.
[6]Fred Davis and Laura Munoz, "Heads and Freaks: Patterns and Meanings of Drug Use Among Hippies," *Journal of Health and Social Behavior* 9, no. 2 (1968): 157.
[7]Elcock, 20.
[8]Ibid, 21.
[9]Ibid, 23.
[10]Elcock, 21.
[11]Michael Allen, "I Just Want to Be a Cosmic Cowboy: Hippies, Cowboy Code, and the Culture of a Counterculture," *Western Historical Quarterly* 36, no. 3 (2005): 279.

highlight counterculture's fundamentally Americanist foundation. Both characterizations emphasized freedom, self-sufficiency, and the expansion of American society into a new realm. Hippie culture also found common ground with the cowboy by sharing a "near-Jeffersonian vision of an agrarian republic,"[12] reflected by the numerous countercultural communes that sprouted up throughout the United States in the sixties and seventies. One such commune, The Farm, now located in tiny Summertown, Tennessee, was formed around the lofty principles of love, altruism, and communalism, and, as the commune's founders perceived, cities were incapable of maintaining spaces suitable for these values.[13] It is not too outlandish to perceive some similarities between this drive to escape the seemingly indifferent social principles of the city and the Thirteen Colonies' own will to escape the restrictive hand of London. Just as the burgeoning American republic sought the acquisition of rich farmland west of the Appalachians, so to did the hippie seek the acquisition of an agrarian space that could satiate her appetite, literally and spiritually.

Aside from comparable historical stereotypes, legal arguments in favor of psychedelics were made during the 1960's that harkened to the United State's founding principles. Art Kleps employed a reimagining of American History to furnish legal arguments in support of the use of mind-altering drugs in a religious setting. In 1966, Kleps would testify to the United States Senate about rising psychedelic drug use by college students, largely supporting this trend himself. Kleps would describe imagery of the Revolutionary War before the Senate, declaring hopeful wishes for a "return to that fierce defense of human rights, to that spirit of freedom and tolerance under which [the United States] was founded."[14] Kleps' notions of early American 'freedom' and 'tolerance' are certainly exaggerations of America's true social circumstances following the Revolutionary War's conclusion. Despite this, his reference to a nationally defining moment in American History gives credence to a counterculture ideology that stems from the comparison of historical American ideals to those of contemporary events.

Symbolic imagery of cowboys and continental marines was not the only reimaging of American society undertaken by psychedelic counterculture, as a certain zealot of psychedelia presented the framework for a mind-altering religion. Purporting "new answers to the ultimate secrets of the universe,"[15] Timothy Leary would become adored by his devotees in much the way Jesus, Mohammad or Gotama were revered by their early disciples.[16] Religious allusions within Leary's psychedelic

[12]Ibid.
[13]Morgan Shipley, "Hippies and the Mystic Way: Dropping Out, Unitive Experience, and Communal Utopianism," *Utopian Studies* 24, no. 2 (2013): 255.
[14]Devin R. Lander, "Start Your Own Religion: New York's Acid Churches," *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 14, no. 3 (2011): 71.
[15]Lander, 73.
[16]Ibid, 70.

doctrine can be found throughout his *Politics of Ecstasy*. While the analysis of psychological studies purporting 'religious' experiences while intoxicated by psychedelics[17] may speak directly to notions of spiritual-psychedelia, Leary's "seven basic spiritual questions"[18] highlights his counter-Christian approach. When compared to the Bible's Ten Commandments, Leary's seven questions appear diametrically opposed to Christian scripture. Whereas The Ten Commandments declare absolute truth and simple guidelines about how to approach God and social existence, the seven spiritual questions offer no answers. Leary can thus be seen to eschew the traditions of conformity and immaterial assurances that were typically associated with twentieth century Christianity and turn instead to provocative thinking and inward spiritual exploration. Each question hints at answers that may be found within separate disciplines of science, "continually being answered and answered,"[19] akin to Eastern tenets of reincarnation.

A focus on Eastern mysticism can be found throughout much of hippie counterculture. Writer Aldous Huxley proposed that his first use of mescaline had propelled him "directly into the realms of Eastern enlightenment,"[20] far from Christian theology's monotheism.[21] Huxley's intermingling of Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism and Christian theologies, expressed throughout his *The Perennial Philosophy,* likely helped magnify his psychedelic experience's mystical nature. Alternatively, LSD inventor Albert Hofmann stated that his experience with LSD "illuminated the very words of Jesus recorded in John 14:20… I am in my Father, and yet in me, and I in you."[22] While LSD offered Hofmann greater insight into his Christian beliefs, it also pushed him to scrutinize the church as an institution.[23] Though perhaps not an explicit proponent of counterculture in the same vein as Timothy Leary, Hofmann's personal revolution against church-led Christianity speaks to the ability of drugs like LSD to inspire a rejection or intense scrutiny of well-established institutions. Much like the cowboy, the church represented a fundamental ethos that the counterculture could agree upon. Rather than seek to destroy such institutions, the counterculture simply upended what was deemed incorrect or perverted with psychedelically inspired Eastern revisionism and Christian reanalysis.

Concurrent to psychedelically inspired spiritual reassessment was the embracing of psychedelically inspired music. Although early sixties folk music would inspire

[17]Timothy Leary, *The Politics of Ecstasy* (Berkeley: Ronin Publishing, 1980), 17.
[18]Ibid, 19.
[19]Ibid, 20.
[20]Robert C. Fuller, "Drugs and the Baby Boomers' Quest for Metaphysical Illumination," *Nova Religio: The Journal of Alternative and Emergent Religions* 3, no. 1 (1999): 104.
[21]Ibid.
[22]Ibid.
[23]Ibid.

many social messages associated with the 1967 Summer of Love,[24] the advent of psychedelic rock (psyche-rock or progressive rock) did not occur until later in the sixties, concurrent with the increasing popularity of psychedelics.[25] One has only to look at the progressively vivid and extravagant album covers of bands like The Rolling Stones or The Beatles to note an escalating marketability of psychedelic imagery and audio as the decade progressed. The popularity surrounding this combination of hallucinogens and music may have been aided by the dawn of televised performances and world tours by the likes of Elvis or – again – The Beatles. Television brought concerts into households across the United States and larger concerts, that now had global reach thanks to commercial air travel, demanded a greater volume of sound. Essentially, music had become more widely marketable and visceral in its presentation, undergoing its own technologically induced transformation. Pushed to its psychedelic extreme by acts such as Pink Floyd, "the worldwide trend toward concerts as perception-altering experiences had begun."[26] Following concurrent advancements in television, amplification, and affordable air travel, the use of psychedelic drugs turned the concert dial to eleven.

As one prime example of contemporary visual and auditory experience, Jimi Hendrix highlights the dawn of electrified psychedelia. While bands such as The Beatles or Rolling Stones may have simply shifted their artistic stylings to suit ongoing social change, Jimi Hendrix stands out as an artist whose dress, sound, and lyrical content fully represents the sixties psychedelic and countercultural stereotypes from beginning to end. Writer Sheila Whiteley's exploration of Hendrix's overtly psychedelic song "Purple Haze" notes prevailing psychedelia not just in the song's lyrical content, but in the sonic composition of the song as well. In her own words, "the sheer volume of noise works towards the drowning of personal consciousness…the guitar…*tripping* around the basic notes."[27] In many ways, the imperfect *tripping* of notes or unbearably loud volume of Purple Haze plays into a concept of anti-music, with a focus on dissonance and noise rather than harmony and tempered dynamics. Hendrix's take on "The Star-Spangled Banner" may be his most clairvoyant deconstruction of American culture, pervading the national anthem with a series of electrified eruptions that some might equate to noise rather than music. Even his decision to play a right-handed guitar upside down rather than purchase a left-handed guitar might reinforce notions of "turning upside down the conventional world."[28] Sonically inspired by psychedelia, Jimi Hendrix would embrace a reimagining of what constituted music, reflecting

[24]Briand D. Ott and Lionel S. Joseph, "Mysticism, Technology, and the Music of the Summer of Love," *Generations: Journal of the American Society on Aging* 41, no. 2 (2017): 29.
[25]Ben Sessa, "From Sacred Plants to Psychotherapy: The History and Re-Emergence of Psychedelics in Medicine," *European Neuropsychopharmacology* 17, supplement 4 (2007): 215.
[26]Ott and Joseph, 28.
[27]Sheila Whiteley, "Progressive Rock and Psychedelic Coding in the Work of Jimi Hendrix," *Popular Music* 9, no. 1, (1990): 45.
[28]Ibid, 52.

contemporary counterculture's broader reimagining of society and culture. Although musical genres of the twentieth century evolved nearly per-decade, none of these evolutions were influenced so markedly by drugs and anti-establishment ideology. The influence of psychedelia on counterculture had been permanently etched into the less tangible language of music.

Popularized by youth resistance, psycho-gurus, and revolutionary music, psychedelics played a critical role in sixties counterculture. Stringent opposition by generations preceding the baby boomers added the allure of rebellion to their use, while their pronounced introspective effects made existing countercultural opinions stronger. These opinions were further compounded through the reimagining of Western spiritualism by thinkers such as Timothy Leary and Albert Hofmann, who scrutinized Christianity while instigating a marriage between psychedelia and Eastern theologies. The visual and auditory culmination of psychedelically influenced counterculture is then broadly apparent in the late sixties' popularization of psychedelic rock, whose leading artist was arguably Jimi Hendrix. Based on my personal experience, psychedelic drug use can be conducive of intense inner reflection and environmental examination. With a deep re-examination of American society during the sixties, the self-reflective effects of psychedelic drugs coincided almost perfectly with the ere of radical change sought by counterculture. Psychedelic drugs and the sixties counterculture proved to be an historical match made in heaven, whose anthem was choired by psychonautic angels adorned with electric guitars.

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MYOPIC DEVELOPMENT: A PROXIED CRITIQUE OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC THEORY THROUGH THE ENVIRONMENTAL KUZNETS CURVE

SOPHIA HABEDUS

How did the devastating decline of environmental conditions evade the econometric instrumentation used to measure trade and development viability? At the foundation of global trade institutions is econometric instrumentation informed by neoliberal economic theory. The extraction and allocation of global resources is profoundly impacted by the manner in which trade and development is valued by said measurement apparatus. The stringent models of neoliberal economic theory are structurally insufficient at evaluating the true costs of trade and development because important environmental and social dimensions are omitted from their equation. The Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is an example of a neoliberal econometric measure that structurally fails to assess important environmental implications of development. The EKC is used as scientific rationalization for economic growth in the face of environmental concern, as it appears to show that environmental degradation in a country will eventually resolve itself with further development. Despite its major shortcomings, the EKC is still implemented in international trade institutions. The EKC is a meaningful proxy for how the politically sterile neoliberal econometrics of international organizations and the global political economy have contributed to the current climate crisis. The EKC's scientific myopia is first examined through the liberal lens, then the Marxist lens, and finally through the Mercantilist lens of international political economy.

The 2022 International Panel of Climate Change (IPCC) climate report,[1] offered its gravest warning yet of imminent global climate catastrophe. The ineptitude of the economic and political institutions that have ushered in the climate crisis prompt

[1]"IPCC, 2022: Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change," ed. H.-O. Pörtner et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 8.

the question of how we drove ourselves here. Albeit, the causes of climate change are plentiful and complex. However, the underlying ideology of neoliberalism has underpinned institutional direction on the key matters of trade and economic development since the postwar period. Neoliberalism is characterized by policies that foster market-based solutions, trade liberalization, and deregulation in the name of its ultimate goal of economic growth. On an international scale, neoliberalism was multilaterally institutionalized early in the postwar period through the Keystone International Economic Organizations (KIEOs); namely, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) - now the World Trade Organization (WTO).

At the heart of neoliberal policy lies simplified econometric modeling that claim to safeguard the institutions from political will and therefore from corruption.[2] Ironically, some of the key econometrics used in KIEOs are structurally corrupt by providing sinister "scientific" substantiation for exploitative policy, and providing dangerously misleading conclusions about the true cost of economic growth.

Economic expansion has profound implications on public, social, and environmental health; none of which are inherently accounted for in neoliberal econometric modeling. Thus, the multifaceted cost of economic expansion through international trade and development cannot be accurately gauged by neoliberalistic econometric instrumentation. In this paper, weaknesses in the neoliberal economic theory of trade will be critically examined using the proxy econometric model known as the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC).[3] Specifically, an analysis of the EKC will be made; first through the liberal lens, then the Marxist lens, and finally the mercantilist lens of international political economy.

When the discipline of economics was distilled into a sterile science from its nuanced parent field of political economy, simplified analytical econometric instrumentation left behind important ethical dimensions of humanity and environmental stewardship. To contextualize this discussion in the grander critique of market based economic theory, it is helpful to understand the EKC's econometric and political parallels to the original Kuznets curve. In 1955, the economist Simon Kuznets used econometric analysis to plot a curve that came to be known as the "Kuznets curve". This curve claimed an inverse-U association of per capita income with income inequality. Simply: as per capita income in a country grows, income inequality is at first exacerbated and then eventually resolved.[4] This finding was a seemingly scientifically-irrefutable counterargument for KIEOs facing Marxian critique of the stratifying consequences of economic development. Kuznets himself

[2]Robert Gilpin, *Global Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 315.
[3]Alan B. Krueger and Gene M. Grossman, "Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement," (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1990), 35.
[4]Simon Kuznets, "Economic Growth and Income Inequality," *The American Economic Review* 45, no. 1 (1955): 1-28.

acknowledged the applicable limits of his original hypothesis to the real world of economic policy. He warned that his hypothesis was a fragile function, as it had appeared across a precarious sample of data from "an extremely limited period of time" and "exceptional historical experiences",[5] and even went so far as to add in the concluding paragraph of his original publication that his hypothesis was "95 percent speculation, some of it possibly tainted by wishful thinking."[6] Despite his cautionary notes, Kuznets' hypothesis was converted into scientific instrumentation and elevated to applicable use by KIEOs that govern international trade policy, like the World Bank.[7] The original Kuznets curve hypothesis has since been tested across a myriad of data sets, with unrelenting scholarly contention regarding its viability. The same controversy applies to Kreuger & Grossman's "Environmental Kuznets Curve", which instead plots environmental degradation as an inverted-U function of Gross Domestic Product (GDP).[8] The EKC model serves as a meaningful proxy of how some neoliberal econometrics are ill-placed in the institutions that govern the international political economy to assess the environmental viability of trade.

Interestingly, the liberal argument that international trade has an overall positive impact on environmental degradation has valid points. Liberal theory points out that liberalized trade unleashes market forces that pressure international trade partners into exporting goods that they have a comparative advantage in[9] – a scenario known as the "Hecksher-Ohlin (H-O) model".[10] Under H-O conditions, international trade can be modelled as a positive-sum game, yielding the liberal ideal of aggregate gain. Liberal theory recognizes that a market-optimized allocation of production reduces aggregate waste, increases per capita income, and pressures states away from pollution-heavy economies in the long run.[11] Liberal theorists would also point out that export-driven economic growth has a robust positive correlation with increased national income, and wealth tends to have a ripple effect in the economy. Wealthier households alleviate environmental strain by their tendency to have less children, to demand better living conditions, and to eventually contribute to an economy that moves away from heavily polluting industries in the long run.[12]

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[5]Robert W Fogel, "Some Notes on the Scientific Methods of Simon Kuznets," (NBER Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic Research, December 1987), 27.
[6]Kuznets, 26.
[7]Fogel, 26.
[8]Krueger and Grossman, 36.
[9]John Ravenhill, "The Study of Global Political Economy," in *Global Political Economy*, ed. John Ravenhill, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 9.
[10]Eli Filip Hecksher, Bertil Ohlin, and M. Flanders, *Hecksher-Ohlin Trade Theory* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), 222.
[11]Peter Dauvergne, "The Political Economy of the Environment," in *Global Political Economy*, ed. John Ravenhill, 6th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), 395.
[12]Dauvergne, 395.

Additionally, liberalized trade also allows for the Global North's (GN) more rigorous environmental regulations to exert market pressure on trading partners in the Global South (GS), and thereby triggering a race to the top effect,[13] fueling international demand for the GN's "green" technologies along with it. Liberal economic theory models this argument through market-based econometrics, such as the EKC. The narrative told by the EKC poses as potent substantiation in favor of adopting liberalized trade as an effective policy response to environmental degradation. Liberal theory would argue that trade is ultimately good for environmental conditions, as the EKC models increasing national income as a causal factor in the long-term improvement of environmental degradation metrics.[14]

The Marxist lens of the international political economy would point out the environmental consequences of liberalized trade. Specifically, liberalized trade claims to bring more accurate pricing of goods in regard to their international scarcity, but the Marxian lens would reveal that market-based price equilibrium does not account for the full environmental and social cost of the production of those goods. For example, consumers of fast fashion in the US do not face the environmental consequences of their purchases firsthand. The garments are produced in a low-income country where untreated textile dye wastewater is often discharged into waterways due to environmental policy being relatively deregulated. Once the garments have completed their consumer cycle in the US, many are compressed and shipped back to low-income countries for discard; where they often clog waterways, greenways, and parks.[15] Because American consumers do not face these consequences firsthand, they have relatively little rational incentive to adjust their demand for fast fashion garments. Where the liberal lens would see optimized production efficiency, through the low-income country specializing in pollution-heavy textile production, the Marxist lens illuminates the disparity in the distribution of the gains of this efficiency; with negative environmental externalities being disproportionately allocated to economically vulnerable countries through the H-O model.

Because the Marxian lens recognizes that the depletion of public goods disproportionately affects marginalized groups, it is a useful tool in the examination of where the EKC fails to represent the inequalities of environmental consequences of trade. The EKC does not tell a comprehensive story about the impact of trade-induced national income and environmental degradation. The inverse-U function only seems to appear for short-term, localized degradation factors such as sulfur

[13]Jorge Rivera and Chang Hoon Oh, "Environmental Regulations and Multinational Corporations' Foreign Market Entry Investments: Environmental Regulation and Foreign Entry," *Policy Studies Journal* 41, no. 2 (2013): 244.
[14]Krueger and Grossman, 35.
[15]Rachel Bick, Erika Halsey, and Christine C. Ekenga, "The Global Environmental Injustice of Fast Fashion," *Environmental Health* 17, no. 1 (2018): 2.

dioxide and fecal coliforms. Environmental indicators with long-term, cumulative, and international elements increased uniformly with income growth; such as resource stock depletion, waste stock, and CO2 emissions.[16] Alexandra Leitao showed that political corruption was an influencing factor on the EKC's prediction ~~on~~ when environmental conditions would start to improve. Specifically, the presence of corruption was positively associated with worse environmental degradation metrics than less corrupt nations.[17] A Marxian would render these findings as evidence that the centralization of power over the allocation of resources bears consequences for all.

There is much more to be observed about the effects of liberalized trade on environmental degradation. The mercantilist lens critically measures the consequences of a country's trade policy in regard to its sovereignty, relative gain, and acceptance of negative externalities. The mercantilist lens examines the dimensions of a country's economic, political and regulatory sovereignty in the context of international trade. Through this approach, trade is viewed as a zero-sum game: one country's gain is inherently another country's loss. Thus, there is always an exploited party in trade deals. Regarding the dimension of environmental degradation in trade exchanges, a mercantilist would be mostly concerned with losing their regulatory sovereignty, and the avoidance of becoming environmentally leverageable under the political or economic pressure of other countries. The mercantilist lens sheds light on the environmental consequences of international trade that are parallel and proportionate to the gains.

This mercantilist hypothesis aligns with the narrative of the H-O theory of production specialization: some countries will be coerced by market forces to produce goods like natural resources if that is relatively plentiful.[18] Of course, it is arguable that the mercantilist interpretation of the H-O theory is that countries with relatively less capital are defenseless to market forces that will push them into hosting heavily polluting industries. A "race to the bottom" effect[19] would be forecasted by mercantilism as a result of entering international markets. For low-income countries with relatively little economic leverage, the "bottom" is deregulated environmental policy. More formally, regulatory chill is a phenomenon where a state is stunted in their agency to enact domestic regulation because of international trade pressure or obligations. If countries both specialize under the H-O model, they become interdependent and therefore sacrifice a measure of their sovereignty. This zero-sum game dynamic reduces a country's agency to enact protectionist policies in a situation where domestic environmental matters are

[16]Kenneth Arrow et al. "Economic Growth, Carrying Capacity, and the Environment," *Ecological Applications* 6, no. 1 (1996): 13.
[17]Alexandra Leitao, "Corruption and the Environmental Kuznets Curve: Empirical Evidence for Sulfur," *Ecological Economics* 69, no. 11 (2010): 2199.
[18]Hecksher and Ohlin, 222.
[19]Rivera and Oh, 243.

negatively affected by interdependent trade. Because of these market forces, many low-income countries are pressured to become "pollution havens",[20] effectively an environmental entrance fee to access the potential gains of international trade. The market forces that have contributed to the unfairness of this deal seem to spell a perpetuity of environmental exploitation of low-income countries by the hegemons of the GN. However, because of the poorly informed econometrics of the neoliberal GN and its KIEOs, economic growth is deemed as worth the cost of being a pollution haven.

The romantic neoliberal narrative of the EKC is that environmental degradation is eventually mitigated through innovation produced by a growing economy. However, through the mercantilist lens, the EKC's hypothesized decrease of trade-induced environmental degradation represents a zero-sum game of exporting heavily polluting industries to low-income countries. The H-O model would state that the less developed nation will have a comparative advantage in environmentally exploitative production. With each new low-income country to shoulder the environmental cost of trade, the EKC starts again for the domestic metrics of that country. The EKC fails to represent the long-term global scenario of what happens when there are no more countries to coercively export the pollution to. The EKC also does not represent the degradation of environmental factors that are not domestically limited,[21] nor the long-term consequences of accumulated waste, or the arrival at the carrying capacity of the Earth for degradation.[22] The mercantilist lens would also point out increasing GDP from trade liberalization inherently renders a country dependent on liberalized trade for the maintenance and growth of their GDP. Not only that, but as wealth grows, so do the CO2 emissions of that country. Scale effects[23] entail that as a country's income grows on account of trade, so does their propensity to consume; therefore eroding sovereignty gradually through the passive establishment of dependence on trade. Because of the proportionate loss of environmental regulatory sovereignty with the national wealth gained from liberalized trade, mercantilist theory would caution faith in the narrative of the EKC.

Thus, the misleading insights from the EKC do not accurately reflect the full impact that trade-induced economic growth has on environmental degradation. Policy that undiscerningly legislates around the claims of the EKC hypothesis would produce

[20]Monica Singhania and Neha Saini, "Demystifying Pollution Haven Hypothesis: Role of FDI," *Journal of Business Research* 123 (2021): 516.
[21]M. A. Cole, A. J. Rayner, and J. M. Bates, "The Environmental Kuznets Curve: An Empirical Analysis," *Environment and Development Economics* 2, no. 4 (1997): 409.
[22]Arrow, et al., 14.
[23]Aaron Cosbey, "The Trade, Investment, and Environmental Interface", in *Trade and Environment: Difficult Policy Choices at the Interface*, ed. Shahrukh Rafi Khan (London: Zed, 2002), 9.

market forces that fail to account for long-term, international, and delayed consequences of environmental degradation.

The EKC, like many neoliberal econometric instruments, perilously places faith in market forces that do not structurally integrate the stratified externalities of delayed environmental degradation, declining social conditions, or the insidious global climate cost of chronic unequal consumption. The dangerously misleading but still widely implemented EKC hypothesis acts as a proxy for insight as to why the neoliberal econometric apparatus that govern international trade institutions often structurally fail to remedy the environmental consequences of trade. One group of economists summarized the impossibly simple but paradoxically complex economic apparatus issue that has led us past Earth's environmental carrying capacity. They observed during their analysis of the EKC that the broader market "signals" to correct environmentally damaging economic activity are simply "not part of the incentive structure of societies."[24]

[24]Arrow et al., 15.

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FACTORS IN THE DEVELOPMENT AND ASCENSION OF THE NEW PERSIAN LANGUAGE

GRAEME MCDONALD

The Muslim conquests of the 7th century spread not only religion but language to the places they subjugated. In most regions, Arabic became the vernacular, pushing local languages into the background, but this was not true for Persia and Central Asia. There, a colloquial form of Sassanian Persian would be transformed into a refined literary and cultural language preferred by an emerging Islamic Persianate world. This paper explores the factors that made this unique occurrence possible. Practiced in the art of cultural blending, the eastern provinces were home to patrons who still felt a connection to ancient Iran. These local lords commissioned literary works which encouraged a cultural and political spirit independent of the caliph, and the literary achievements of the poets and writers of their courts proved what was possible in the new medium, securing New Persian's place as the lingua franca of the east.

As the Muslim conquests engulfed the Middle East, North Africa, and Western Asia, they swept away many ancient traditions and languages of the people they conquered. Most regions saw their native tongues replaced by vernacular Arabic or reduced to niche usage, but this was not the case in Persia and Central Asia. Rather than Arabic dominating cultural life, a colloquial dialect of the Sassanian empire evolved into a refined language that became the *lingua franca* of an emerging blended culture. The rise of this new literary language was enabled by the high level of continuity in the region's culture, along with its adaptive characteristics; the patrons who supported the project, seeking prestige and political cohesion; and the efforts of the individual creators, whose mastery of the language elevated it to preeminence.

The lands that gave rise to New Persian had a long history of adaptation to foreign imperial cultures. By the time of the Muslim conquest, Persia and Central Asia had seen the ebbs and flows of the Achaemenids, Alexander of Macedon, the Parthians,

the Kushans, and the Sassanians, each time absorbing and managing their overlords adeptly.[1] The languages of the region, of the Iranian and Turkic families, had proven to be flexible in adopting foreign scripts and subsequently flourishing.[2] The region and its tongues were, by the time of the arrival of the Muslims, exceptionally well-practiced in the art of cultural blending.

This did not mean the Muslims would have an easy time subjugating the region, however. With raiding as the main objective, the initial incursions stoked resistance in the population, and when the Muslims did conquer the land and people, rebellions, particularly in the region of Sistan, were frequent.[3] Ultimately, it was decided that a military approach would never succeed, and the Umayyads opted for cooperation, offering diplomatic, religious, and economic concessions in the late 730s.[4] Local rulers found these offers quite agreeable.

The caliph was now the ultimate authority, and as the people of Persia and Central Asia converted to Islam, many of their old customs and folk traditions were replaced.[5] However, the legacy of the Sassanians lingered in important ways. The young caliphate, still lacking the resources and institutional memory to administer so much newly-acquired territory, adopted certain cultural institutions; the Sassanian hereditary class of scribes was employed in administration,[6] for example, and financial records were thus kept in Middle Persian until caliph 'Abd al-Malik's orders to switch to Arabic in 697.[7] Zoroastrian centers remained active as well, particularly in the provinces of Fars and Khurasan. Here, priest-scholars accumulated Middle Persian literary works and translated many into Arabic.[8]

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[1]Frederick S. Starr, *Lost Enlightenment: Central Asia's Golden Age from the Arab Conquest to Tamerlane* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013), 48-54.
[2]Ibid, 69-70.
[3]Ibid, 106-108.
[4]Ibid, 116-117.
[5]Francois de Blois, "Pre-Islamic Iranian and Indian Influences of Persian Literature," in *A History of Persian Literature, Vol. 1: General Introduction to Persian Literature*, ed. J. T. P. de Bruijn (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2009), 426-427.
[6]Victor Danner, "Arabic Literature in Iran," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4: From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs*, ed. R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 567.
[7]This was implemented gradually; in the easternmost territories, the switch took almost 100 years to happen; see Danner, 575-576.
[8]Notable among these translations are the *Khwaday-Namag,* or Book of Kings, which would later be developed into the *Shahnameh,* and *Hazar Afsan,* the Thousand Tales, which later formed the basis for the *One Thousand and One Nights*; see John R. Perry, "The Origin and Development of Literary Persian," in *A History of Persian Literature, Vol. 1: General Introduction to Persian Literature,"* ed. J. T. P. de Bruijn (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2009), 86; Gilbert Lazard, "The Rise of the New Persian Language," in *The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4: From the Arab Invasion to the Saljuqs,"* ed. R. N. Frye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 602.

Arabic was, over time, adopted as the *lingua franca* for administration, science, and, for now, literature.[9] However, unlike in all other parts of the caliphate,[10] it did not succeed in becoming the everyday spoken language.[11] Instead, the conquest spread a different language, a colloquial form of Middle Persian known as Dari, as Iranian populations joined the Muslim army sweeping eastward and settled across the land in greater numbers than Arab troops.[12] Dari, not the pre-existing literary Middle Persian, would become the basis for the emerging New Persian language. In the west, Zoroastrian scholars jealously kept Middle Persian to themselves, and Arabic's foothold was thus more secure; there was little room for a new literary language. In the east, however, these influences were faint. There, an entire class of local lords, the *dihqans*, still connected to ancient Iran, would be the ones to nurture New Persian.[13]

Central Asia, already ruled with a light touch, grew more independent with time. When caliph al-Ma'mun's appointed governor of Khurasan, Tahir (r. 821-822), asserted his own authority by omitting al-Ma'mun's name from Friday prayers, the caliph was politically unable to react.[14] Later, when a new popular revolt in Sistan gave rise to the Saffarids (861-1003),[15] they voluntarily operated under caliphal authority, but paid little attention to his wishes.[16] The Persian language's relevance grew along with these developments: the Tahirids (821-873) used Dari in court and were the first to request it be written using Arabic characters rather than the old Middle Persian script,[17] but they still preferred Arabic as their literary medium;[18] the Saffarids, by contrast, and by virtue of their local populist roots, were staunch defenders of the Persian language. When, to celebrate a military victory, a court poet presented the Saffarid emir with a panegyric in Arabic, the emir responded, "Why do you compose verses I do not understand?"[19] The poet, Muhammad ibn Vasif (d. 909), then recomposed the poem in the same Arabic form, but in Dari. The resulting work is among the first surviving examples of New Persian poetry.[20]

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[9]Lazard, 603.
[10]Perry, 82.
[11]Lazard, 602.
[12]Perry, 92; Lazard, 602
[13]Lazard, 609.
[14]Bertold Spuler, *Iran in the Early Islamic Period: Politics, Culture, Administration, and Public Life between the Arab and the Seljuk Conquests, 633-1055*, ed. Robert G. Hoyland, trans. Gwendolin Goldbloom and Berenike Walburg (Boston: Brill, 2015), 315.
[15]The revolt came to be led by a coppersmith named Yakub ibn Laith. *Saffar* is the Persian word for coppersmith, so the dynasty became known as the Saffarids; see Starr, 211-212.
[16]Spuler, 315.
[17]Ira M. Lapidus, *Islamic Societies to the Nineteenth Century: A Global History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 256.
[18]Danner, 582.
[19]Lazard, 595.
[20]Perry, 93; Lazard, 607.

Lyrical poetry, panegyric in the Arabic form of the *qasida*, was thus the origin of New Persian literature, and it developed as Arabic models mingled with an oral Iranian poetic tradition.[21] Court poets such as Ibn Vasif would have been as familiar with poetry in Dari as in Arabic, because though Arabic had at this point replaced Persian languages as the dominant literary medium, across Persia and Central Asia pre-Islamic poetry, performed orally in Dari, had remained steadfastly popular among the common people and the *dihqans*.[22] When court poets in the region began producing poetry in Arabic forms, which had a suitably noble quality for the purpose of praising their patrons, but using Dari, to cater to their patrons' affinity for local traditions, the stage was set for a new literary language to rise to preeminence.[23] Arabic would retain importance due to its status as the sacred language of Islam, strong influences from the Qur'an on emerging works and, later on, its value to Sufi writers,[24] but patrons now sought to commission works in Persian.

The Samanid dynasty (819-999) is considered the most important of these patrons. As their forebears had done with foreign imperial powers in the past, the Samanids saw the blend of Persian and Arabic cultures mature into a new coequal hybrid.[25] It was under Samanid supervision that Dari was expressed *primarily* using Arabic script, borrowing additionally many Arabic words and phrases;[26] this level of hybridization is New Persian's most distinguishing characteristic from its predecessors. At Samanid courts, interactions between Arabic and Persian literature encouraged developments in both,[27] and many Arabic texts were translated into New Persian, such as Tabari's *Tafsir*. The introduction to the translation of *Tafsir* sheds light on the political motivations for the promotion of the new language: by utilizing quotations from the Qur'an, asserting the ancientness of Persian, and questioning Arabic's position as the only medium of religious discussion, the translators challenge the 'Abbasids' claims to preeminence.[28] Through this, their translation and modification of Tabari's *Tarikh*,[29] and similar projects, the Samanids promoted an autonomous imperial consciousness.

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[21]Lapidus, 256; Lazard, 609-612.
[22]Ibid, 605.
[23]Ibid, 607-608.
[24]J. T. P. de Bruijn, "Arabic Influences of Persian Literature," in *A History of Persian Literature, Vol. 1: General Introduction to Persian Literature*, ed. J. T. P. de Bruijn (London: I. B. Tauris & Company, 2009), 470.
[25]Starr, 235.
[26]Hayrettin Yücesoy, "Language of Empire: Politics of Arabic and Persian in the Abbasid World," *PMLA* 130, no. 2 (March 2015): 384.
[27]For example, the *ghazal* was introduced to New Persian, new variations of it evolved, and these made their way back into the world of Arabic literature; see Starr, 234; de Bruijn, 472.
[28]Yücesoy, 389.
[29]Ibid, 390.

On a more individual level, rulers knew the practical importance of maintaining a stable of writers and poets: they were the primary source of publicity;[30] as the 12th-century writer Nizami Arudi of Samarkand put it, "a king cannot do without a good poet, who will make his name immortal and record his fame in verse and books."[31] Mahmud of Ghazna (r. 998-1030), while inheriting and furthering the Samanid literary project and securing the territorial position of the new Persianate world,[32] amassed a staggering number of poets following this logic. His methods in this significantly varied. At times acquisitive in his approach, he once wrote a letter to the emir of Khwarazm demanding that all the emir's scholars be sent to Ghazna.[33] The shah of Khwarazm attempted a compromise, so Mahmud took the realm, and its scholars, by force.[34] However, many more were attracted by the undeniable brilliance of his court, and as a result of his poets' promotional efforts, Mahmud's fame and status in the Persian literary tradition is legendary.[35] As well, in this environment, many scholars recognize the flowering of a second great period in New Persian literature, citing increased ornateness in poetry and literary style distinct from the Samanid period.[36]

One of Mahmud's poets, now thought to be the best of his time, was Farrukhi Sistani (c. 1000-1040).[37] His celebrations of nature and court life reached an impressive literary standard, and subsequent generations have kept alive more than nine thousand couplets from his collection, demonstrating his enduring popularity. Outliving Mahmud, the elegy he wrote his sultan is still considered one of the best in the Persian language.[38] The efforts of poets like Farukhi were centrally important to the elevation of the status of New Persian from mere vernacular to a marker of eloquence. Patrons created the conditions for this to happen, but the masters demonstrated what was possible in the new medium.

During the Samanid period, when New Persian was still an upstart, a poet from western Iran who wrote in Arabic sneered, "What has recently been created in Persian by way of poetry is only talk without meaning, without titles, and without usefulness."[39] However, an eastern contemporary of his, Rudaki (c. 858-940/41), known later as the father of Persian poetry, would establish the medium as true

[30]C. E. Bosworth, *The Ghaznavids: Their Empire in Afghanistan and Eastern Iran 994-1040* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1963), 133.
[31]Starr, 350.
[32]Hamid Dabashi, *The Shahnameh: The Persian Epic as World Literature* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), 11, 40.
[33]Among these scholars were such luminaries as Biruni and Ibn Sina. The latter opted to flee Khwarazm rather than be taken to Mahmud's court; see Starr, 284-285.
[34]Some have described Mahmud as "a great kidnapper of literary men"; see Bosworth, 132.
[35]Lazard, 620.
[36]Bosworth, 133-134.
[37]Lazard, 620.
[38]Starr, 353.
[39]Lazard, 618.

literature. Earning fame as a teenager for his skill at singing he was invited to the Samanid court at Bukhara and became the official poet of Nasr II.[40] His heartfelt panegyrics avoided clichés, commonly evoked Zoroastrian imagery, and brilliantly enhanced the themes and forms he employed.[41] Though New Persian may still have had some detractors, many in Rudaki's own time fully appreciated the genius of his work and strove to follow his example.

The most famous piece of literature resulting from the early days of this new literary tradition, and one that arguably did the most to secure its exalted status, is the *Shahnameh* of Ferdowsi (c. 940-1019/1025). Born in a village near Tus, a Zoroastrian stronghold in Samanid Khurasan, he, as a young man, almost certainly assisted in Samanid efforts to compile the Middle Persian texts of the book of kings.[42] Translations to New Persian were completed around 957, and the renowned poet Daqiqi (c. 935-977) began the project of putting the epic to verse. Political turmoil and Daqiqi's death ended Samanid support for this project, but Ferdowsi, now in possession of all the materials, undertook the task of completing it.[43] Perhaps aware of Mahmud of Ghazna's appreciation for Persian culture, he secured Mahmud as his new patron and was able to present to him the completed *Shahnameh* after thirty years of toil. However, to the now-aged poet's dismay, the final product did not resonate with Mahmud.[44] Not finding the epic to his taste and unwilling to follow through on the enormous payment he had promised his client, Mahmud's final meeting with Ferdowsi concluded with the outraged poet leaving Ghazna with nothing. The events surrounding this tragic finale remain obscure and tinged with legend; one tradition has a guilty Mahmud at last sending the promised payment to Ferdowsi in Tus, but just as the camels approach the city gate, there emerges a funeral procession. Mahmud's caravan is too late.

Regardless of what Mahmud thought of the work itself, it is undeniable that the *Shahnameh* was a titanic undertaking. Seven times longer than the Iliad and with lines longer than Homer's by half,[45] it is the product of imperial heritage newly re-established, its path paved by the now-vibrant and rich traditions of poetry and prose in New Persian.[46] Ferdowsi, at least, knew the importance in his work, declaring that "Rustam was hitherto merely a warrior of Sistan; I have made him Rustam the son of Dastan."[47] As he carefully selected which of the scores of tales,

[40]Starr, 227.
[41]Lazard, 618.
[42]Starr, 216.
[43]Ibid, 217.
[44]"Ferdowsi, Abu'l-Qasem i. Life," *Encyclopaedia Iranica* online, last modified January 26, 2012, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ferdowsi-i; Starr, 354-356.
[45]Starr, 218.
[46]Dabashi, 42.
[47]Lazard, 627.

*dastan*s, and others,[48] to incorporate into his grand narrative, Ferdowsi established a new historical canon for Persia and Central Asia. Moreover, he endowed these tales with a breathtaking artistry that secured not only his own fame but the permanent place of this work and its characters in the cultural consciousness. The exceptional beauty and significance Ferdowsi bestowed on the epic of the *Shahnameh* went beyond the veneration of cultural legends: it brought them to life and, in doing so, created a masterpiece that enshrined the language of New Persian as *the* language of literature in the new Persianate world.

In an early section of the *Shahnameh*, a newborn prince, born an albino, is abandoned atop a mountain.[49] The baby's cries are heard by a nearby *simurgh,* a mythical bird analogous to a phoenix. Through God's mercy, the *Simurgh* cares for the baby as its own, and he survives. As an adult, this prince, the hero Zal, rejoins his old society and becomes the father of none other than Rustam, the greatest of the *Shahnameh*'s heroes. Like the *Simurgh* that rescued Zal, the eastern reaches of the caliphate protected and nurtured the Persian language, allowing it to rise from the ashes of conquest and take its place as the premier cultural language of the Persianate world. The unique position of Persia and Central Asia within the caliphate allowed for a balanced cultural exchange that was not found anywhere else in the realm. Rather than being overtaken by Arabic, the local vernacular was reborn as the primary literary medium in a form that is still familiar today. Three factors were instrumental in this process: the eastern provinces' high degree of cultural continuity and flexibility in the wake of the Muslim conquests, the efforts of local patrons to cultivate a new cultural consciousness, and the legendary artists who chose New Persian as their medium all ensured that over a millennium later, readers would still be enjoying works such as the *Shahnameh*.

[48]A *dastan* is a major storyline unit within the greater narrative of the *Shahnameh,* and is also the general term for "narrative" in Persian. Therefore, in the preceding quote, Ferdowsi is not referring to Rustam's father but describing the significance within Persianate culture and tradition to which his project elevated Rustam, and, by extension, the story as a whole; see "Fiction, i: Traditional Forms," *Encyclopaedia Iranica* online, last modified January 26, 2012, https://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fiction-i-traditional.
[49]Dabashi, 221.

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